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WHAT IS WRONG WITH SOCIAL THEORY? *

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My concern is limited to that form of social theory which stands or presumes to stand as a part of empirical science.[1]

The aim of theory in empirical science is to develop analytical schemes of the empirical world with which the given science is concerned. This is done by conceiving the world abstractly, that is in terms of classes of objects and of relations between such classes. Theoretical schemes are essentially proposals as to the nature of such classes and of their relations where this nature is problematic or unknown. Such proposals become guides to investigation to see whether they or their implications are true. Thus, theory exercises compelling influence on research—setting problems, staking out objects and leading inquiry into asserted relations. In turn, findings of fact test theories, and in suggesting new problems invite the formulation of new proposals. Theory, inquiry and empirical fact are interwoven in a texture of operation with theory guiding inquiry, inquiry seeking and isolating facts, and facts affecting theory. The fruitfulness of their interplay is the means by which an empirical science develops.

Compared with this brief sketch of theory in empirical science, social theory in general shows grave shortcomings. Its divorcement from the empirical world is glaring. To a preponderant extent it is compartmentalized into a world of its own, inside of which it feeds on itself. We usually localize it in separate courses and separate fields. For the most part it has its own literature. Its lifeline is primarily exegesis—a critical exami-

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* Paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, August, 1953.

[1] There are two other legitimate and important kinds of social theory which I do not propose to assess. One of them seeks to develop a meaningful interpretation of the social world or of some significant part of it. Its aim is not to form scientific propositions but to outline and define life situations so that people may have a clearer understanding of their world, its possibilities of development, and the directions along which it may move. In every society, particularly in a changing society, there is a need for meaningful clarification of basic social values, social institutions, modes of living and social relations. This need cannot be met by empirical science, even though some help may be gained from analysis made by empirical science. Its effective fulfillment requires a sensitivity to new dispositions and an appreciation of new lines along which social life may take shape. Most social theory of the past and a great deal in the present is wittingly or unwittingly of this interpretative type. This type of social theory is important and stands in its own right. — Riesman

A second type of theory might be termed "policy" theory. It is concerned with analyzing a given social situation, or social structure, or social action as a basis for policy or action. It might be an analysis of communist strategy and tactics, or of the conditions that sustain racial segregation in an American city, or of the power play in labor relations in mass production industry, or of the morale potential of an enemy country. Such theoretical analysis is not made in the interests of empirical science. Nor is it a mere application of scientific knowledge. Nor is it research inquiry in accordance with the canons of empirical science. The elements of its analysis and their relations have a nature given by the concrete situation and not by the methods or abstractions of empirical science. This form of social theorizing is of obvious importance.

nation of prior theoretical schemes, the compounding of portions of them into new arrangements, the translation of old ideas into a new vocabulary, and the occasional addition of a new notion as a result of reflection on other theories. It is remarkably susceptible to the importation of schemes from outside its own empirical field, as in the case of the organic analogy, the evolutionary doctrine, physicalism, the instinct doctrine, behaviorism, psychoanalysis, and the doctrine of the conditioned reflex. Further, when applied to the empirical world social theory is primarily an interpretation which orders the world into its mold, not a studious cultivation of empirical facts to see if the theory fits. In terms of both origin and use social theory seems in general not to be geared into its empirical world.

Next, social theory is conspicuously defective in its guidance of research inquiry. It is rarely couched in such form as to facilitate or allow directed investigation to see whether it or its implications are true. Thus, it is gravely restricted in setting research problems, in suggesting kinds of empirical data to be sought, and in connecting these data to one another. Its divorcement from research is as great as its divorcement from its empirical world.

Finally, it benefits little from the vast and ever growing accumulation of "facts" that come from empirical observation and research inquiry. While this may be due to an intrinsic uselessness of such facts for theoretic purposes, it also may be due to deficiency in theory.

These three lines of deficiency in social theory suggest that all that is needed is to correct improper preoccupations and bad working practices in theorizing. We hear repeatedly recommendations and injunctions to this effect. Get social theorists to reduce drastically their preoccupation with the literature of social theory and instead get in touch with the empirical social world. Let them renounce their practice of taking in each other's washing and instead work with empirical data. Let them develop their own conceptual capital through the cultivation of their own empirical field instead of importing spurious currency from alien realms. Get them to abandon the practice of merely interpreting things to fit their theories and instead test their theories. Above all, get them to cast their theory into forms which are testable. Have them orient their theory to the vast bodies of accumulated research findings and develop theory in the light of such findings.

These are nice injunctions to which all of us would subscribe. They do have a limited order of merit. But they neither isolate the problem of what is basically wrong with social theory nor do they provide means of correcting the difficulties. The problem continues to remain in the wake of studies made with due respect to the injunctions. There have been and there are many able and conscientious people in our field, alone, who have sought and are seeking to develop social theory through careful, sometimes meticulous preoccupation with empirical data—Robert E. Park, W. I. Thomas, Florian Znaniecki, Edwin Sutherland, Stuart Dodd, E. W. Burgess, Samuel Stouffer, Paul Lazarsfeld, Robert Merton, Louis Wirth, Robin Williams, Robert Bales and dozens of others who equally merit mention. All of these people are empirically minded. All have sought in their respective ways to guide research by theory and to assess their theoretical propositions in the light of empirical data. Practically all of them are familiar with the textbook canons of empirical research. We cannot correctly accuse such people of indifference to the empirical world, or of procedural naivete, or of professional incompetence. Yet their theories and their work are held suspect and found wanting, some theories by some, other theories by others. Indeed, the criticisms and counter-criticisms directed to their respective work are severe and box the compass. It is obvious that we have to probe deeper than the level of the above injunctions.

In my judgment the appropriate line of probing is with regard to the concept. Theory is of value in empirical science only to the extent to which it connects fruitfully with the empirical world. Concepts are the means, and the only means of establishing such connection, for it is the concept that points to the empirical instances about which a theoretical proposal is made. If the concept is clear as to what it refers, then sure identification of the empirical instances may be made. With their identification, they

can be studied carefully, used to test theoretical proposals and exploited for suggestions as to new proposals. Thus, with clear concepts theoretical statements can be brought into close and self-correcting relations with the empirical world. Contrariwise, vague concepts deter the identification of appropriate empirical instances, and obscure the detection of what is relevant in the empirical instances that are chosen. Thus, they block connection between theory and its empirical world and prevent their effective interplay.

A recognition of the crucial position of concepts in theory in empirical science does not mean that other matters are of no importance. Obviously, the significance of intellectual abilities in theorizing, such as originality and disciplined imagination, requires no highlighting. Similarly, techniques of study are of clear importance. Also, bodies of fact are necessary. Yet, profound and brilliant thought, an arsenal of the most precise and ingenious instruments, and an extensive array of facts are meaningless in empirical science without the empirical relevance, guidance and analytical order that can come only through concepts. Since in empirical science everything depends on how fruitfully and faithfully thinking intertwines with the empirical world of study, and since concepts are the gateway to that world, the effective functioning of concepts is a matter of decisive importance.

Now, it should be evident that concepts in social theory are distressingly vague. Representative terms like mores, social institutions, attitudes, social class, value, cultural norm, personality, reference group, social structure, primary group, social process, social system, urbanization, accommodation, differential discrimination and social control do not discriminate cleanly their empirical instances. At best they allow only rough identification, and in what is so roughly identified they do not permit a determination of what is covered by the concept and what is not. Definitions which are provided to such terms are usually no clearer than the concepts which they seek to define. Careful scrutinizing of our concepts forces one to recognize that they rest on vague sense and not on precise specification of attributes. We see this in our common experience in explaining concepts to our students or outsiders. Formal definitions are of little use. Instead, if we are good teachers we seek to give the sense of the concept by the use of a few apt illustrations. This initial sense, in time, becomes entrenched through the sheer experience of sharing in a common universe of discourse. Our concepts come to be taken for granted on the basis of such a sense. It is such a sense and not precise specifications that guides us in our discipline in transactions with our empirical world.

This ambiguous nature of concepts is the basic deficiency in social theory. It hinders us in coming to close grips with our empirical world, for we are not sure what to grip. Our uncertainty as to what we are referring obstructs us from asking pertinent questions and setting relevant problems for research. The vague sense dulls our perception and thus vitiates directed empirical observation. It subjects our reflection on possible relations between concepts to wide bands of error. It encourages our theorizing to revolve in a separate world of its own with only a tenuous connection with the empirical world. It limits severely the clarification and growth that concepts may derive from the findings of research. It leads to the undisciplined theorizing that is bad theorizing.

If the crucial deficiency of social theory, and for that matter of our discipline, is the ambiguous nature of our concepts, why not proceed to make our concepts clear and definite? This is the nub of the problem. The question is how to do this. The possible lines of answer can be reduced a lot by recognizing that a great deal of endeavor, otherwise conscientious and zealous, does not touch the problem. The clarification of concepts is not achieved by introducing a new vocabulary of terms or substituting new terms—the task is not one of lexicography. It is not achieved by extensive reflection on theories to show their logical weaknesses and pitfalls. It is not accomplished by forming or importing new theories. It is not achieved by inventing new technical instruments or by improving the reliability of old techniques—such instruments and techniques are neutral to the concepts on behalf of which they may be used. The clarification of concepts does not come from piling up

mountains of research findings. As just one illustration I would point to the hundreds of studies of attitudes and the thousands of items they have yielded; these thousands of items of finding have not contributed one iota of clarification to the concept of attitudes. By the same token, the mere extension of research in scope and direction does not offer in itself assurance of leading to clarification of concepts. These various lines of endeavor, as the results themselves seem abundantly to testify, do not meet the problem of the ambiguous concept.

The most serious attempts to grapple with this problem in our field take the form of developing fixed and specific procedures designed to isolate a stable and definitive empirical content, with this content constituting the definition or the reference of the concept. The better known of these attempts are the formation of operational definitions, the experimental construction of concepts, factoral analysis, the formation of deductive mathematical systems and, although slightly different, the construction of reliable quantitative indexes. Although these attempts vary as to the kind of specific procedure that is used, they are alike in that the procedure is designed to yield through repeated performances a stable and definitive finding. A definition of intelligence as being the intelligence quotient is a convenient illustration of what is common to these approaches. The intelligence quotient is a stable and discriminating finding that can be checked through a repetition of clearly specified procedures. Ignoring questions as to the differential merit and the differential level of penetration between these approaches, it would seem that in yielding a specific and discriminating content they are the answer to the problem of the ambiguous concept in social theory. Many hold that resolute employment of one or the other of these methods will yield definitive concepts with the consequence that theory can be applied decisively to the empirical world and tested effectively in research inquiry.

So far, the suitability of these precision endeavors to solving the problem of the ambiguous concept remains in the realm of claim and promise. They encounter three pronounced difficulties in striving to produce genuine concepts related to our empirical world.

First, insofar as the definitive empirical content that is isolated is regarded as constituting by itself the concept (as in the statement that, "X is the intelligence quotient") it is lacking in theoretic possibilities and cannot be regarded as yielding a genuine concept. It does not have the abstract character of a class with specifiable attributes. What is "intelligence quotient" as a class and what are its properties? While one can say that "intelligence quotient" is a class made up of a series of specific intelligence quotients, can one or does one point out common features of this series—features which, of course, would characterize the class? Until the specific instances of empirical content isolated by a given procedure are brought together in a class with common distinguishing features of content, no concept with theoretic character is formed. One cannot make proposals about the class or abstraction or relate it to other abstractions.

Second, insofar as the definitive empirical content that is isolated is regarded as qualifying something beyond itself (as in the statement that, "Intelligence is the intelligence quotient" wherein intelligence would now be conceived as including a variety of common sense references such as ability to solve business problems, plan campaigns, invent, exercise diplomatic ingenuity, etc.), the concept is constituted by this something which is beyond the definitive empirical content. But since this "something beyond" is not dealt with by the procedure yielding the definitive empirical content, the concept remains in the ambiguous position that originally set the problem. In other words, the concept continues to be constituted by general sense or understanding and not by specification.

Third, a pertinent question has to be faced as to the relation of the definitive empirical content that is isolated, to the empirical world that is the concern of the discipline. One has to have the possibilities of establishing the place and role of the specific content, in the empirical world in order for the empirical content to enter into theory about the world. A specific procedure may yield a stable finding, sometimes necessarily so by the internal mechanics of the pro-

cedure. Unless this finding is shown to have a relevant place in the empirical world under study, it has no value for theory. The showing of such relevancy is a critical difficulty confronting efforts to establish definitive concepts by isolating stable empirical contents through precise procedures. Incidentally, the establishment of such relevancy is not accomplished by making correlations. While classes of objects or items covered by concepts may be correlated, the mere establishment of correlations between items does not form concepts or, in other words, does not give an item as an instance of a class, a place or a function. Further, the relevance of an isolated empirical content to the empirical world is not established merely by using the concept to label given occurrences in that empirical world. This is a semantic pit into which scores of workers fall, particularly those working with operational definitions of concepts or with experimental construction of concepts. For example, a careful study of "morale" made in a restricted experiment may yield a stable finding; however, the mere fact that we customarily label many instances in our empirical world with the term, "morale," gives no assurance, whatsoever, that such an experimental construct of "morale" fits them. Such a relation has to be established and not presumed.

Perhaps these three difficulties I have mentioned may be successfully solved so that genuine definitive concepts of theoretic use can be formed out of the type of efforts I have been considering. There still remains what I am forced to recognize as the most important question of all, namely whether definitive concepts are suited to the study of our empirical social world. To pose such a question at this point seems to move in a reverse direction, to contradict all that I have said above about the logical need for definitive concepts to overcome the basic source of deficiency in social theory. Even though the question be heretical I do not see how it can be avoided. I wish to explain why the question is very much in order.

I think that thoughtful study shows conclusively that the concepts of our discipline are fundamentally sensitizing instruments. Hence, I call them "sensitizing concepts" and put them in contrast with definitive concepts such as I have been referring to in the foregoing discussion. A definitive concept refers precisely to what is common to a class of objects, by the aid of a clear definition in terms of attributes or fixed bench marks. This definition, or the bench marks, serve as a means of clearly identifying the individual instance of the class and the make-up of that instance that is covered by the concept. A sensitizing concept lacks such specification of attributes or bench marks and consequently it does not enable the user to move directly to the instance and its relevant content. Instead, it gives the user a general sense of reference and guidance in approaching empirical instances. Whereas definitive concepts provide prescriptions of what to see, sensitizing concepts merely suggest directions along which to look. The hundreds of our concepts—like culture, institutions, social structure, mores, and personality—are not definitive concepts but are sensitizing in nature. They lack precise reference and have no bench marks which allow a clean-cut identification of a specific instance and of its content. Instead, they rest on a general sense of what is relevant. There can scarcely be any dispute over this characterization.

Now, we should not assume too readily that our concepts are sensitizing and not definitive merely because of immaturity and lack of scientific sophistication. We should consider whether there are other reasons for this condition and ask particularly whether it is due to the nature of the empirical world which we are seeking to study and analyze.

I take it that the empirical world of our discipline is the natural social world of every-day experience. In this natural world every object of our consideration—whether a person, group, institution, practice or what not—has a distinctive, particular or unique character and lies in a context of a similar distinctive character. I think that it is this distinctive character of the empirical instance and of its setting which explains why our concepts are sensitizing and not definitive. In handling an empirical instance of a concept for purposes of study or analysis we do not, and apparently cannot meaningfully, confine our consideration of it strictly to what is covered by the abstract reference

of the concept. We do not cleave aside what gives each instance its peculiar character and restrict ourselves to what it has in common with the other instances in the class covered by the concept. To the contrary, we seem forced to reach what is common by accepting and using what is distinctive to the given empirical instance. In other words, what is common (i.e. what the concept refers to) is expressed in a distinctive manner in each empirical instance and can be got at only by accepting and working through the distinctive expression. All of us recognize this when we commonly ask, for instance, what form does social structure take in a Chinese peasant community or in an American labor union, or how does assimilation take place in a Jewish rabbi from Poland or a peasant from Mexico. I believe that you will find that this is true in applying any of our concepts to our natural empirical world, whether it be social structure, assimilation, custom, institution, anomie, value, role, stratification or any of the other hundreds of our concepts. We recognize that what we are referring to by any given concept shapes up in a different way in each empirical instance. We have to accept, develop and use the distinctive expression in order to detect and study the common.

This apparent need of having to make one's study of what the concept refers to, by working with and through the distinctive or unique nature of the empirical instance, instead of casting this unique nature aside calls, seemingly by necessity, for a sensitizing concept. Since the immediate data of observation in the form of the distinctive expression in the separate instances of study are different, in approaching the empirical instances one cannot rely on bench marks or fixed, objective traits of expression. Instead, the concept must guide one in developing a picture of the distinctive expression, as in studying the assimilation of the Jewish rabbi. One moves out from the concept to the concrete distinctiveness of the instance instead of embracing the instance in the abstract framework of the concept. This is a matter of filling out a new situation or of picking one's way in an unknown terrain. The concept sensitizes one to this task, providing clues and suggestions. If our empirical world presents itself in the form of distinctive and unique happenings or situations and if we seek through the direct study of this world to establish classes of objects and relations between classes, we are, I think, forced to work with sensitizing concepts.

The point that I am considering may be put in another way, by stating that seemingly we have to *infer* that any given instance in our natural empirical world and its content are covered by one of our concepts. We have to make the inference from the concrete expression of the instance. Because of the varying nature of the concrete expression from instance to instance we have to rely, apparently, on general guides and not on fixed objective traits or modes of expression. To invert the matter, since what we infer does not express itself in the same fixed way, we are not able to rely on fixed objective expressions to make the inference.

Given current fashions of thought, a conclusion that concepts of social theory are intrinsically sensitizing and not definitive will be summarily dismissed as sheer nonsense by most people in our field. Others who are led to pause and give consideration to such a conclusion may be appropriately disquieted by what it implies. Does it mean that our field is to remain forever in its present state of vagueness and to forego the possibilities of improving its concepts, its propositions, its theory and its knowledge? This is not implied. Sensitizing concepts can be tested, improved and refined. Their validity can be assayed through careful study of empirical instances which they are presumed to cover. Relevant features of such instances, which one finds not to be covered adequately by what the concept asserts and implies, become the means of revising the concept. To be true, this is more difficult with sensitizing concepts than with definitive concepts precisely because one must work with variable instead of fixed forms of expression. Such greater difficulty does not preclude progressive refinement of sensitizing concepts through careful and imaginative study of the stubborn world to which such concepts are addressed. The concepts of assimilation and social disorganization, for instance, have gained more fitting abstraction and keener discrimination through insightful and realistic studies, such as those of W. I. Thomas and Robert E. Park. Actually, all

that I am saying here is that careful and probing study of occurrences in our natural social world provide the means of bringing sensitizing concepts more and more in line with what such study reveals. In short, there is nothing esoteric or basically unusual in correcting and refining sensitizing concepts in the light of stubborn empirical findings.

It should be pointed out, also, that sensitizing concepts, even though they are grounded on sense instead of on explicit objective traits, can be formulated and communicated. This is done little by formal definition and certainly not by setting bench marks. It is accomplished instead by exposition which yields a meaningful picture, abetted by apt illustrations which enable one to grasp the reference in terms of one's own experience. This is how we come to see meaning and sense in our concepts. Such exposition, it should be added, may be good or poor—and by the same token it may be improved.

Deficiency in sensitizing concepts, then, is not inevitable nor irremediable. Indeed, the admitted deficiency in our concepts, which certainly are used these days as sensitizing concepts, is to be ascribed to inadequacy of study of the empirical instances to which they refer, and to inadequacy of their exposition. Inadequate study and poor exposition usually go together. The great vice, and the enormously widespread vice, in the use of sensitizing concepts is to take them for granted—to rest content with whatever element of plausibility they possess. Under such circumstances, the concept takes the form of a vague stereotype and it becomes only a device for ordering or arranging empirical instances. As such it is not tested and assayed against the empirical instances and thus forfeits the only means of its improvement as an analytical tool. But this merely indicates inadequate, slovenly or lazy work and need not be. If varied empirical instances are chosen for study, and if that study is careful, probing and imaginative, with an ever alert eye on whether, or how far, the concept fits, full means are provided for the progressive refinement of sensitizing concepts.

Enough has been said to set the problem of what is wrong with social theory. I have ignored a host of minor deficiencies or touched them only lightly. I have sought to pin-point the basic source of deficiency. This consists in the difficulty of bringing social theory into a close and self-correcting relation with its empirical world so that its proposals about that world can be tested, refined and enriched by the data of that world. This difficulty, in turn, centers in the concepts of theory, since the concept is the pivot of reference, or the gateway, to that world. Ambiguity in concepts blocks or frustrates contact with the empirical world and keeps theory apart in a corresponding unrealistic realm. Such a condition of ambiguity seems in general to be true of concepts of social theory.

How to correct this condition is the most important problem of our discipline insofar as we seek to develop it into an empirical science. A great part, if not most, of what we do these days does not touch the problem. Reflective cogitation on existing theory, the formulation of new theory, the execution of research without conceptual guidance or of research in which concepts are accepted uncritically, the amassing of quantities of disparate findings, and the devising and use of new technical instruments—all these detour around the problem.

It seems clear that there are two fundamental lines of attack on the problem. The first seeks to develop precise and fixed procedures that will yield a stable and definitive empirical content. It relies on neat and standardized techniques, on experimental arrangements, on mathematical categories. Its immediate world of data is not the natural social world of our experience but specialized abstractions out of it or substitutes for it. The aim is to return to the natural social world with definitive concepts based on precisely specified procedures. While such procedures may be useful and valuable in many ways, their ability to establish genuine concepts related to the natural world is confronted by three serious difficulties which so far have not been met successfully.

The other line of attack accepts our concepts as being intrinsically sensitizing and not definitive. It is spared the logical difficulties confronting the first line of attack but at the expense of forfeiting the achievement of definitive concepts with specific, objective bench marks. It seeks to improve

concepts by naturalistic research,[2] that is by direct study of our natural social world wherein empirical instances are accepted in their concrete and distinctive form. It depends on faithful reportorial depiction of the instances and on analytical probing into their character. As such its procedure is markedly different from that employed in the effort to develop definitive concepts. Its success depends on patient, careful and imaginative life study, not on quick short-cuts or technical instruments. While its progress may be slow and tedious, it has the virtue of remaining in close and continuing relations with the natural social world.

The opposition which I have sketched between these two modes of attack sets, I believe, the problem of how the basic deficiency of social theory is to be addressed. It also poses, I suspect, the primary line of issue in our discipline with regard to becoming an empirical science of our natural social world.

[2] I have not sought in this paper to deal with the logic of naturalistic research.

DISAGREEMENT, DISAGREEMENT ESTIMATE, AND NON-EMPATHETIC IMPUTATIONS FOR INTIMACY GROUPS VARYING FROM FAVORITE DATE TO MARRIED

CLIFFORD KIRKPATRICK AND CHARLES HOBART

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The sociological study of pairings leading to marriage has been neglected until recently. In so far as there has been study of attitudinal agreement and disagreement between members of pairs in various intimacy groups, stress has been laid upon subjective reports of disagreement. Rarely has there been a design such that pair member "A" reports for himself and imputes responses to his specific partner "B," subject to check against "B" 's actual response. Objective measures of disagreements of prediction of the particular partner's independent response and of disagreement estimates are needed.

Theories concerning relative disagreement between courtship partners at various stages of intimacy are not well developed. The folk belief in a sudden romantic involvement which sweeps a couple blindly toward marriage would imply little emergent consensus concerning issues pertaining to marriage. On the other hand, if the advice of professional marriage counselors were generally followed, the stages (1) "favorite date," (2) "going steady," (3) "engaged," (4) "married," would be marked by discussion and growing consensus concerning issues involved in the marriage relationship. It is generally agreed that increasing homogamy with reference to attitudes concerning marriage would be due to selection-rejection and to association. There is great doubt, however, as to the relative importance of these two mechanisms producing attitudinal similarity.

NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE PRESENT INVESTIGATION

The research to be here reported is exploratory and admittedly lacking in a design which would give a definite answer to questions concerning attitudinal disagreement, estimates of disagreement, and non-empathetic imputation of attitude to the other party to a relationship. While not venturing specific hypotheses we are concerned with the following topics:

(1) The degree of disagreement between parties to courtship pairings in progressive intimacy categories as compared with random pairings of attitudes of persons of opposite sex within corresponding intimacy categories.

(2) A possible trend to more accurate prediction of partner attitude in more intimate categories, again with reference to randomly paired responses.

(3) The trend of disagreement expectations of pairs in various intimacy categories as compared with randomly paired responses.

(4) Possible sex differences with respect to disagreement estimates and non-empathetic attitude imputation as revealed at various stages of the courtship process.
(5) The relative influence of selection-rejection as compared with association in affecting measures of disagreement, disagreement estimate, and non-empathetic attitude imputation.
(6) The possibility of devising a schedule for clinical purposes which would yield norms of readiness for marriage with reference to issues pertinent to successful marriage. Such norms should be specific for intimacy groups, item areas, and items, so that scores for a particular couple could be revealed as conformist or as specifically deviant.

Evidence bearing upon the above mentioned issues and possibilities is fragmentary, gathered by crude devices, and drawn predominantly from college students who are atypical of the general population. Such limitations are not unique, however, for most of the research to date concerned with pairings leading to marriage has been done with middle class subjects typified by college students.

THE SCHEDULE

In 1950 the process of preparing items for a "Family Opinion Survey" was begun. These items called for responses by subjects to a Likert type scale. The responses "Strongly Agree," "Agree," "Undecided," "Disagree," "Strongly Disagree," were to be indicated by writing in the corresponding numbers 5, 4, 3, 2, 1. Following experimentation with a schedule consisting of 161 items, a revision was made reducing the schedule to 81 items.

An attempt was made to express antithetical attitudes toward each issue in each area, although no precise reversal of wording was attempted. The primary concern was to express issues pertaining to marital adjustment in a format such that a contrasting choice of response on the part of pair members would mean clear disagreement on an issue which might be the source of marital conflict. In general, the items were stated in terms of personal desire which could well be incompatible with the desire of the partner, assuming that marriage took place. For example, if the male strongly agreed with item 30, "In my marriage I would want to make whatever family sacrifices are necessary in order to have several children," and the female strongly agreed with item 43, "I do not especially want children in my marriage even assuming favorable conditions for child bearing and child rearing," the stage would be set for potential conflict. The disagreement would be reflected in the probability that the female would disagree with item 30 and male would disagree with item 43.[1]

The revised schedule used in this research consisted of three parts. The first part called for information concerning background and pair relationships with persons of the opposite sex. From such information it was possible to identify pairs in the categories, "favorite date," "going steady" (and/or "pinned"), "engaged," and "married." Part II of the schedule presented the 81 items each aligned with an "X" and a "Y" cell in which numbers indicating responses could be written. The directions called for filling each "X" cell in accordance with personal reaction to the item, as for example, 5 for "strongly agree" or 1 for "strongly disagree." Part III of the schedule requested confirmation of a particular cross sex relationship, if such was indicated, in Part I. The instructions then called for imputation with reference to the specific relationship partner such as fiance or husband. The imputation was expressed by turning back to Part II and indicating in each "Y" cell the response which the subject thought the partner would make as a personal response in filling out the schedule. Finally, Part III called for information concerning the specific relationship partner which could be used in inducing this partner independently to fill out an identical schedule. A completed schedule from each pair partner would thus provide the basis for a comparison of: (1) "A" 's personal response, (2) the response imputed by "A" to "B," (3) "B" 's personal response, (4) the response imputed by "B" to "A." From such personal and imputed responses involving "A" and "B," five total scores can be derived and similar scores by areas or items.

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[1] Copies of the schedule will be made available to persons having a scientific interest in family research.

(1) The first and perhaps most significant score will be called a disagreement score. This score was computed from the discrepancy between the personal choices of the partners on the 5 point scale for each item. Such a discrepancy, as for example between personal choice 5 and personal choice 2, would mean an item disagreement score of 3. The range of such item scores would be 0 to 4. The total disagreement score was obtained by summing the item disagreement scores and hence would have a theoretical range from 0 to 324. Area scores were obtained by taking the mean of mean item scores for a particular area. There is full recognition that in using the above procedure, an assumption of equal and interchangeable intervals on a 5 point scale is extremely doubtful. Fortunately, the general trend of the evidence to be presented does not tend to depend upon such an assumption.

(2) The second score can be called a male non-empathy score. This score involves the comparison of paired schedules. As an item score it is the numerical discrepancy between the response imputed to the female partner and response which the female partner independently records on her schedule. The total male non-empathy score is the sum of item scores and has a theoretical range from 0 to 324. The score objectively reveals inability to predict actual responses of the female partner at some stage of the courtship process.

(3) The female non-empathy score is the counterpart of the male score. Again, as an item score, it consists of the numerical discrepancy between the response imputed to the male partner, and his actual independent response. Obviously the range of this score would be that of the male non-empathy score.

(4) The male disagreement estimate score as an item score is the discrepancy between the personal response of the male and the response imputed to the female partner. Again the total male disagreement estimate is the sum of the item disagreement scores.

(5) The female disagreement estimate score is based on the corresponding discrepancies between the personal response of the female and the responses imputed to her male partner in an intimacy relationship.

SELECTION OF SUBJECT PAIRS

Sampling of intimacy pairs is extremely difficult because of lack of known populations for all types of intimacy groupings. Some use was made of a list of engaged couples on campus, of organizations of married students, and of housing areas assigned to married students. It must be admitted that the subject pairs in this study were merely pairs in which one or more parties were Indiana University students, and pairs of which both members could be induced to cooperate by filling out schedules independently and without opportunity for collusion. In the majority of cases the second member of the pair was induced to fill out a schedule, often in connection with an office visit, after being identified by the first party as a pair member. House to house visits, phone calls, and letters were used to induce the identified pair member to fill out a schedule independently and without collusion.

The most significant comment on the possibility of biased selection because of noncooperation would be in terms of refusal rate. It can be said that of all known individual couple members solicited with respect to filling out schedules, 95.5 per cent did fill out schedules with some degree of completeness. This percentage should not be taken as precise because some pair partners were service men who may not have received mailed requests for cooperation. Of the schedules collected, filled out in some degree, 89.5 per cent or 612 schedules were complete and usable. The method involving comparison of partner responses required that both schedules be completely filled out with respect to every item to be usable.

The 306 pairs of schedules were from 62 favorite date couples, 66 going steady couples, 75 engaged couples, and 103 married couples, representing stages 1, 2, 3, and 4, of the courtship process. The research design called for systematic comparison of scores for actual pairs with scores derived from random matching of individuals and their responses. It is sufficient, therefore, to indicate that the mean age for stage 1 (favorite date group) was 20.5, for stage 2 (going steady) 19.9, for stage 3 (engaged) 21.0, and for stage 4 (married) 27.2. The

FIGURE 1.

TREND OF MEAN PAIRED DISAGREEMENT SCORES IN COMPARISON WITH MEAN RANDOM DISAGREEMENT SCORES BY INTIMACY STAGES WITH CRITICAL RATIOS



FIGURE 2.

TREND OF MEAN PAIRED MALE AND FEMALE NON-EMPATHY SCORES IN COMPARISON WITH MEAN RANDOM MALE AND FEMALE NON-EMPATHY SCORES BY INTIMACY STAGES WITH CRITICAL RATIOS



subjects in all four intimacy groups were widely distributed with respect to over 50 areas of specialization. Of the total 612 individuals only 15 were sociology majors.

SCORE TRENDS BY INTIMACY GROUPS

In Figure 1 the mean disagreement scores are shown by intimacy groups. Critical ratios are also indicated on the curves of Figure 1. The critical ratios on the solid lines compare the three later intimacy groups with the first stage, favorite date group. The critical ratios on dashed lines show the degree of significance of other group comparisons indicated by arrows, if 2.0 or higher. The mean score of 74.7 for stage 1 drops to 66.1 at stage 2 with a CR of 3.0. At stage 3 the mean disagreement score of 66.4 is associated with a CR of 3.1 based on a comparison with the first intimacy stage. At stage 4 the mean disagreement score drops to 62.6 and is associated with a CR of 4.6, thus indicating a significant decline in disagreement for married couples as compared with couples in stage 1 of the courtship process. The critical ratios based on comparisons not involving the stage 1 group are not high. The general trend however is in the direction of declining disagreement with increased intimacy. There is special interest in a stage-by-stage comparison of mean pair scores with mean random scores as shown by the upper line of the graph. These random scores were computed by pairing the personal reactions of males and females within an intimacy group with the aid of a table of random numbers. Thus the random disagreement score was obtained by comparing the personal opinions of a randomly selected male with the personal opinions of a randomly selected girl, by appropriate manipulation of schedules within an intimacy group. It will be noted from the graph that the critical ratios increased from 3.4 at stage 1, to 4.2 at stage 2, 4.4 at stage 3, and to 10.1 at stage 4.

It does seem that pairing involving selection-rejection and association means less than chance disagreement on issues pertaining to marriage. There is no way of knowing what decline in disagreement would be "expected" but it does not seem that love is completely blind. There could be speculation as to why the mean random disagreement scores are not identical in the various in-

FIGURE 3.

TREND OF MEAN PAIRED MALE AND FEMALE DISAGREEMENT ESTIMATE SCORES IN COMPARISON WITH MEAN RANDOM MALE AND FEMALE DISAGREEMENT ESTIMATE SCORES BY INTIMACY CATEGORIES WITH CRITICAL RATIOS



timacy groups. Presumably it is a matter of differential homogeneity. Individuals of the opposite sex involved in relationships at stage 1 may disagree because of varied family backgrounds, while individuals in stage 1 and 3 may achieve more attitudinal homogeneity irrespective of relationship partners because of college experience in going steady and engagement. It is possible that the greater disagreement of married persons is explainable by differentiation resulting from their unique marital experiences.

Non-empathy scores, like agreement scores, involve comparison of schedules independently prepared by male and female partners. It might be expected that non-empathy would decrease with successive stages of the courtship process as measured by prediction of the partner's actual response. Figure 2 shows by the two lower curves the trend of mean non-empathy scores by courtship stages. The lower curve on the left hand side of the graph portrays male mean scores with critical ratios designated as in Figure 1. At stage 1 the male non-empathy score is 73.3 which declines at stage 2 to 63.6, rises slightly at stage 3 to 65.4, and finally declines at stage 4 to 59.2. The mean scores for the last three intimacy stages all differ significantly from the stage 1 mean non-empathy score as shown by critical ratios of 3.0, 2.7, and 4.7. There is a significant drop from stage 3 to stage 4 as shown by a CR of 2.5. Again at every successive courtship stage there is a significant difference between paired and random scores as shown by the successive critical ratios of 4.3, 5.0, 5.0, and 10.7.

The lower curve at the right hand side of Figure 2 shows the trend of female mean non-empathy scores, the means being respectively, 69.6, 63.6, 67.4, 60.6, for intimacy stages 1 through 4. As shown by the graph, the downward trend is less regular and pronounced although married couples do have significantly lower mean non-empathy scores as compared with couples in stage 1. Again at every intimacy stage mean paired scores differ significantly from mean random scores.

Mean disagreement estimate scores are shown by intimacy stages in Figure 3. The trend of male disagreement estimate scores is shown by the lower curve on the left hand side of Figure 3. At stage 1 the mean male disagreement estimate score is 45.0; at stage

2, 37.2; at stage 3, 30.0; and at stage 4, 35.7. In contrast to male non-empathy scores, the lowest male disagreement estimate score falls at stage 3. Again at every stage the paired disagreement estimate scores are significantly lower than mean random scores.

The trend of female mean disagreement estimate scores is shown by the lower curve on the right hand side of Figure 3. At successive intimacy stages the corresponding mean female disagreement estimate scores are 37.8, 30.8, 34.4, and 31.4. The downward trend is still less regular and pronounced as compared with curves for other paired scores. Yet again as shown by the upper line on the right hand side of Figure 3, the differences between mean paired scores and mean random scores are highly significant at every intimacy stage.

Intimacy group trends for the various scores may conceal different trends with respect to areas covered by the items. This possibility is especially significant in the case of total disagreement scores. It is conceivable, for example, that couples in stage 1 (favorite date), would have disagreement scores concerned with in-law relationships which would contrast more sharply with the corresponding area scores of married couples than would the respective total scores. In other words, the trend of disagreement from stage 1 to stage 4 may be distinctive with respect to areas. This possibility justifies a comparison of area disagreement scores (mean of mean item

TABLE 1. MEAN AREA SCORES BY TOTAL AND INTIMACY GROUPS WITH PERTINENT CRITICAL RATIOS BETWEEN MEAN SCORES * TOGETHER WITH TREND PATTERN TYPES

Area	Number of Items	Total Group	Stage 1	Stage 2	Stage 3	Stage 4	CR	Trend Pattern
Personal Freedom	10	.83	.93	.80	.80	.81	1–234, 2.8	A
Sex and Affection	4	.77	.85	.79	.84	.70	123–4, 3.9	B
Relative Dominance	4	.80	.82	.84	.81	.72	123–4, 1.9	B
Economic Roles	9	.93	1.01	.91	.91	.91	1–234, 2.8	A
Marital Roles	3	.75	.83	.69	.72	.70	1–234, 1.8	A
Having Children	5	.80	.96	.89	.81	.68	12–4, 4.5 12–3, 2.0 3–4, 2.2	C
Child Rearing	8	.84	.91	.89	.88	.70	123–4, 4.9	B
In-Laws	6	.87	.97	.82	.92	.74	1–4, 3.9 1–2, 2.2 2–3, 1.5 3–4, 3.2	D
Religion	8	.60	.71	.57	.57	.54	1–234, 4.5	A
Intellectual Values	2	.59	.59	.56	.67	.56	3–4, 1.2	D
Values Placed On Neatness	4	1.00	1.12	.91	1.05	1.00	1–2, 2.6 2–3, 1.8	D
Values Placed On Saving	2	1.06	1.09	1.06	.84	.94	12–4, 1.6 12–3, 2.6	D
Values Placed On Home Life	8	.85	.92	.77	.85	.85	1–2, 2.8	D
Divorce	8	.90	1.04	.92	.87	.87	1–234, 3.3	A

* Total group means and means for combined intimacy stages weighted by N's of intimacy groups.

scores) by courtship stages. The findings are presented in Table 1.

Inspection of Table 1 suggests four trend patterns. Type A, illustrated by "Personal Freedom" scores, is characterized by a sharp drop in disagreement score from stage 1 to stages 2, 3, and 4, all having similar scores. Type B, illustrated by "Sex and Affection" area score trends, is characterized by similar scores for stages 1, 2, and 3, but a sharp drop in disagreement with stage 4. Type C, illustrated by the trend of "Having Children" scores, is characterized by similar scores for stages 1 and 2 with a progressive drop at stages 3 and 4. Type D, illustrated by "In Law" scores, is characterized by an erratic trend. It will be noted from Table 1 that for all intimacy stages, disagreement scores tend to be high in the areas of "Value Placed on Saving," "Value Placed on Neatness," "Economic Roles," and "Divorce." On the other hand, for all intimacy groups, disagreement scores tend to be low in the areas of "Religion" and "Intellectual Values." These differences may reflect the attitudes of a predominantly Protestant college group.

SEX AND INTIMACY GROUP DIFFERENCES

The preceding graphs concerned with intimacy stage trends of five scores derived from the schedule make possible analysis of possible sex differences at various stages of the courtship process. Mean male non-empathy scores may be contrasted with female mean non-empathy scores by comparing the lower lines on the left and right hand portions of Figure 2. Such a comparison bears on the stereotype of "feminine intuition." It might be expected that the mean female non-empathy scores would be lower at every courtship stage than the corresponding mean male non-empathy scores if women were especially gifted with respect to intuition. The evidence however does not support the hypothesis, for the largest critical ratio, the one pertaining to Stage 1 symbolized on the graph by M_1F_1, is 1.23, and the slight advantage to women in predicting the personal responses of their partners is reversed at certain intimacy stages.

Comparison of the lower left hand line in Figure 3 with the lower right hand line throws light on the trend of mean male disagreement estimate scores as compared with mean female disagreement estimate scores. Here the sex difference is more apparent both in terms of mean scores and score trends by intimacy groups. At stages 1 and 2, the significance of the higher mean male disagreement estimate scores is indicated in Figure 2 by CRs of $+ 2.0$ and $+ 2.2$ respectively. At stage 4 the male scores are also somewhat higher with a significance indicated by a CR of $+ 1.6$. The interesting fact is that at the engagement stage of intimacy the female mean disagreement estimate score is higher, at a level of significance represented by a CR of -1.6.

Disagreement estimate scores are a rough measure of realism. That persons in all intimacy groups are definitely lacking in realism is shown by the fact that the weighted mean disagreement estimate scores for all intimacy groups is 31.8 points lower than corresponding weighted mean of disagreement scores. This fact lends pertinence to the higher mean disagreement estimates of males at the first two stages as compared with females. It may be suggested that males as compared with females are more realistic at these early stages of the courtship process. It may be that the male disagreement estimates go down at the engagement stage because of male initiative in courtship, and conviction that a decision initiated by males is a wise decision. Perhaps they have less doubt concerning ideological harmony because they feel that such matters are under their control, and furthermore less meaningful in the total pattern of life interest. Girls on the other hand may have higher female disagreement estimate scores at engagement because of the greater importance of engagement, their lack of initiative, and the possibility that they have accepted a proposal in doubt of other marriage prospects. Furthermore it is possible that engaged girls expect a continuance of chivalrous attentions which males feel are not quite so necessary in engagement, since a bargain has been struck.

The mean disagreement estimate score for males is somewhat higher in the married group than for females. There is no definitive explanation for this slight difference.

It may be true, however, that males are somewhat disillusioned after marriage in view of the smugness of the engagement period and wider interests unshared by their wives. The wives may be more secure than engaged girls and, because of preoccupation with household affairs, may be less aware than their husbands of possibilities of disagreement.

THE RELATIVE INFLUENCE OF SELECTION-REJECTION AS COMPARED WITH ASSOCIATION

There is no clear evidence, in this research, on the relative influence of selection-rejection as compared with association. The evidence bearing most directly upon the influence of association is that relating the five scores to duration of association in the four intimacy categories. Without citing specific quantitative evidence it may be stated that no relation was found between duration of relationship in any intimacy category and any of the five scores derived from the schedules.

Another line of evidence favoring a selection-rejection hypothesis to explain the general progressive decline of mean scores with successive courtship stages would be the pattern of the curves as shown in Figures 1, 2, and 3. All of these curves are somewhat irregular in their downward trend, thus suggesting that selection-rejection mechanisms bring about some new level of agreement, empathy, and agreement estimate. It does seem to be true that the transitions from favorite date to going steady and from engagement to marriage are especially significant. This fact is in accordance with the selection - rejection hypothesis. Selection would determine the transition from favorite date to going steady while rejection in the form of broken engagements would affect the transition to marriage.

It was assumed that intelligence and intelligence differences between relationship partners might affect scores utilized in this research in terms of selection-rejection mechanisms. American Council on Education total scores were obtained from University records for 113 non-married couples. Correlating male A.C.E. total score with female A.C.E. total score for the 34 couples in intimacy stage 1, the Pearsonian correlation proved to be —.050. The correlation for the 40 couples in the going steady category was —.022. For the 39 engaged couples the correlation was —.246.

Since it seemed that intelligence score differences, disregarding direction, might be especially associated with disagreement scores, coefficients were calculated between intelligence score discrepancy and disagreement scores for the three intimacy groups. The coefficient at the first stage of intimacy was + .358, at the second stage of intimacy was + .174, and at the third stage of intimacy was —.077.

TABLE 2. CORRELATIONS OF TOTAL A.C.E. SCORES WITH SEX SPECIFIC SCORES

Type of Score	Favorite date (N = 34)	Going steady (N = 40)	Engaged (N = 29)
Male non-empathy with male intelligence score	—.106	—.280	—.132
Female non-empathy with female intelligence score	+.058	—.049	—.111
Male disagreement estimate with male intelligence score	+.094	+.121	+.041
Female disagreement estimate with female intelligence score	+.148	—.096	+.380

(The evidence involving intelligence as a variable in coefficients of correlation seems to indicate that there is little selection for homogamy and little influence of intelligence on scores used in this study.)

In the case of the remaining four scores coefficients were calculated using total A.C.E. scores rather than score differences between partners. The results are shown in Table 2.

MODIFICATIONS AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FAMILY OPINION SCHEDULE

Modifications of the family opinion survey schedule are possible. For certain purposes it would be desirable to decrease the number of items. While item analysis

could be applied with reference to any or all of the five scores derived from the schedule, work of this type has been done only with reference to disagreement scores.

Each of the eighty-one items was checked regarding discrimination of the item between high and low total score groups. Various criteria were applied involving size of critical ratio and number of intimacy groups within which items discriminated. Depending on the severity of the criteria employed, from 6 to 29 items could be eliminated. Abbreviated disagreement scale scores should of course be correlated with scores derived from the original scale and there should be a repetition of the process with a trial sample. These steps have not yet been taken.

Item selection might be made with reference to other purposes, for example to sharpen comparisons of unmarried couples with married persons. While relatively few items showed steady decline in item score with intimacy stage, there were thirty items for which the item scores were lowest for married couples. A further refinement would be to take the item scores of happily married couples as a basis for item discrimination and item selection.

The mention of happily married couples as a basis for item analysis suggests the possibility of determining the potentialities of the various scores as predictive of relationship success. Various scales are available for measuring success in engagement and marriage.

Clinical applications of the family opinion survey are possible at the present stage of research. A chart too detailed for publication shows mean item disagreement scores by intimacy groups and areas for all 81 items. It might be valuable for a couple going steady to check their disagreement on various issues against mean item disagreement scores of couples likewise going steady and also with scores of couples who have achieved the final intimacy stage of marriage. In the case of items clearly showing a steady reduction in disagreement with intimacy stages the couple should expect to achieve corresponding reduction of their own disagreements. Obviously the scores derived from the "Family Opinion Schedule" would make possible experimental study of the effect of discussion and counseling upon conflict and disagreement.

The non-empathy and disagreement estimate scores may have special application in counseling and experimentation. Norms can also be provided by item and intimacy group for these scales. Scales of this type may show that "A" disagrees with what "A" thinks "B" thinks, rather than with what "B" thinks "B" thinks.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

(1) A schedule entitled, "The Family Opinion Survey" was described which yielded five scales useful for the objective analysis of disagreement, non-empathetic predictions of partner responses and disagreement estimates in four stages of courtship intimacy.

(2) Comparison of pair scores with random scores revealed significant differences at every intimacy stage.

(3) While there was no significant progressive trend toward lower scores with increased intimacy, in every case mean scores were significantly lower for married couples as compared with couples in the "Favorite date" stage.

(4) There was no consistent sex difference in the trend of mean scores, nor evidence of superior feminine intuition. Males tended to have higher disagreement estimates save at the "engagement" stage when their mean scores were somewhat lower than female mean scores.

(5) The limited evidence suggests influence of selection-rejection, rather than association.

(6) Various modifications and applications of the "Family Opinion Survey" were suggested.

MARITAL HAPPINESS OF PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN'S ATTITUDE TO MARRIAGE

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PERSONS reared in present day urban America are exposed to a number of experiences which contribute to their conception of marriage, and influence their evaluation of marriage as a relatively desirable or undesirable status for themselves. Most of these experiences are vicarious: exposure to the representations of marriage in print, movies, the radio and television. Less vicarious is the learning of the risks of marital failure as epitomized by the divorce rate. But marriage is also very directly depicted and defined for the young by the marital relationship of their parents. It is in the home that they first and most continuously encounter marriage, not as a fiction or concept but as embodied in the behavior of their fathers and mothers with and toward one another. Apart from the picture of marriage which the child may build out of inferences from the parents' behavior one or both parents may wittingly attempt to indoctrinate the child with a conception of marriage as one of the great joys of adulthood or as a status to be warily approached if not altogether avoided.

For the majority of the young, one of the probable major effects of their vicarious learning about marriage is that it is made to appear a highly attractive and desirable status. ("And they lived happily ever after.") If this evaluation is not materially influenced by knowledge of the divorce rate it is still subject to some reality testing in that the child has intimate knowledge of the union of his parents, if of no other adults. To the extent that marriage as thus directly known is perceived as a highly satisfying experience the vicariously assimilated conception is reinforced or at least not contradicted. But insofar as the relationship of his parents is seen by the child as fraught with conflict and unhappiness his conception of marriage as a desirable goal may be challenged and his enthusiasm for marriage diminished.[1]

Favorableness of attitude to marriage is a variable of theoretical interest for a number of reasons. It may be important in accounting for individual differences in age at marriage. It may be associated with individual differences and sex differences in patterns of courtship and mate selection. And it may be related to marital success. If, as hypothesized above, favorableness of attitude to marriage varies with parental happiness, the former may be one of the intervening variables in the oft-noted correlation between the marital happiness of parents and that of their offspring.

The research reported below was concerned with testing the hypothesis of a positive association between the marital success of parents and the favorableness of their children's attitude to marriage. Since data were secured from men and women subjects it was also possible to test the widely-held assumption that in our society the unmarried female views marriage more favorably than does the male.

THE DATA

The data of the study were obtained with anonymous questionnaires filled out by students assembled in classes. The subjects rated their parents' marriage in answer to the question, "In your opinion, up to the time you were 12, were your parents on the average happy or unhappy in their marriage?" The response categories were: Very

[1] Even if it be assumed that the net effect of vicarious experience with marriage is negative the argument as to the impact of parental happiness or unhappiness would still hold. It would be expected that children reared by unhappily married parents would have an even more unfavorable attitude to matrimony than children whose parents were happily wed.

happy, happy, average, unhappy, very unhappy.[2]

Favorableness of attitude to marriage was measured with a Guttman scale developed by Richard J. Hill.[3] The nine items, which were tentatively concluded to be scalable for a sample of men and women, are presented here as ordered in the final scale. The scores given the various response categories are indicated in the parenthesis.

(1) If you marry to what extent will you miss the life you have had as a single person? Not at all (1), very little, to some extent or very much (0).
(2) In your opinion to what extent will it trouble you to give up your personal freedom when you marry? Not at all (1), very little, to some extent, or very much (0).
(3) In your opinion, will adjustment to married life be difficult for you? Not at all (1), not too difficult, rather or very difficult (0).
(4) Do you ever have doubts as to whether you will enjoy living exclusively in marriage with one member of the opposite sex? Never (1), hardly, occasionally or frequently (0).
(5) In your opinion, to what extent will the responsibilities of married life be enjoyable to you? Very much so (1) fairly enjoyable, not too much or not at all (0).
(6) How happy do you think you will be if you marry? Very happy (1) happy, unhappy or very unhappy (0).
(7) Do you ever have doubts about your chance of having a successful marriage? Never or rarely (1), occasionally or frequently (0).
(8) Do you think you will find (or have found) a person who is a suitable marriage partner for you? Yes (1), no (0).
(9) Do you think it would be advisable for you always to remain single? Yes (0), no (1).

The subjects were scored on their responses to each of the nine questions. Their total scores ranging from zero to nine represent their positions on the continuum defined by the items as favorableness of attitude to marriage. These totals were then plotted against the subjects' ratings of their parents' marital happiness, the data for the men and women being separately analyzed.

[2] The reliability and validity of marital happiness ratings are discussed at length in E. W. Burgess and L. S. Cottrell, *Predicting Success or Failure in Marriage,* New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1939, chapter 3.

[3] *"Attitude Toward Marriage,"* unpublished Master's thesis, Stanford University Library, 1951.

THE SAMPLE STUDIED

The data of the study were secured from 394 women and 215 men by means of a

TABLE 1. MARITAL HAPPINESS OF MEN'S PARENTS AND MEN'S SCORES ON "FAVORABLENESS OF ATTITUDE TO MARRIAGE" SCALE

Scale Scores	Marital Happiness of Parents: Very Happy	Happy	Average to Very Unhappy *	Divorced	Total
(Low) 0	–	–	4	1	5
1	1	2	1	2	6
2	6	8	16	13	43
3	9	18	8	9	44
4	8	14	7	6	35
5	10	7	10	4	31
6	6	6	4	1	17
7	9	5	–	1	15
8	7	3	3	–	13
(High) 9	3	2	1	–	6
Total	59	65	54	37	215
Mean	5.15	4.25	3.56	3.03	4.11
Standard deviation	2.12	1.92	2.08	1.44	2.09

* Because of the small number of cases the categories average, unhappy and very unhappy have been combined.

TABLE 2. MARITAL HAPPINESS OF WOMEN'S PARENTS AND WOMEN'S SCORES ON "FAVORABLENESS OF ATTITUDE TO MARRIAGE" SCALE

Scale Scores	Marital Happiness of Parents				
	Very Happy	Happy	Average to Very Unhappy *	Divorced	Total
(Low) 0	–	1	–	–	1
1	5	2	4	2	13
2	10	4	14	3	31
3	16	14	14	10	54
4	19	16	19	7	61
5	22	20	5	4	51
6	27	10	8	7	52
7	29	15	4	5	53
8	25	9	5	9	48
(High) 9	17	7	3	3	30
Total	170	98	76	50	394
Mean	5.75	5.27	4.18	5.24	5.26
Standard deviation	2.17	2.07	2.09	2.28	2.22

* Because of the small number of cases the categories average, unhappy and very happy have been combined.

questionnaire administered to classes in three colleges in the San Francisco Bay area.[4] The classes were for the most part in sociology or psychology. With few exceptions the subjects were undergraduate students. They ranged in age from sixteen to twenty-seven, the median age being 20. The sample was restricted to unmarried persons, whose parents were both living. The men and women were predominantly Protestant and of native-born parentage. The parents of about 55 per cent of the group had one or more years of college education.

THE FINDINGS

The findings for the men subjects are presented in Table 1. They are clearly consistent with the hypothesis that the happier the men conceive of their parents' marriage as being, the more favorable tends to be the men's attitude toward marriage. The mean favorableness score declines steadily from the "very happy" parents to those who are divorced.[5]

The results for the women are given in Table 2. We note first that they have a more favorable attitude to marriage than the men. The mean score of the women is 5.26 as compared with a mean of 4.11 for the men.[6] This difference obtains for each of the parental happiness categories. The data, therefore, support the assumption that the unmarried female is more positively oriented to marriage than the unmarried male.

The data of Table 2 suggest that the pattern of association between parental happiness and favorableness of attitude to marriage is not the same for women as for men. The striking difference is that in the case of the latter the relationship between the variables is linear, whereas in the case of the former it appears to be nonlinear. The mean scale score of the women decreases from 5.75 (for those who rate their parents' marriage "very happy") to 4.18

[4] San Francisco State College, Stanford University and University of California at Berkeley. Data were also obtained from students in four Negro educational institutions. These are not reported because the responses of the Negro women to the "attitude to marriage" items failed entirely to yield a scale and the responses of the men formed a scale with several non-scale types.

[5] The CR's of the differences between the various means are "very happy" and "happy," 2.47; "very happy" and "average to very unhappy," 4.03; "very happy" and "divorced," 5.82; "happy" and "divorced," 3.63; "happy" and "average to very unhappy," 1.62; "average to very unhappy" and "divorced," 1.44.

[6] The CR of the difference between the means is 6.35.

(for those rating their parents' marriage "average to very unhappy").[7] The mean score then rises to 5.24 for the women with divorced parents and this does not differ significantly from the mean scores of those who rate their parents' marriage "very happy" or "happy."

The relatively high mean score of women whose parents are divorced reflects the fact that a considerable proportion of the women in this group have scores near the upper limit of the scale. Thirty-four per cent score 7, 8, or 9. This contrasts sharply with the 2.7 per cent of the men having divorced parents who secure such high scores.

The finding of a sex difference in the pattern of association between parental happiness and favorableness of attitude to marriage must be regarded as tentative, because of the rather small number of men and women with divorced parents in the present study. Assuming, however, that the finding is sustained by subsequent research what explanation can be advanced for it?

The problem essentially is why, unlike the men subjects, a substantial proportion of the women with divorced parents confidently anticipate marriage as a source of happiness and satisfaction. One solution to the problem can be derived from the assumption that women to a greater extent than men look upon marriage as the essential framework of their adult life. Insofar as this is true it might be argued that, when led to take a dim view of marriage because of the decisive failure of their parents' matrimonial venture, men have greater tolerance than women for their pessimistic outlook. Generally speaking, the pessimism of the men relates to what they consider only a part of their future life; that of the women relates to what they consider their entire existence. The latter consequently are more highly motivated to reject the conception of marriage given to them by the experience of their parents. Some may even be convinced that having learned much from the marital failure of their parents they can look forward with all the greater certainty to marital happiness for themselves.

[7] CR of the difference between the means (a) for the categories "average to very unhappy" and "happy," 4.31; (b) for the categories "average to very unhappy" and "very happy," 7.17; (c) for the categories "average to very unhappy" and "divorced," 2.64; (d) for the categories "very happy" and "happy," 1.79.

THE FAMILY AS A THREE-PERSON GROUP *

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At different centers and in different disciplines small group research has grown at a rapid rate during the past five years. The limited empirical character of most of these studies has enabled their authors to attain what for students of social behavior is an enviable level of rigor, but a central question remains: How far may we generalize these results? The objective of the present paper is to test the appropriateness of certain propositions concerning ad hoc three-person groups by the use of father, mother and adolescent son subject groups. Insofar as our work is carefully done, our results should contribute to the understanding of

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With regard to this particular paper, the author is indebted to T. M. Mills for a most constructive criticism of the first draft.

the extent to which propositions concerning ad hoc three-person groups may be extended to family groups, and to a more limited degree, to other groups with prior common experience and expectations of continued relations.

Our procedure for obtaining a sample discussion between a father, mother, and adolescent son was, very briefly, as follows: Each family is visited at home. We explain that we are interested in the way a family considers questions which relate to the son's selection of his occupation. To help the family recall specific topics which they may have previously discussed, we ask the father, mother and son to check independently one of two alternatives to 47 items of the following type:[1]

(a) A teen-agers' hobby club plans to enter their models in a state-wide contest. Some of the boys want to put the models up under the club's name and win honor for the club as a whole. Others want to put the models up under each boy's name so that each can gain individual honor. Which plan should they adopt?

(b) Two fathers were discussing their boys, one of whom was a brilliant student and the other an athlete of great promise. In general, some people feel one father was more fortunate and some the other. Do you think the father with the *athletic* son or the father with the *studious* son was most fortunate?

(c) Some people believe that a father should be prepared to speak to a son as a father and direct the son's behavior so long as the son lives, others believe the son should be accepted as completely independent of his father's direction after 18 or 21. Which would you tend to agree to with regard to a boy in his late 20's?

While our introductory remarks are being made in the home, we request permission to set up our portable tape recorder. After the 47 item questionnaire has been checked, we have the family fill out still another similar questionnaire so that we will have time to sort through their responses. We select three items which represent a potential coalition of the type in which the mother and father have taken one alternative and the son another; three with mother-son paired against the father; and three with father-son paired against the mother. We then present the family successively with these nine disagreements rotating the isolate role. They are asked to talk the question over, understand why each person chose the alternative he did, and, if possible, select one alternative which best represents the thinking of the family as a whole. While this discussion takes place, the experimenter withdraws to another room, operates the controls on the sound equipment, and tries to keep any other member of the family from overhearing or interrupting the interaction. During May and June of 1953 we obtained 48 cases in this manner.

Concerning the selection of the 48 cases, three criteria were considered: ethnicity, the families were predominantly second generation (the son, third) divided equally between Jews and Italians; socioeconomic status (SES), equal numbers of high, medium and low; and the son's achievement, half of the boys were underachieving in school and half were overachieving as determined by a comparison of grades and intelligence test performance. By sampling from a frame of more than a thousand 14 to 16 year old boys in New Haven public and parochial schools it was possible to work out a factorial design of the following type:

	Jews		Italians	
SES	Over	Under	Over	Under
High	4	4	4	4
Medium	4	4	4	4
Low	4	4	4	4
			Total 48	

The recordings averaged about 40 minutes in length. The interaction analysis consisted of breaking the on-going discussion into units, or acts; identifying the originator and target of each act; and assigning each act to one of Bales' 12 categories which are identified in our discussion of the index of supportiveness below.[2]

One primary objective of the present paper is to compare our results with those of

[1] These items have in large part been adapted from questions originated by the Social Mobility Seminar at Harvard, conducted by Samuel A. Stouffer, Talcott Parsons and Florence R. Kluckhohn.

[2] See Robert F. Bales, *Interaction Process Analysis*, 1950.

Mills who, working with student volunteers, asked them to create from three pictures a single dramatic story upon which all agreed.[3] The comparison requires that we utilize jointly the information concerning the originator and target of each act, as well as the category in which it is placed, to form an index which reflects the tendency of a particular actor, number 1, to give positive responses to the attempts at problem solution by another actor, number 2. The following steps are involved in arriving at the index of supportiveness:

(a) Sum together the acts in the following categories which have been originated by person number 1 and directed to number 2:
 1. SHOWS SOLIDARITY, raises other's status, gives help, reward
 2. SHOWS TENSION RELEASE, jokes, laughs, show satisfaction
 3. AGREES, shows passive acceptance, understands, concurs, complies

(b) Subtract from the above sum the number of acts originated by number 1 and directed to number 2 in these categories to form the numerator of the index:
 10. DISAGREES, shows passive rejection, formality, withholds help
 11. SHOWS TENSION, asks for help, withdraws "Out of Field"
 12. SHOWS ANTAGONISM, deflates other's status, defends or asserts self

(c) Divide the above numerator by the number of acts originated by number 2 in the following categories:
 4. GIVES SUGGESTION, direction, implying autonomy for other
 5. GIVES OPINION, evaluation, analysis, expresses feeling, wish
 6. GIVES ORIENTATION, information, repeats, clarifies, confirms
 7. ASKS FOR ORIENTATION, information, repetition, confirmation
 8. ASKS FOR OPINION, evaluation, analysis, expression of feeling
 9. ASKS FOR SUGGESTION, direction, possible ways of action

(d) The result, multiplied by 100, is I_{12}, the index of support of person 1 of person 2. Between three persons, six index values are produced. To simplify our reference to this set of values we organize it in a matrix, placing the person with the largest number of acts originated in the first row and column and the person with the least number of acts originated in the last row and column. To illustrate this convention see Table 1. To form Table 1 we have taken the median of the corresponding cells for the 48 discussions in each of the six positions. In parenthesis we show the value Mills obtained when he carried out these steps for his 48 groups.

Mills makes the following observation with regard to Simmel's having anticipated the pattern of support which Mills found:[4]

"The highest rates of support are those exchanged between the two more active members and the rates are very nearly the same. . . All other distributions of rates are significantly different from these two. This is to say that, as far as exchange of support is concerned, the relationship between these two members is sharply differentiated from the other relationships. The results for this sample confirm Simmel's observation. The two more active members form the pair and the least active member is the relatively isolated third party."

TABLE 1. MEDIAN INDEX OF SUPPORT, FAMILIES COMPARED WITH AD HOC STUDENT GROUPS *

Rank of Initiator	Rank of Recipient		
	1st	2nd	3rd
1st		—6 (12)	—5 (7)
2nd	—5 (11)		—5 (4)
3rd	3 (4)	—2 (2)	

* Mills' values for ad hoc student groups are given in parenthesis.

For Mills the 1–2 value is 12 and the 2–1 value is 11, which are higher than the other cell values and similar. In our data the 1–2 value is minus 6 and the 2–1 value is minus 5—these do not differ significantly from the other values. By correlating the sets of medians in particular cells of Table 1, we may compare the relative magnitudes of our values to Mills' without regard for the difference in means. We obtain a rho of —.67. Neither the inspection of the corresponding cells of the two most speaking participants nor the correlation over the

[3] Theodore M. Mills, "Power Relations in Three-Person Groups," *American Sociological Review*, 18 (August, 1953), pp. 351–357.

[4] Mills and Simmel's thesis treating of the partition of three into two and one is most effectively stated in von Wiese's, *Systematic Sociology*, translated by H. Becker, 1932, p. 525.

whole table can be interpreted as a confirmation of Mills' results on ad hoc groups. Whether the significantly lower mean level of the index of support can be accounted for by the differences in our tasks or by a lesser emphasis on polite behavior on the part of family groups we, of course, can not say.

We are indebted to Mills for the following typology for classifying the individual matrixes. He suggests that we look at the index of support, I_{12} and I_{21}. These indices are then compared with the medians for the I_{12} and I_{21} positions, and the experimenter indicates + if the value is above its corresponding median and — if it is below, the following results:

I_{12}	I_{21}	Support Types
+	+	solidary
+	—	contending
—	+	dominant
—	—	conflicting

For our data I_{12} is minus 6 and I_{21} is minus 5.

Mills finds that when the two high ranking participants have a solidary relationship, both the intake and output of support for the low man is lower than in any other circumstances. Our data are not in accord with his finding (see Table 2). The lowest value in any row would have been in the solidary (++) column if our data had corresponded to Mills' finding. It may be seen that no one of the four cells involved fulfill this requirement.

Mills goes further to say,

> "Not only is this determined position of the third party as weak as a power position can be (when the relation between the two principals is solidary), but it is likely that the power interests involved in it are inversely related to the interests of the other member. The stronger the coalition, the weaker the position of the third man, and vice versa."

Unfortunately Mills had no measure of power other than participation. With our data, to form a "power" score, we arbitrarily give two points to each decision. If the isolated person persuades the others he is given two points and they receive none; if he holds them off and no decision is made, he is given one point and the other two get .5 each; if the isolated person is persuaded by the other two, they receive one point each and he receives nothing. Thus, for nine decisions there is a total of 18 points. Under random expectations the mean for each participant would be six.

TABLE 2. MEDIAN INDEX OF SUPPORT FOR CELLS INVOLVING THE LOW-RANKING PARTICIPANT

Matrix Cell	Support Type ++ (17)	+— (8)	—+ (7)	—— (16)
1 to 3	—05	12	08	—11
2 to 3	03	—10	—08	—07
3 to 1	03	—02	08	01
3 to 2	00	02	—03	—05

In our experiment we find that if one attempted to predict power, as measured in this way, from participation he would account for less than three tenths of the variation, though the correlation is significant in the .5 to .6 range. We therefore have attempted to test Mills' statement by comparing the mean power score computed by the system explained above for the first, second and third most speaking participant for each of the four support types. It may be seen from Table 3 that the low man does not appear to be conspicuously worse off in the solidary (++) type. There is no significant gap between his power and that of the man in the second position whereas there is such a gap between the low and middle man in the contending (+ —) and dominant (— +) support types.

In three of the four support types the most-speaking person wins the largest

TABLE 3. MEAN DECISION-WINNING POWER BY PARTICIPATION RANK AND SUPPORT TYPE

Rank	Support Type ++ (17)	+— (8)	—+ (7)	—— (16)
1st	8.0*	6.3	8.0	8.3
	...		...	...
2nd	5.2	6.6	5.5	4.9
		...	...	
3rd	4.8	5.0	4.5	4.8

* The value 8.0 indicates that the most-speaking participants in solidary (++) groups won on the average 8.0 of the 18 possible points. The dots in the columns indicate significant gaps.

TABLE 4. STABILITY OF RANK BETWEEN FIRST AND THIRD PHASE *

Required Values	Support Type			
	+ +	+ −	− +	− −
S	344 (278)	62 (62)	0 (122)	96 (62)
M	17 (15)	8 (9)	7 (11)	16 (13)
S.05	102 (90)	48 (54)	– (66)	90 (78)
P(S)	<.05 (<.05)	<.05 (<.05)	>.05 (<.05)	<.05 (>.05)

* Mills' values for ad hoc groups given in parentheses.

share of the decisions and in all cases the least-speaking person wins least. We have found the means for the rank positions within three of the support types to be heterogeneous and the gap between the first and second most-speaking person significant at the .05 level or less.[5] There is a reversal of power scores between the first and second rank position in the contending (+ —) pattern.

One of the observations in Mills' article with broad implications for a theory of group process dealt with the stability of the participation patterns through time. His measure of stability was a comparison of the participation rank in the first third of his sessions with the participation rank in the last third. His conclusions are as follows:

> In summary, there is one pattern where all positions are stable; there is another where all positions are unstable; and in the others, the strongest position is stable while the others fluctuate. The significantly stable pattern is the *solidary* (++) one, which, as we have seen, tends to develop into the fully differentiated, interdependent pattern called the ***true coalition***. The significantly unstable one is the *conflict* (——) pattern which is notable for its lack of interdetermination."

From this comment and study of other portions of the text it is our guess that Mills would rank the support types: solidary (++), contending (+ —) and dominant (— +) tied, and conflict (— —) lowest regarding their implication for participation stability. For our data we have the relative participation for three decisions each with the father, mother and son as isolate—a total of nine. To parallel Mills procedure and stratify the incidence of the isolate role, we sum the first three decisions and compare with the sum of the last three decisions. The father, mother, and son are the isolate once in each group. By considering the rank for the first three decisions as the criterion ranking, we can compare the consistency of participation within the four support types by use of Kendall's S (see Table 4).[6] Corresponding values from Mills' study are given in parentheses.

In this instance our findings partially correspond to Mills'. Our most stable group is the solidary (+ +), but our least stable is not the conflicting (— —). The dominant (— +) has less stability than the conflicting, but since there are only seven cases this apparent reversal of order must remain in doubt.

Mills includes in his paper certain observations on the temporal shifts of support patterns. He finds that the solidary (+ +) patterns in the first phase tend to persist into the third whereas other patterns more frequently shift toward solidarity (+ +) or conflicting (— —). Mills' refers to these two latter patterns as ***terminal*** pat-

[5] For similar findings see A. Paul Hare, "Interaction and Consensus in Different Sized Groups," *American Sociological Review*, 17 (June, 1952), pp. 261–267; same author, "Small Group Discussions with Participatory and Supervisory Leadership," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 48 (1953), pp. 273–275; Fred L. Strodtbeck, "Husband-Wife Interaction Over Revealed Differences," *American Sociological Review*, 16 (August, 1951), p. 16; Robert L. French, "Verbal Output and Leadership Status in Initially Leaderless Discussion Groups," *American Psychologist*, 5 (1950), pp. 310–311; and, if it may be inferred that an instructor has more power than students, F. F. Stephan and E. G. Mishler, "The Distribution of Participation in Small Groups: An Exponential Approximation," *American Sociological Review*, 17 (October, 1952), pp. 598–608.

[6] M. G. Kendall, *Rank Correlation Methods*, London, 1948.

terns. Unfortunately our data were not tabulated so that this comparison could be made at a modest cost. We do note however that one might infer from Mills' comments that primary groups with a much longer period in which to stabilize their interaction would tend to be more concentrated in the (+ +) and (— —) categories. While our distribution of cases is in line with this expectation,

+ +	17 (15)
— —	16 (13)
+ —	8 (9)
— +	7 (11)

the observed differences are not statistically significant.

DISCUSSION

Any given hour of face to face interaction can be categorized in many different ways. Even a simple system such as Bales', which extracts only a small portion of the available information, results in units which can be recombined to form a number of measures or indices. The net effect of this latitude in analysis is to provide a very large set of potential hypotheses which may be tested. Since this is the case, special precautions must be taken against errors of the first kind—the rejection of the null hypothesis when the hypothesis is in fact true.

To avoid errors of the first type some workers only report relationships which they have demonstrated several times and others report, or write as if they are reporting, only those relationships they have deduced, predicted, or anticipated in advance of the experiment. In the present context Mills has used still a third alternative. He reported his basic operations in detail, he carefully specified the particular characteristics of his group, and he was completely candid in noting that his findings arose from what we have come to call "blind analysis" notwithstanding the fact that they had in part been "adumbrated" by Simmel. Mills' treatment invited comparison, and although we had collected our three-person interaction for a different purpose, comparison was easily made.

The subjects we used were related in a particular and pervasive way—they were a family. There was every reason to believe that after the experimental session was over they would pick up their daily relations very much as they had been in the past. Their actions in the experimental session proceeded on a broad basis of common knowledge and their behavior in the experimental situation could very well have consequences in their interpersonal relations at a latter time.

The tendency for a three person group to break into a pair and another party, which was the central theme of Mills' analysis, would seem to run counter to certain expectations we associate with a family. Crudely expressed, parents give succorance to children contingent upon the child's conforming to selected rules of behavior. This elemental aspect of the relationship becomes greatly elaborated. By adolescence one is tempted to believe that a son has moved into a position where his censure of parents may be fully as effective a control mechanism as parents' censure of the son. Competition for sexual favors is regulated by incest proscriptions. The action of one family member in the community is not without implications for other family members. In short, three family members may, in many important ways, reward one another and accept responsibility for one another's well being. No member can easily withdraw from the relationship. From considerations of this order one can form a strong common sense basis for the expectation that the division of the trio into two and one will be attenuated in families in contrast with ad hoc groups and in this way account for the disparity between our data and the expectations based on Mills' findings relative to the distribution of support.

An alternative explanation for the disparity can be based upon the task we've set for our subjects. There were nine specific decisions, each person had three isolated and six coupled coalitions and the group was instructed to try to achieve consensus. This shifting of coalitions would strike at the stability of relations which might have grown if only one task were involved, hence the task also might have caused the departure from Mills' distribution of support findings which we report in Table 1.

The effects of our using a task different from Mills' are not entirely negative. We were enabled by virtue of our decision-winning measure to test a proposition concerning the relative power of the low man in the solidary (+ +) group which had not been tested with equal directness by Mills. It is plausible to believe that the members of the major coalition in a solidary (+ +) family would not pool their power against the low man to the same degree as would an ad hoc group. While the evidence we present is in line with such an expectation, the proposition at issue cannot be firmly established until it has been demonstrated, in accordance with Mills' expectations, that the low ranking participant in ad hoc solidarity (+ +) groups is in fact less powerful than the low ranking member in groups with other support characteristics.

A point of correspondence between Mills' study and the present, which encourages one to believe that it is fruitful to think in terms of a common process underlying both primary and ad hoc group interaction, relates to the stability of the participation ranks. In both studies it is demonstrated that the solidary (+ +) pattern results in the most stable participation ranks. In this manner support type takes its place along with previously published discussions of the phase hypothesis,[7] status struggle,[8] and equilibrium problem,[9] as one of a series of more or less cumulative increments in our understanding of factors which influence participation stability.

In conclusion, we have attempted to assess the appropriateness for families of propositions derived from the study of ad hoc three-person groups. We do not find in families the regularities in the distribution of support which Mills' reported, nor do we confirm the tendency for solidary high-participating members to dominate the decision-making which Mills anticipated would materialize. We do find in families, like many other groups, decision-making power is associated with high participation.[10] We confirm Mills' finding that when the two most active members are solidary in their relation to one another the stability of their rank participation is high, but we do not find that when the two most active members are in conflict, the stability is as low for families as he found it to be for ad hoc groups.

[7] Robert F. Bales and Fred L. Strodtbeck, "Phases in Group Problem Solving," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology,* 46 (1951), pp. 485–495.

[8] Christoph Heinecke and Robert F. Bales, "Developmental Trends in the Structure of Small Groups," *Sociometry* (February, 1953), pp. 7–39.

[9] Talcott Parsons, Robert F. Bales and Edward A. Shils, *Working Papers in the Theory of Action,* (1953), pp. 111–163.

[10] Other correlates of decision-making power based upon this set of data and related to father, mother, and son roles will be described in later publications.

CHANGE IN FARM TECHNOLOGY AS RELATED TO FAMILISM, FAMILY DECISION MAKING, AND FAMILY INTEGRATION *

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CERTAIN previous studies have shown that acceptance of innovations in farming is related to dependence upon neighborhood and kinship ties and to the prevalence of familism.[1] These studies raise the question whether the roles and

* Expanded version of paper read at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Society, August, 1953. Data for this paper were obtained from a study of acceptance of farm practices as related to family and other group factors supported by the Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station.

The Numerical Analysis Laboratory provided assistance in computations for the study.

[1] Eugene A. Wilkening, "A Sociopsychological Approach to the Study of Acceptance of Innovations in Farming," *Rural Sociology,* 15 (December, 1950), pp. 352–364; and Harald A. Pedersen, "Cultural Differences in the Acceptance of Recommended Practices," *Rural Sociology,* 16 (March, 1951), pp. 37–49.

relationships of the farmer within the institution of the family influence his role and activities in the farm enterprise insofar as the acceptance of change in technology is concerned. Put another way, how does the role of husband-father influence the role of farm operator in making decisions involving changes in technology? The general hypothesis is that *family roles and relationships are differentially associated with the acceptance of changes in farm technology depending upon the extent to which those roles and relationships are enhanced or jeopardized by accepting those changes.*

An assumption upon which this hypothesis is based is that family and farm are interdependent and that changes in one result in a change in the other. The test of the hypothesis is a test of this more general proposition that family and farm are interdependent.

There has been much concern in recent years about the family farm and its importance to the American way of life. Few studies, however, have attempted to determine how farm and family are interrelated and what the significance of variations in one are for the other.[2] If each can vary more or less independently, then change in one does not necessarily result in appreciable consequences for the other. This study is mainly concerned with the manner in which variations in the family produce variations in certain decisions affecting farming.

SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY

The data presented here were obtained from 170 farm operators and their wives in a county (Sauk) in south central Wisconsin. The design of the study, of which this is only a part, required that the sample be selected to eliminate certain variations extraneous to the study. A one-third sample of the farm operators who met the following criteria were selected for interview: owned their farms three years or longer, both husband and wife were living, had at least one child 12 to 19 years of age, had made three-fourths or more of their income from farming in 1951, and had no serious physical or language difficulties. Of those qualified, eleven refused to be interviewed and eight were not at home on repeated visits.

The sample families were largely the second generation of German immigrants. Seventeen per cent of the husbands had at least one parent born in Germany, and 4.2 per cent had at least one parent born in another foreign country. Only 9.2 per cent of the wives had one or more parents of German birth, and 2.4 per cent born in another country. Four-fifths of the farms depended upon dairying for half or more of their income; only seven farms had less than five milk cows. The size of farm ranged from 24 acres of cropland to 400, with a mean of 114 acres.

Since the main concern of this study is that of how variations in family organization relate to acceptance of change in farm technology in general, indexes of acceptance (adoption) of a number of practices were constructed. The eighteen change-in-farming practices were divided into two groups, those which were innovations in the sense that they required new techniques or materials or both, and those which were improvements in existing operations not requiring new techniques or materials.[3] It was felt that the roles and relationships of the acceptor are more likely to influence the acceptance of innovations than of improvements, since innovations are more likely to affect changes in these roles and relationships. But, since the classification of the two types of practices is somewhat arbitrary, both indexes and

[2] See Wilson Longmore and Carl C. Taylor, "Elasticities of Expenditures for Farm Family Living, Farm Production and Savings, United States, 1946," *Journal of Farm Economics*, 33 (February, 1951), pp. 1–19; and Ervin J. Long and Kenneth Parsons, *How Family Labor Affects Wisconsin Farming*, Research Bulletin 167, Wisconsin Agricultural Experiment Station, Madison, May, 1950.

[3] *Innovations*: Used the following: field baler, hay chopper, 2–4–D for weed control, ever seeded alfalfa-brome mixture, strip cropping, grass silage, artificial insemination, milking machine, mechanical milk cooler, and residual fly spray on barn. All of these apply to 1951 except seeding of alfalfa-brome mixture.

Improvements: Used 200 lb. or more of recommended fertilizer on pasture with last seeding, tested soil within past three years, ever used high nitrogen fertilizer on corn as side-dressing, kept livestock off part or all of woodland in 1951, used registered sire in 1951, ever tested cows for production, clipped cows' udders in 1951, and sold Grade A milk in 1951.

a combined index of the two are taken as three measures of the same dependent variable—acceptance of change in farm technology.

The main methodological problem of this study was that of constructing measures of family organization which were both reliable and valid. While there are scales of family solidarity and integration, established measures of the components of familism and decision-making are almost nonexistent.[4] Hence, one task of this study was to devise measures of inter-family dependence or familism and of the extent to which decision making was father-centered. It was not the intent to develop scales of these variables. An attempt was made only to classify the families studied into three or four categories with respect to these variables.

Both behavioral and attitudinal data were obtained for constructing the indexes of the family variables. While this raises some questions about the unidimensionality of the measures, it was felt that greater validity could be assured at this stage of investigation than by using either type of data alone. Another violation of unidimensionality was the inclusion of both husband and wife responses in the same measures. In general, more of the wife's responses than of the husband's responses were used for measures of family organization factors. This was partly due to interviewing expediency and partly to the feeling that the wife's responses were more reliable in these matters. Both husband and wife were interviewed at the same time by different persons.

Where indexes were constructed, item analysis was used to exclude items which did not discriminate between upper and lower halves by a critical ratio of 2. Weights were assigned arbitrarily without the use of statistical devices. The indexes were used as a basis for establishing categories with respect to the family factors rather than as numerical measures of those factors.

DEPENDENCE UPON FAMILY LABOR AND CHANGE

The extent to which the family supplies the labor requirement for the farm is an indication of interdependence between family and farm. Since the main hypothesis is based upon the assumption that such interdependence exists, the relationship between proportion of labor supplied by the family and acceptance of change in farm technology will be presented first.

Four-fifths of the farm operators reported that the family provided almost all of the labor for the farm. Twelve per cent reported that family labor made up about three-fourths and eight per cent reported that family labor made up half or less of the total labor requirement. The chi square test of the comparison of expected and actual distribution of cases according to the three measures of acceptance and proportion of labor provided by the family reveals high probability of a negative association. The chi squares, with degrees of freedom and probability of chance association, are as follows: acceptance of innovations, 6.70, 2 d.f., less than .05; acceptance of improvements, 17.71, 6 d.f., less than .01; ar acceptance of all practices, 12.67, 6 d.f., less than .01.[5]

This consistent negative relationship between acceptance of change in farm technology and extent of labor provided by family suggests that there is interdependence between family and farm, although other explanations are not ruled out. For example, when size of farm is controlled, extent of labor provided by the family is negatively associated only with acceptance of innovations at a significant level (1 per cent). But the above data are evidence that family and farm are interdependent and that family

[4] Eleanor Godfrey has attempted to develop a typology based upon these and other dimensions of the family in "A Construction of Family Types and Their Empirical Validation," doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1950. Robert A. Rohwer has constructed an index of familism in *Family Factors and Tenure Experience*, Bulletin 375, Iowa Agricultural Experiment Station, Ames, Iowa, 1950. For measures of family integration, see Robert C. Angell, *The Family Encounters the Depression*, New York: Scribners, 1934, pp. 14–15; Ruth S. Cavan and K. Ranck, *The Family and the Depression*, Chicago: The University of Chicago, 1938; and, Reuben Hill, *Families Under Stress*, New York: Harper and Bros., 1949, pp. 130–132 and 426–428.

[5] Tables from which the chi squares for the associations presented in this paper are on file in the Department of Rural Sociology, University of Wisconsin.

factors are likely to influence decisions in farm matters.

FAMILY INTEGRATION AND CHANGE

Family integration as used here refers to the degree to which the family functions as a unit in attaining common goals with the interest of the individual members being considered. Four aspects of integration obtained from the wife's responses are: joint participation, cooperation, expression of solidarity and esprit de corps. An index of integration was constructed, based upon weighted ratings for each of these four aspects.[6] Joint participation was rated by the interviewer as "almost everything," "many," "some," "few," and "almost none" with weights from five to one. The rating was based upon responses to questions asked of the wife about extent of joint family participation in church activities, visiting, vacations, picnics and fairs. Cooperation of family members was rated from "very cooperative" to "very uncooperative" on the basis of the wife's response to a direct question. Feeling of solidarity was rated by the interviewer as "very high," "above average," "average," "some dissatisfaction" and "much dissatisfaction." Responses to questions about assisting children in getting started in farming or in another occupation, supporting parents in old age, attitude of wife toward helping with field work, attitude of husband toward helping with housework, and feeling about chores for children provided a basis for the rating. Degree of esprit de corps was rated by the interviewer as "much pride in family," "some pride in family" and "no pride in family" with weights from three to one. The ratings were based primarily upon reference to past and present family status and accomplishments. Each of the four aspects of family integration is relatively independent in that the coefficients of correlation of each aspect with the other range from + .34 to + .58. Also integration as measured is independent of familism, with a correlation of only — .04. This meets the criticism that some measures of solidarity reflect familism more than solidarity, expressed as the mutual satisfaction of individuals in their association with each other.[7]

Integration of the family as measured is not an indication of the extent to which family roles and relationships are involved in farm matters. Rather, it is an indication of the coherence of the family unit. It was conceived that integration might operate to influence acceptance of change in at least two different ways. On the one hand, change tends to disrupt established behavior patterns and expectations. To this extent integration would be expected to be negatively associated with change in farming techniques. On the other hand, family integration and cooperation might be expected to provide motivation for change to the extent that such change would result in benefits to the family. Consequently, no consistent relationship was expected between the measures of family integration and adoption of changes in farming.

As shown in Table 1, only two out of fifteen associations between integration variables and the acceptance variables were significant at the 5 per cent level of probability. The index of integration is associated with the acceptance of innovations and with the acceptance of improvements at no less than about a 50–50 probability. Only the rating of family solidarity is positively associated with the acceptance of improvements in farming at the 5 per cent level of probability and the rating of esprit de corps is positively associated with the index of acceptance of all practices at the .1 per cent level of probability.

These findings suggest that while family integration tends to be positively associated with acceptance of innovations and improvements in farming in that all associations were in a positive direction and two were associated at much above chance expectations, the null form of the hypothesis cannot be rejected with much certainty. If integration is a factor in acceptance of innovations and improvements in farming, it operates more as a conditioning than as a causal factor. Multiple and partial correlations of integration and other factors with

[6] See Reuben Hill, *op. cit.*, pp. 426–428.

[7] Luther T. Jansen, "Measuring Family Solidarity," *American Sociological Review*, 17 (December, 1952), pp. 727–733.

TABLE 1. CHI SQUARES AND PROBABILITY OF CHANCE ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN MEASURES OF FAMILY INTEGRATION AND THE ACCEPTANCE OF INNOVATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS IN FARMING

	Index of Innovations			Index-of Improvements			Index of All Practices		
	Chi Square	Degrees of Freedom	Probability (less than)	Chi Square	Degrees of Freedom	Probability (less than)	Chi Square	Degrees of Freedom	Probability (less than)
Index of integration	8.70	9	.50	10.00	9	.50	6.98	9	.70
Cooperation of family members	6.44	6	.50	1.93	6	.95	4.06	6	.70
Joint participation of family	6.58	6	.50	4.39	6	.70	7.47	6	.30
Rating of family solidarity	5.26	6	.70	13.97	6	.05	6.83	6	.50
Esprit de corps	10.14	6	.20	10.16	6	.20	29.96	6	.001

acceptance are necessary to provide a more conclusive test.[8]

FAMILISM AND CHANGE

By familism is meant the ascendence of family interests over the interests of the individual members as expressed in the maintenance of family tradition, property, social contacts, and occupational pursuits.[9] Due to limitations in the scope of the study, an index of familism was constructed to include only certain indications of the degree of dependence upon and feeling of obligation to immediate kin and family members between generations. Dependence includes the idea of dependence for mutual assistance and social contact as well as dependence for obtaining a start in farming. The feeling of obligation to children and to other kin is the reciprocal of dependence. The index of familism is composed of items of four types: (a) those pertaining to influence of parents in occupational choice of children, (b) nature of expectations pertaining to transfer of farm to children and to support of parents in old age, (c) extent to which parents are the source of knowledge about farming and about homemaking, and (d) the extent of social contact and mutual assistance between relatives as compared with nonrelatives (see Table 2). The families were divided into four categories with respect to degree of familism.

According to the general hypothesis, it was expected that the greater the degree of familism the less the acceptance of innovations, but there would be no relationship to the acceptance of improvements in farming. This is based upon the reasoning that dependence upon family and kin would result in more conservatism of the farm operator in taking on new practices, since that decision would be influenced by considerations of security and family interest as well as economic advantage. On the other hand, there would be no effect upon acceptance of improvements in existing farm operations since they involve less risk and less change in existing family norms and values.

The chi square test indicates that there is somewhat less than a 50 per cent probability of chance association between familism and acceptance of innovations, and 10 to 20 per cent probability of chance association between familism and the acceptance of improvements in farming (see Table 3). Furthermore, such association as does exist in both instances is in a positive rather than in a negative direction. Hence, the hypothesis is not supported with respect to the relationship between familism and changes in farm technology. There is no significant negative association between familism, as measured, and acceptance of innovations, and the tendency toward

[8] That family integration does influence certain types of family behavior is indicated by the positive association between joint family participation, family solidarity, and index of integration, with an index of family living at the 1 per cent level of probability.

[9] See Ernest W. Burgess and Harvey Locke, *The Family From Institution to Companionship*, New York: American Book Co., 1945, p. 64.

TABLE 2. ITEM ANALYSIS OF INDEX OF FAMILISM

Item	Total (170)	Number with Item: Upper Half (83)	Lower Half (87)	Critical Ratio of Difference	Weight
Inherited part or all of farm from parents	47	42	5	7.4	1
Husband feels that child should take over farm	80	49	31	3.2	1
Wife feels parents should provide at least some help for children to get started in farming because they can't get started otherwise	108	65	43	4.1	1
Husband feels parents ought to encourage children to go into farming or particular occupation	67	43	24	4.3	1
Wife feels parents ought to encourage children to go into farming or particular occupation	82	49	33	2.8	1
Husband feels children ought to support parents if unable to support themselves	112	66	46	3.8	1
Wife feels children ought to support parents if unable to support themselves	118	66	52	2.9	1
Wife learned most about home-making from mother	87	52	35	3.0	1
Very high index of kinship * contacts	18	18	0	4.9	4
High index of kinship contacts	63	56	7	6.1	2

* Index of kinship contacts was based upon:
(1) Whether most of relatives of each husband and wife lived nearby
(2) Whether most of relatives of husband and wife belonged to same church
(3) Whether family visited more with relatives than nonrelatives
(4) Whether husband exchanged work more with relatives than nonrelatives
(5) Whether family keeps in close touch with relatives not living nearby

positive association between familism and acceptance of improvements is contrary to the expectation.

These findings, contrary to the hypothesis, lead to further analysis and inspection of individual cases with high and low familism. The first observation is that high familism is positively associated with the adoption of improvements in farming for those cases in which the family provided more than three-fourths of the labor for the farm. While this association is significant at the 1 per cent level, there is no evidence of association between the two variables for those cases in which a substantial amount of outside labor was hired. This suggests that the positive relationship of familism with acceptance is greatest when the family contributes almost all of the labor for the farm.

A second observation is that degree of familism is related to size of farm. When the cases are classified by familism and by acceptance of those changes regarded as improvements for those with less than 100 acres of cropland and for those with 100 acres and over separately, the positive relationship between familism and acceptance disappears. An interpretation is that familism responses reflect the greater land resources of the family. Perhaps where there is more investment in land, there is more to be gained by reciprocal relationships between young and old generations. Perhaps

TABLE 3. CHI SQUARES AND PROBABILITY OF CHANCE ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN INDEX OF FAMILISM, INDEX OF KINSHIP CONTACTS, SOURCE OF KNOWLEDGE ABOUT FARMING, AND ACCEPTANCE OF INNOVATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS IN FARMING

	Index of Innovations			Index of Improvements			Index of All Practices		
	Chi Square	Degrees of Freedom	Probability (less than)	Chi Square	Degrees of Freedom	Probability (less than)	Chi Square	Degrees of Freedom	Probability (less than)
Index of familism	10.38	9	.50	13.15	9	.20	10.17	9	.50
Index of kinship contacts	1.95	6	.95	6.92	9	.70	5.22	9	.90
Whether husband learned most about farming from father	2.05	2	.50	12.14	3	.01	9.72	3	.05

familism in one sense is a product of the attempt on the part of the family to attain or to maintain security and status of both young and old generations.

The index of kinship contacts, taken as a separate measure of familism, shows no relationship either positive or negative to the acceptance of innovations or improvements in farming. Whether husband learned most about farming from his father, however, is negatively associated with the acceptance of improvements in farming at the 1 per cent level of probability. Those who said they had learned most from their fathers had adopted fewest improvements in farming, although they had adopted about as many innovations. While these findings are not in direct support of the original hypothesis, the negative association between dependence upon father for knowledge

TABLE 4. ITEM ANALYSIS INDEX OF FATHER-CENTERED DECISION MAKING

Item	Total (170)	Number with Item: Upper Half (74)	Number with Item: Lower Half (96)	Critical Ratio of Difference	Weight
Chores for children important as a duty	67	41	26	3.9	1
Husband does not discuss farm matters except buying major farm equipment with wife	82	51	31	5.1	2
Husband feels that boys should not be free to make own decisions until they are 20 or 21	65	35	30	2.1	1
Husband is most influential in decisions on farm equipment, household appliances, and automobile	32	26	6	4.8	2
Husband decides on spending money or recreation or both for children	21	19	2	4.5	1
Children do not have separate savings or bank account	79	48	31	4.5	1
Husband decides on more of children's activities than wife	16	13	3	3.0	1
Children not consulted on either spending money or recreation	90	49	41	3.1	1
Deed to farm in husband's name only	19	15	4	3.2	1

TABLE 5. CHI SQUARES AND PROBABILITY OF CHANCE ASSOCIATION OF INDEX OF FATHER-CENTERED DECISION-MAKING, DISCUSSION OF FARM MATTERS WITH SON AND ATTITUDE TOWARD PARTNERSHIP AND SHARE ARRANGEMENTS, WITH ACCEPTANCE OF INNOVATIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS IN FARMING

	Index of Innovations			Index of Improvements			Index of All Practices		
	Chi Square	Degrees of Freedom	Probability (less than)	Chi Square	Degrees of Freedom	Probability (less than)	Chi Square	Degrees of Freedom	Probability (less than)
Index of father-centered decision making	3.23	6	.80	3.44	9	.95	6.07	6	.50
Farm matters discussed with sons *	0.71	4	.95	11.02	6	.10	14.02	6	.05
Best method of compensating sons interested in farming	9.48	4	.05	7.51	6	.30	15.49	6	.05

* Excludes 47 cases with no sons 16 years of age.

about farming and acceptance of improvements in farming does suggest that a dependent family role is not conducive to making changes in farm technology.

FATHER-CENTERED DECISION-MAKING AND CHANGE

The extent to which decision-making for the family is centered in the father and is influenced by traditional norms rather than by the interests of other members of the family is the third dimension of family organization associated with acceptance of innovations and improvements in farming. Items composing the index of father-centered decision-making include responses of the wife to questions about the nature of decision-making in farm matters, household matters, and matters pertaining to children's activities (see Tabe 4).

The hypothesis is that the more father-centered the decision-making the fewer innovations accepted, but there would be no association with improvements accepted. The reasoning is that the acceptance of innovations is not as likely to occur in farm matters when the father exerts most influence in all decisions. The father's authority is likely to be based upon traditional definition of the father's role of carrying on the practices proved on the basis of past experience rather than of trying out new ideas based upon scientific experiments. Also, the acceptance of innovations with risk of failure in producing the desired results is not consistent with the maintenance of his position of authority.

The chi square test of contingency between father-centered decision making and acceptance of innovations and of improvements in farming reveals no association of consequence in either case. Examination of the distribution of cases within the highest category of acceptance of innovations, however, reveals seven out of fifty of those low in father-centered decision with very high acceptance, and only one out of nineteen of those high in father-centered decision at the same level of acceptance. Such differences do not exist at the lower levels of acceptance. This suggests that while shared decision making might be an important condition for high acceptance, low acceptance is influenced by many other factors (see Table 5).

The hypothesis is supported only insofar as it applies to the relationship between the index of father-centered decision-making and acceptance of improvements in farming. The expectation that father-centered decision-making would have a negative effect upon acceptance of innovations is not upheld. But, the use of two other items not included in the index presents some additional evidence related to the hypothesis. Fathers who discussed farm matters with their sons had adopted more total practices than had those who had not. Also, those farmers who thought that partnership or

share arrangements were best, for compensating sons interested in remaining on the farm, had adopted more innovations than had those who thought separate projects were best. In a partnership or share arrangement it is expected that the son would share more in the decisions than if the son had a separate project. These findings suggest that while the nature of decision-making within the family in general has little bearing upon acceptance of change in farm technology, perhaps the relationship between father and son with respect to farm matters does have a bearing upon acceptance.

CONCLUSIONS

Evidence presented in this study suggests that family relationships as indicated by integration, familism, and father-centered decision-making have little direct influence upon the acceptance of innovations or improvements in farming. Such association as does occur suggests that these structural factors operate to affect acceptance at the higher levels but do not explain low acceptance. In other words, degrees of integration, familism, and father-centered decision-making are not predictive of acceptance in themselves. Of higher predictive value are specific items related to the operation of the farm enterprise such as whether the informant learned most about farming from father rather than from other sources, or the nature of the arrangement between father and son with respect to farm matters.

There is evidence from data not presented in this paper that goals and values of the farm operator and his wife are more highly associated with acceptance of innovations and improvements in the farm than are the structural factors. Furthermore, it is known that situational factors and contacts for information influence acceptance of practices.[10]

There is little evidence that the family factors considered in this paper have a different influence upon the acceptance of innovations as distinguished from the acceptance of improvements in farming as two separate measures of change in farm technology. Direction of association between the family factors and the two acceptance indexes were the same in all cases where there was evidence of association, although there were differences in probability of association.

It is concluded that while there are important mutual influences between the farm and the family, variations in general family structure do not necessarily produce variations in the farm in at least one important respect, the acceptance of innovations and improvements in farming. A related conclusion is that the role of husband-father has no consistent influence upon the role of farm operator in the acceptance of changes in farm technology.

[10] Eugene A. Wilkening, *Acceptance of Improved Farm Practices in Three Coastal Plain Counties of North Carolina*, Technical Bulletin 98, North Carolina Agricultural Experiment Station, Raleigh, North Carolina, May, 1952; and, "Sources of Information for Improved Farm Practices," *Rural Sociology*, 15 (March, 1950), pp. 19–30.

LEADERSHIP AMONG PRISON INMATES

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INEFFECTIVENESS of our penal institutions as therapeutic agencies is usually explained in terms of inadequate treatment facilities,[1] inferior qualifications of administrators,[2] or the criminogenic characteristics of inmates.[3] The social climate of

[1] Harry Elmer Barnes and Negley K. Teeters, *New Horizons in Criminology*, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1951, especially Chapters 22 and 26.

[2] Kenyon J. Scudder, *Prisoners are People*, Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1952.

[3] J. A. Johnson, *Alcatraz Island Prison*, New York: Scribner's, 1949.

the prison and the interpersonal relations among the inmates have received less attention.[4] Failure to investigate more thoroughly the dynamics of interaction among prison inmates may be a serious theoretical and methodological omission in criminological research.[5]

Results of an investigation into inmate interaction in a western state prison are reported in this paper. Although data were obtained on several kinds of interaction, such as congeniality, antagonism, and leadership, the discussion here is limited to leadership phenomena.

THE PROBLEM

The study is chiefly concerned with two problems: (1) How may inmate leaders and their followers be identified? (2) Assuming that leaders and followers are known, how may their interrelations be investigated so as to promote the eventual prediction and control of leadership phenomena?

Conclusive solutions to the above problems would require an experimental answer to the question: Who among the inmates says or does what to whom, and with what effect? However, common sense opinions are such compelling forces in the determination of penal policies that random techniques and experimental controls are rarely tolerated in prison research. We are consequently forced to use non-experimental research procedures which, if interpreted consistently with certain assumptions, may enable us to approximate the results of an experiment.[6]

RESEARCH PROCEDURES

Designation of leaders and followers. Data on leadership were obtained from a sociometric schedule which was administered to the residents of Trusty Quarters, a medium custody building within the prison.[7] One hundred and forty-three respondents completed and returned their schedules.[8] Included in the schedules is an item designed to obtain the names of inmate leaders.[9] Responses to this item were validated against the results of an official election in which members of the Inmate's Council were chosen.[10] Results of the election, held one week after the schedules were completed, are in agreement with our sociometric data.[11]

Hypotheses to be tested. Eventual prediction and control of prison leadership requires (1) identification of the general characteristics of leaders and (2) knowledge

[4] Most important among the studies of prison social structure are Donald Clemmer, ***The Prison Community***, Boston: Christopher Publishing House, 1940: Hans Reimer, "Socialization in the Prison Community," ***Proceedings of the American Prison Association*** (1937), pp. 151–155; Norman S. Hayner and Ellis Ash, "The Prison as a Community," ***American Sociological Review***, 5 (April, 1940), pp. 577–583; Kirson Weinberg, "Aspects of the Prison's Social Structure," ***American Journal of Sociology***, 47 (March, 1942), pp. 717–726.

[5] For studies of inmate interaction see J. L. Moreno, ***Who Shall Survive?*** Washington, D. C.: Nervous and Mental Disease Publishing Company, 1934; and Helen Jennings, ***Leadership and Isolation***, New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1943.

[6] Assumptions in science are propositions which, although perhaps capable of proof, are accepted without proof for the purposes at hand. They should be consistent with current theories and empirical evidence. The assumptions required in this study are: (1) Social interaction is a prerequisite for any important influence to be exerted on one inmate by another. (2) Inmates are able and willing to name those of their fellows who influence them. (3) A sociometric test is a reliable device for securing information on inmate influence and interaction. For evidence concerning these assumptions see, for example, Moreno, *op. cit.*, and Jennings, *op. cit.*

[7] Trusty Quarters houses inmates adjudged unlikely to escape or commit serious rule infractions. More seriously maladjusted inmates are housed in the Strong Box, a close custody building. The author for several years was Director of Classification at the prison.

[8] This is a forty per cent sample of the Trusty Quarters population. No significant differences were observed between the sample and the rest of the inmates on any social or criminal characteristics. Chi-square tests were used at the five per cent level of significance.

[9] This item was stated as follows: "Name the inmates now in the institution who are in your opinion best fitted to represent the rest of the inmates by selection for the Council. List your first choice on the line below, then your second choice on the second line." The present analysis is restricted to first choices.

[10] The Council, elected annually, consults with the staff on such matters as recreation, inmate welfare, visits, and correspondence privileges.

[11] Distributions of sociometric choices and of votes in the election did not differ significantly according to the chi-square test at the five per cent level.

of the kinds of inmates who are most likely to be influenced by certain types of leaders. Accordingly, two sets of hypotheses were in this study submitted to statistical test. The first set is concerned with the question: Are the social and criminal backgrounds of inmate leaders significantly different from those of the other prisoners? Specifically, these hypotheses, stated in null form, assert that leaders are not significantly different from the total Trusty Quarters population with respect to age, ethnic status, occupation, marital status, educational attainment, test intelligence, type of offense, previous criminal record, or institutional adjustment. Rejection of certain of these hypotheses identifies background characteristics that are significantly associated with the status of inmate leader.

The second set of hypotheses is concerned with the question: Do variations in the social and criminal backgrounds of our respondents influence their choices for leaders? Stated in null form, these hypotheses assert that leadership preferences, as indicated by responses to our schedule, are independent of the background factors mentioned above. That is, expressions of preference are expected to be uninfluenced by variations in the backgrounds of our respondents. However, rejection of some of these hypotheses implies that the characteristics of leaders differ significantly according to the characteristics of the respondents by whom they are chosen. Thus, consensus among the prisoners does not occur with respect to their leadership preferences.

Detailed knowledge of the general characteristics of leaders and of the variations in leadership preferences among different groups of inmates should facilitate the prediction and regulation of interpersonal contacts and influences within the prison community. Such information should simplify the control of the prisoner population by means of segregation or special assignments.

Procedures for testing the hypotheses. The above hypotheses, when tested by conventional chi-square analysis,[12] may be accepted or rejected within specified degrees of probability. For example, the assertion that leaders do not differ from the rest of the Trusty Quarters prisoners was tested by classifying the two groups of inmates according to the sub-categories of a given characteristic, and then determining the significance of the difference between the two resulting frequency distributions.[13] This procedure was repeated for each of the characteristics on which reliable information was available.

The second set of hypotheses, asserting that leadership preferences are independent of the respondents' characteristics, requires a somewhat more elaborate testing procedure. To illustrate, Table 1 presents data on leaders and followers classified according to type of offense. Leaders and the respondents by whom they were chosen are classified with respect to a given characteristic, type of offense, and the resulting data are recorded in a 3 by 3 table. Traits of leaders are plotted in rows and those of followers in columns. Obviously rows equal columns in number, and there are as many of each as there are sub-categories within the characteristic used in classifying the inmates.

TABLE 1. LEADERS AND RESPONDENTS WHO CHOSE THEM CLASSIFIED BY TYPE OF OFFENSE

Leaders	Respondents			Totals
	Violence	Sex	Property	
Violence	31	20	41	92
Sex	3	12	4	19
Property	7	3	22	32
Totals	41	35	67	143

Cell frequencies in Table 1 may easily be compared to a hypothetical model which is based on the assumption that leadership choices are independent of type of offense. This model is constructed by making cell frequencies proportional to the products of their row and column totals. If the hypothesis of independence is tenable, the model should duplicate the cell frequencies in Table 1. Large discrepancies between the two sets of frequencies, on the other hand,

[12] Testing procedures were followed as outlined in John F. Kenney, *Mathematics of Statistics*, New York: Van Nostrand, 1939, Vol. II, pp. 168–186.

[13] Chi-square test was used at the five per cent level.

would require that the hypothesis be rejected.

Significance of the differences between the frequencies observed in Table 1 and those of the model may be determined by the usual chi-square test of independence. Chi-square for Table 1 rejects the independence hypothesis at the one per cent level of significance. Thus, leadership preferences, according to our data, are significantly related to the crimes for which the respondents were committed to prison.

What, however, is the nature of the relationship between leadership and type of offense? Further analysis of the data brings out several other important facts regarding prison leadership. For example, the most striking disparities between the independence model and Table 1 occur along the diagonal of homogeneity. That is, violent offenders [14] are almost exclusive in their preference for leaders who are also violent offenders, while sex offenders prefer sex offenders, and property offenders likewise choose leaders from their own offense category. This tendency for like to choose like is significant at the one per cent level.[15] Furthermore, persons committed for violent or property offenses refrain from choosing sex offenders and, conversely, sex offenders avoid choosing property offenders.[16] Despite these differences in the choice patterns of certain types of offenders, there is nevertheless a significant tendency for persons in all offense categories to select leaders who are committed for crimes of violence. Thus, statistical analysis of Table 1 shows that although a certain offense category—namely, crimes of violence—is uniformly related to leader status, important differences occur in the preference patterns of inmates who are classified by the offenses for which they were imprisoned.

Analyses similar to the above were made of the interrelations among leaders and followers classified according to each of the previously mentioned background factors.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

Characteristics of the leader group. What are the determinants of leadership in a prison community? Comparison of our leaders with the total population suggests that, in general, factors related to criminal career and institutional adjustment are significantly associated with leadership, while social and economic background traits are not. Leaders, as a group, do not differ from the other inmates with respect to age, occupation, educational attainment, ethnic status, marital status, or scores on an intelligence test.[17] However, leaders have served more years in prison, have longer sentences remaining to be served, are more frequently charged with crimes of violence, and are more likely to be repeated offenders.[18] Significantly more leaders than other inmates are officially diagnosed as homosexual, psychoneurotic, or psychopathic.[19] Finally, the institutional adjustments of leaders are marked by a significantly greater number of serious rule infractions, including escape, attempted escape, fighting, and assault.

Infrequently selected as leaders are first offenders, non-violent offenders, or persons with short prison sentences. Most important among the determinants of leadership are criminal maturity, comparatively permanent tenure in the institution, and habits of aggressiveness and violence. It is probable, therefore, that the group identifications of the inmates are generally organized around the activities and interests of the least improvable offenders, and that the values of the prison culture encourage rebellion and non-conformity.

Patterns of preference among the respondents. What are the major variations in the leader preferences of our respondents? Choices of certain groups of inmates deviate significantly from the pattern outlined

[14] Violent offenders include, chiefly, cases of murder, assault, or robbery with a weapon.

[15] The significance of the departure of any cell or set of cells from the frequencies expected according to the model can be computed by appropriately partitioning the contributions to the chi-square total.

[16] This barrier between sex offenders and other inmates is also statistically significant.

[17] Differences not significant at five per cent level.

[18] Differences are significant at five per cent level.

[19] All diagnoses were obtained from official case records.

above. Different choice patterns of inmates classified by type of offense have already been mentioned. Other important variations occur with respect to both social and criminal background factors.

First offenders, for example, select leaders who are first offenders.[20] Recidivists do so infrequently. Inmates serving short sentences prefer short-termers, whereas persons serving long sentences very rarely choose short-termers as leaders. Again, inmates with clear conduct records exclude those who have committed serious rule infractions. Conversely, the well-behaved inmates are excluded by the more fractious prisoners. Homosexuals, psychoneurotics, and psychopaths show greater preference for leaders from their own ranks than do the rest of the inmates.

We have already noted that leaders, as a group, do not differ significantly from the other inmates with respect to social background. However, preference patterns are significantly associated with certain social characteristics. Ethnic status is an example. Whites choose whites with rare exceptions, while Negroes tend to choose Negroes. Other ethnic groups scatter their choices throughout the prisoner population. Preferences are also associated with level of intelligence. Superior inmates choose leaders who have superior intelligence, while average and dull inmates choose leaders from their own intelligence classes. On the other hand, no significant differences were observed among respondents classified by age, occupation, education, or marital status.

Data on preference patterns, then, show that respondents, when classified by offense, sentence, previous criminal record, institutional adjustment, ethnic status, or test intelligence, tend to choose leaders who have traits similar to their own. This tendency for like to choose like is statistically significant. It provides the chief source of deviation from the general pattern of leader preference.

Importance of propinquity. Are leadership preferences related to the physical distances between groups of inmates? Segregation of inmates presumably regulates frequency of contact and thereby facilitates the regimentation of inmate activities. If segregation is effective, its influence should be reflected in the choices of our respondents. To test the effect of segregation, leaders and the respondents who chose them were classified according to whether they (1) reside in same cell,[21] (2) reside in different cells on same tier of building, (3) reside on different tiers of same building, and (4) reside in separate buildings. The data show that degree of physical proximity is an important determinant of leader preference.[22] The probability that a given inmate will be chosen by a certain respondent varies inversely with the physical distance between them. Thus, our findings confirm the utility of segregation as a device for regulating inmate interaction.

CONCLUSIONS

Results of this study, of course, cannot be generalized to other institutions until similar investigations are made elsewhere. Tentatively, however, we may conclude that leadership in prison is exercised by the criminally mature inmates who are serving long sentences for crimes of violence.[23] Status of an inmate is ordinarily enhanced by acts of violence within the institution, by homosexuality, or by psychoneurotic or psychopathic behavior. Prison culture is organized around the values of its most persistent and least improvable members. It stimulates aggressive anti-social behavior and minimizes the status of the naive or accidental offender. Socialization in prison means, for many inmates, the acquisition of the skills and attitudes of the habitual criminal.

Despite the dominance of the violent recidivists, certain groups of inmates direct their leadership choices toward persons who possess characteristics the same as their

[20] Differences in choice patterns discussed in this section are significant at the five per cent level.

[21] Trusty Quarters houses four inmates in each cell.

[22] The findings are statistically significant. For example, the ratio of observed to expected choices in the first distance interval is 27 to 1; in the fourth interval, it is 1 to 3.

[23] Our findings are generally consistent with those of Clemmer, *op. cit.*, who used a participant observer technique. They do not, however, support the observations of Reimer, *op. cit.*

own. Short-termers, first offenders, persons convicted of non-violent crimes, and inmates who make good institutional adjustments create within the prison society a number of dissentient minorities. These minorities resist, at least to some extent, the dominant influence of the typical leader group. Thus, an effective classification program may segregate these minorities and in this way neutralize the influence of the more mature criminals.

Physical proximity is an important determinant of inmate influence and leadership. The kinds of influences an inmate encounters in prison life are largely determined by his immediate associates, especially his cell partners.

The above considerations clearly challenge the current trend toward construction of massive, multi-purpose prisons. They indicate the desirability of smaller and more specialized institutions. In a heterogeneous prisoner population, the hardened offenders may inevitably rise to positions of leadership. This is true even among the carefully selected Trusty Quarters inmates. It therefore seems likely that mass treatment, with its economy in construction and supervision, provides a misplaced emphasis in contemporary prison administration.

A QUANTITATIVE STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE

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The basic question the present study is trying to answer is whether the sociology of knowledge must be dealt with in a speculative, philosophical manner or whether it can be approached in a way consistent with the present day approach to other problems of scientific sociology. The latter approach presupposes that the phenomena generally understood by the term "knowledge" in such contexts, that is science, philosophy, religion, literature, be considered as part of the social and cultural activities of man, in no essential way different from his other activities. The task of a study in this field lies in determining relationships between activities of "knowledge" and some other activities.

To fit into a framework of scientific sociology, the study has to proceed inductively rather than deductively. The induction has to be based on many observations rather than a few isolated cases. Preferably, it should be carried on by mathematical means. Furthermore, the study should lead to the possibility of prediction from one set of variables to others. No unnecessary burden of *a priori* assumptions should hamper its development.

The present paper describes the quantitative approach taken to a specific problem in the sociology of knowledge: how are types of epistemological thinking related to social and cultural change, individual freedom of action, and general security? A number of hypotheses, constructed on the basis of informally gained impressions, were set up to answer this question. To avoid repetition, they will be given together with the findings that modify them.

METHOD

Measurement of Correspondence to Types. In order to have a quantitative study of epistemological thinking, it is necessary to develop a way of measuring such thinking. The present study attempts to measure the degree to which the thought of any given thinker corresponds to each of four types of epistemological thinking. Descriptions of the four types follow:[1]

Type A — Universalism, or "realism" in the Medieval sense. The thinker assumes identity of thinking and being. Reasoning is

[1] These types and their descriptions are derived from Karl Pribram, *Conflicting Patterns of Thought*, Public Affairs Press, Washington, D. C., pp. 1–49.

credited with the power to know the truth with the aid of given general concepts and to establish absolutely valid rules for the organization of human relationships in accordance with these concepts. Such concepts are divinely implanted or otherwise innate.

Type B—Nominalism. Thinking appears in terms of hypothetical concepts. The thinker considers all concepts as creations of the human mind, reached by grouping objects and impressions in accordance with their common characteristics. The mind is perfectly free in forming and defining general concepts in accordance with objectives these concepts are intended to serve. Knowledge and understanding of phenomena are held to be attained primarily by experience.

Type C—Organismic, or intuitional thinking. Wholes are constructed according to the organic principle. The whole is said to live in its members as the members live in the whole. Man as a member of a whole has direct insight into the nature of this whole which may be society, the state, nature, the universe. With the aid of some sort of inner light, the mind is thus able to form concepts and judgments, independently of the observation of particulars. It has the power to grasp the essential characteristics of complex phenomena in their totality and to segregate these characteristics from accidental and fortuitous features in order to arrive at insight into the true nature of events.

Type D—Dialectic thinking. The thinker assumes an ability of the mind to interpret all phenomena and events in their continuously changing aspects in terms of an evolutionary process which can be fully understood only when the fundamental concepts correspond to the trichotomous character of the process—thesis, antithesis, synthesis. He has a firm belief that the human mind is able to understand the universe, and hence to grasp the truth. The course of events is determined by the operation of antagonistic forces and must be understood with the aid of concepts adjusted to the contradictions logically represented by these forces.

For the purpose of measurement, the name of a thinker was submitted to a panel of philosophers or sociologists, presumably familiar with his work, who were asked to state which type he resembled most in their opinion. These judges were given the type descriptions with only their alphabetical designations, not the names of the types, so that differences in the subjective meanings of these names would not intrude themselves into the study.

It was hoped that a relation would prevail between the thought content on the one hand and percentages of judges' votes on the other. Thus it was assumed that the work of a man judged by 80 per cent of the judges to be most similar to type A would be more universalist in content than one judged only by 60 per cent to be most similar to this type, but less universalist than one judged by 95 per cent to resemble it most. Thus the percentage of the judges' votes serves as indirect measurement of correspondence to a type. The validity of this measurement cannot be proved, however, and is not claimed. Only when another, independent, method of measurement is tried, will it be possible to compare the results of this and the other. In the meantime, it will be well to remember that any statement made in this paper about degree of resemblance to a type of thought refers only to percentages of votes of judges.

Every thinker is thus characterized by four measurements, each indicating the degree of resemblance of his thought to that of one of the four types of thinking.

The other variables in this study are change, freedom of action, and security. While contemporary events could conceivably be measured directly with regard to these variables, this cannot be done for periods of the past. And if thinkers of the past are studied, it is obviously necessary to pair measurements of their epistemological type correspondences to measurements of change, freedom, and security of their own times. Thus it was decided to treat measurement of historical periods according to the named characteristics in a manner similar to that used in measuring correspondence to type.

Historical periods were submitted to panels of historians who were asked to check the following characteristics concerning each period:

- a1 rapid change
- a2 slow change
- b1 change faster than in directly preceding time in the same area

b2 change at same speed as in directly preceding time in the same area
b3 change slower than in directly preceding time in the same area
c1 change directed toward more regulation of individual action
c2 change directed toward less regulation of individual action
c3 change not related to regulation of individual action at all
d1 time of general security
d2 time of general insecurity
e1 more secure than directly preceding time in the same area
e2 equally secure as directly preceding time in the same area
e3 less secure than directly preceding time in the same area

By counting all the votes of the judges received for each period and by determining the percentage that voted for a1 rather than a2, an indirect estimate of speed of change was obtained. The same was done for variables b, c, d, and e respectively. The logic of the procedure as well as the objections to it are essentially the same as with regard to the resemblance to types of thinking.

The next step was to correlate each of the variables A, B, C, and D with each of the variables a1, b1, b2, b3, c1, c2, c3, d1, e1, e2 and e3. The variables a2 and d2 could, of course, be omitted without loss of information.

Sampling. Four sampling problems arose in the course of this study. Samples of thinkers and samples of periods were to be studied, samples of philosophers and sociologists and samples of historians were needed as judges.

The universe of thinkers is hard to define. It seems that only such thinking is worthy of inclusion which has left or appears to be leaving a lasting mark on the history of thought. No complete list of such thinkers is available, and so it would be difficult to choose an unbiased sample from among them. Therefore it was decided to select a sample first and to define the universe as consisting of all those thinkers who might become part of such a sample whenever another one was wanted. The sample consists of the thinkers generally included in the author's course in the history of social theory. The universe represented by this sample is probably constituted by all the thinkers that are included or at some past or future date have been or will be included in somebody else's course of a similar nature.

The choice of historical periods, on the other hand, offered no difficulties once the question of what thinkers were to be included was settled. The periods of the sample are the approximate life times of the thinkers of the sample. The periods constituting the universe are the life times of all the thinkers in the universe. In times in which the life spans of many thinkers overlap, periods between important historical events combining several life spans or parts of several life spans were used instead of individual life spans.

The philosophers' panel of judges was taken from a membership list of the American Philosophical Association by a random method. The total panel of 600 was divided into five smaller panels of 120. Each of these smaller panels received a list of eleven thinkers to judge.

A panel of 120 sociologists was chosen randomly from those members of the American Sociological Society who, in the membership list of 1946, stated an interest in theory. The list of thinkers submitted to them contained 21 names.

A sample of 600 historians was taken from the membership list of the American Historical Association by a random method and subdivided into five panels. Each panel received a list containing nine or ten historical periods to be judged.

Thirty per cent of the philosophers, 34 per cent of the sociologists, and 41 per cent of the historians approached returned completed questionnaires.

Correlation. Scatter diagrams were prepared to discover the general types of relationship prevailing between each of the four types of thought and each of the eleven characteristics of periods. Of these 44 diagrams, one half failed to show any discernible relationship: these were the diagrams representing organismic-intuitional and dialectic thinking. This seems to indicate a lack of relationship between these types of thought and chosen characteristic of historical periods. For the time being, this part of the study had to be dropped.

The other diagrams showed tendencies to curvilinear relationships and indicated that the use of types of thought as independent

variables leads to better fitted curves than the use of characteristics of periods as independent variables. Second degree parabolas were chosen to represent the relationships throughout.

FINDINGS

Five hypotheses were considered. In the present section these are each stated in the original form in which they were conceived, along with the correlation results bearing on them. The final form of the hypotheses, after modification in view of the results, is then stated in each case.

Hypothesis 1. In its original form the hypothesis was: rapid change is accompanied by nominalist thinking, slow change by universalist thinking.

The curvilinear correlation coefficient, rho, measuring the relationship between universalism (A) and rapid change (a1), is 0.39, which differs significantly (on the one per cent level) from a zero relationship. The prediction formula which estimates rapid change from universalism is $a1 = 82.9 - 0.29A + 0.003A^2$. This formula has a standard error of 18.5.

The rho which measures the relationship between nominalism (B) and rapid change (a1) is 0.228, which is statistically not significant. The equation by which rapid change may be predicted from nominalism is $a1 = 60 + 0.77B - 0.0063B^2$. The standard error of estimate is 19.6.

The scatter diagrams further show that thought of the kind included in the sample whether universalist or nominalist does tend not to occur in periods judged by less than one third of the judges as rapidly changing.

Hypothesis 1 must, then, be modified to read: remarkable thinking of any description does not occur with slow change, but requires or brings about a minimum speed of change. Speed of change is inversely related to universalist thought content. There is a slight positive relationship between nominalism and speed of change—the highest speed of change occurs at about 60 per cent nominalism. The expected value for speed of change at 100 per cent nominalism is, however, higher than at zero per cent.

Hypothesis 2. Originally, the second hypothesis of the study read as follows: increases in the speed of thought bring about increases in dialectic and organismic thinking. Decreases in the speed of thought bring about increases in universalism and decreases in nominalism.

In view of the appearance of the scatter diagrams, no equations for organismic or dialectic thinking were computed.

The correlation of universalism (A) with change faster than in the directly preceding period (b1) yielded a rho of 0.38, significant at the one per cent level. The equation of the curve is $b1 = 81.09 - 0.46A + 0.0035A^2$. The standard error of estimate is 16.1.

Nominalism (B) and change faster than in the directly preceding period (b1) are correlated with a rho of 0.332, significant at the one per cent level. The prediction equation is $b1 = 63.72 + 0.61B - 0.0055B^2$. The standard error of estimate is 16.97.

The relationship of Universalism (A) and change at the same speed as in the directly preceding time in the same area (b2) produces a rho of 0.44, which is significant at the one per cent level. The equation describing the relationship is $b2 = 10.37 + 0.68A - 0.0068A^2$. The standard error of estimate is 12.7.

The relationship of nominalism (B) to the same variable (b2) produces a rho of 0.285, significant at the five per cent level. The prediction equation is $b2 = 26.49 - 0.49B + 0.0044B^2$. The standard error of estimate is 13.6.

Universalism (A) is related to change slower than in the directly preceding period in the same area (b3) with a rho of 0.37 which is significant at the 1 per cent level. The prediction equation is $b3 = 4.14 + 0.32A - 0.0033A^2$. The standard error is 7.4.

Nominalism (B) is related to the same characteristic (b3) with a rho of 0.08, which is not significant. The equation is $b3 = 9.60 - 0.11B + 0.00095B^2$. The standard error is 7.94.

The scatter diagrams show furthermore that remarkable thought of any kind is unlikely to occur in times considered by less than one third of the judges as changing faster or by more than two thirds of the judges as changing at the same speed or by more than about one third of them as changing at a lower speed than preceding periods.

Thus hypothesis 2 assumes the following

modified form: increased speed of change is negatively related to universalism. It is, in the main, positively related to nominalism, the highest increase occurring with about 50 per cent nominalism. Both, universalism and nominalism, occur with high degrees of increased speed of change and low degrees of unchanged or decreasing speed of change. No relation seems to exist between change in the speed of change and either dialectics or organismicism.

Hypothesis 3. The original hypothesis read: change directed toward more regulation of individual action occurs with universalist thinking; change directed toward less regulation of individual action occurs with nominalist thinking.

Universalism (A) is related to change directed toward more regulation of individual action (c1) with a rho of 0.19 which is not significant. The equation describing the curve is $c1 = 47.52 - 0.13A + 0.0004A^2$. The standard error is 18.7.

Nominalism (B) is related to the same characteristic (c1) with a rho of 0.363, significant at the one per cent level. The equation is $c1 = 39.09 + 0.68B - 0.0083B^2$. The standard error is 17.6.

The relationship of Universalism (A) to change directed toward less regulation of individual action (c2) produces a rho of 0.16 which is not significant. The equation is $c2 = 34.47 + 0.28A - 0.0046A^2$. The standard error is 21.76.

The relationship of nominalism (B) to the same variable (c2) shows a rho of 0.335, significant at the one per cent level. The equation is $c2 = 23.70 + 0.40B - 0.0018B^2$. The standard error is 20.77.

Universalism (A) is related to change not related to the regulation of individual action at all (c3) with a rho of 0.433 which is significant at the one per cent level. The equation is $c3 = 20.38 - 0.39A + 0.007A^2$. The standard error of estimate is 12.2.

Nominalism (B) is related to the same variable (c3) with a rho of 0.396 which is significant at the one per cent level. The equation is $c3 = 29.4 - 0.53B + 0.0047B^2$. The standard error is 12.4.

The scatter diagrams furthermore show that remarkable thought of the kind included in this study does not occur in times considered by more than two thirds of the judges as unchanging with regard to regulation of individual action. It does not occur with times considered by more than 78 per cent or by less than 14 per cent of the judges as changing toward more regulation. It does not occur in times judged by more than 84 per cent of the judges as changing toward less regulation.

Modified according to these findings, the third hypothesis now reads: Universalism is weakly negatively related to increasing as well as decreasing regulation of individual action. It shows, however, a significant positive relationship to change not related to regulation of individual action at all. Nominalism shows a mainly negative relationship to increasing regulation of individual action and a clearly positive relationship to decreasing regulation. Only small variations in change not related to regulation of individual action at all can be related to nominalism. A minimum of change toward or away from regulation is necessary for remarkable thought to occur. Change directed too strongly or not strongly enough toward more change does not occur with remarkable thought. Such thought is unlikely to occur in times too strongly directed toward a lessening of regulation of individual action.

Hypothesis 4. Originally, the fourth hypothesis of the study read: security is related to nominalist thinking, insecurity is related to universalist, organismic, and dialectic thinking.

In view of the appearance of the scatter diagrams, no computations were made for either dialectics or organismicism.

The rho measuring the relationship of universalism (A) and time of general security (d1) is 0.42, which is significant at the one per cent level. The prediction equation reads $d1 = 62.46 - 1.07A + 0.011A^2$. The standard error of estimate is 20.25.

The rho measuring the relationship of nominalism (B) to time of general security (d1) is 0.036, which is not significant. The equation is $d1 = 52.03 - 0.45B + 0.0061B^2$. The concave appearance of this curve is very probably due to chance. A convex curve would be expected, and the arrangement of most of the data on the scatter diagram confirm this expectation. However, a few stray data pull the curve down to its present shape. The standard error is 22.4.

The scatter diagrams show that thought of the kind included in this study is unlikely to occur below 10 per cent and above 87 per cent of security. The same is, of course, true below 13 per cent and above 90 per cent of insecurity.

Consequently, the hypothesis was reworded to read now as follows: from zero per cent to about 50 per cent of universalist thought content, security shows a negative, from there on up a positive relationship to universalism. The opposite is true for insecurity. No statement with regard to nominalism should be made at present. With regard to dialectics and organismicism, the hypothesis must be regarded as rejected. It seems that both a minimum of security as well as a minimum of insecurity are needed for the occurrence of any remarkable thought of the kind included in this study.

Hypothesis 5. The original form of this hypothesis was: universalism, organismicism, and dialectics occur in periods which are less secure than preceding ones rather than in periods which are more secure. The opposite is the case for nominalism. The appearance of the scatter diagrams was such as to make any computations concerning dialectics and organismicism useless.

For the relationship of Universalism (A) to time more secure than that immediately preceding time in the same area (e1), the rho is 0.345, which is significant at the one per cent level. The equation is $e1 = 42.98 - 0.67A + 0.0077A^2$. The standard error is 15.4.

For the relationship of nominalism (B) to the same variable (e1) rho is 0.38, which is significant at the one per cent level. The equation is $e1 = 27.36 + 0.66B - 0.0066B^2$. The standard error is 15.22.

For the relationship of universalism (A) and time equally secure as the immediately preceding period in the same area (e2), rho is 0.07, which is not significant. The equation is $e2 = 26.35 + 0.005A^2$. The standard error is 12.3.

For the relationship of nominalism (B) to the same variable (e2), rho is 0.23, which also is not significant. The equation is $e2 = 32.13 - 0.41B + 0.0043B^2$. The standard error is 13.5.

For the relationship of universalism (A) to time less secure than the immediately preceding time in the same area (e3), rho is 0.3, which is significant at the five per cent level. The equation is $e3 = 30.80 + 0.65A - 0.008A^2$. The standard error is 16.65.

For the relationship of nominalism (B) to the same variable (e3), rho is 0.093, which is not significant. The equation is $e3 = 40.51 - 0.25B + 0.0023B^2$. The standard error is 17.37.

According to the scatter diagrams, high degrees of stability of security (above 72 per cent) do not occur with important thinking. Periods judged by more than 74 per cent of the judges as having increased in security show absence of remarkable thought. The same is true about periods judged by more than 86 per cent of the judges as lessening in security.

In conformity with these findings, the fifth hypothesis was given the following modified form: universalism and increased security are in the main positively, universalism and decreased security are in the main negatively, related. For percentages of universalism below 40 per cent, the relationship is reversed. Nominalism and increased security are related in such a manner that the middle percentages (around 50 per cent) of nominalism tend to occur with higher degrees of security than either higher or lower percentages of nominalism. The relation of nominalism to decreased security shows the opposite pattern, but with a very much reduced difference between middle and extreme values. Too much stability seems to be unfavorable to remarkable thinking or *vice versa.* Remarkable thought seems not to occur with very high increases or decreases in security. No relation exists between organismic and dialectic thinking on the one hand and change or absence of change in security on the other.

RELIABILITY AND VERIFICATION

When the answers from the philosophers, historians, and sociologists who served as judges began coming in, the first twenty of each panel were tabulated separately. Then all the answers from each panel, which arrived after the first twenty, and before the reminder letters were sent out, were tabulated separately. The answers which came in after reminder letters had been sent out were

also tabulated separately. Thus there were three samples of answers for each thinker and for each period. These samples of answers were rarely identical, but a comparison of percentages showed that the number of significant differences between sets of answers was below the number which could have been expected to occur by chance if the samples had been drawn from identical universes.

Among the answers of the philosophers and sociologists, 0.24 per cent of the differences among samples of votes concerning the same thinker were significant at the one per cent level, 1.7 per cent were significant on the two per cent level, and 3.7 per cent on the five per cent level.

Among the answers of the historians, 0.35 per cent of the differences among samples of votes concerning the same period were significant at the one per cent level, 0.9 per cent at the two per cent level, and 3.7 per cent at the five per cent level. Thus the method of measurement, if not demonstrably valid, is, at least, reliable.

At the outset of the calculation of the regression equations several cases were eliminated either because the number of votes cast concerning them seemed too small or because the lifetimes of the thinkers seemed to include several of the periods which were arbitrarily fixed for times in which many lifetimes of many thinkers overlapped. Seventeen of these cases were used to test the predictive efficiency of the equations. The predictions of characteristics of the periods from the resemblance of the thinkers to types A and B showed reasonably satisfactory results when compared with the measurements obtained for these periods by the votes of the historians.

CONCLUSIONS

On the basis of this study it can be said with some confidence that the sociology of knowledge is accessible by the same methods as the other parts of sociology, provided that the questions asked are of a nature that is suitable for scientific investigation. As in all other fields of knowledge, there are scientific and metascientific problems in sociology. The latter are open to philosophical speculation, the former to scientific inquiry. As far as scientific methods are applied, reliable knowledge is attainable. Where philosophical methods are applicable, aesthetic satisfaction may be achieved. It is pointless to argue the advantages of one over the other.

The method of measurement by votes of experts in its present, or more preferably, in an improved form may be applicable to a wide range of complex phenomena where direct measurement would be impossible or too time consuming. In any of these cases, types would have to be constructed, among which expert judges could choose in classifying observed or studied phenomena. The possibility of a transposition of the present method to a sociology of literature or art appears almost obvious. A sociology of international relations might use votes of military attachés, consuls, and ambassadors on various matters usually observed by them for the prediction of wars and other moves of international importance. The study of social movements might profit by the establishment of equations linking certain types of social, economic, and political processes as judged by newspapermen, with the rise of revolutions or reform movements as judged by the same kind or other kinds of observers. In other words, the method has practical promise as well as theoretical uses.

The specific hypotheses of the present paper need further study and further revisions. Additional hypotheses are needed to shed light on the two types of thinking for which the present study has produced negative results only.

EXPLORING TECHNIQUES FOR MEASURING HUMAN VALUES

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SCIENCE, as a set of techniques devised by human beings, exists, of course, to gratify certain human needs and desires. But techniques do not always achieve the ends for which they were intended. There is little reason to expect that science can achieve the ends desired by any society or any group within a society until scientists at least, and perhaps society too, are clear as to what those ends are.

Social scientists are not yet in complete agreement on the legitimacy of attempts to develop techniques for ascertaining the ends desired by a given population, the conditions under which they are desired, and the relative intensity with which each of them is desired. Though many have found the description of value patterns inescapable in their analyses of societal behavior, nevertheless "up until the present time the direct empirical investigation of the values of men in different cultures has somehow seemed beyond the proper province of scientific inquiry. . . ."[1]

Various explanations have been advanced for this tendency of social scientists to avoid the study of values. Cattell has suggested: "The *wish* that the human mind should be untouched by science is father to the thought that it *cannot* be treated scientifically."[2] In contrast, Lundberg feels that we have tried, in a sense, to reach too high. He attributes much of the failure to obtain objective results in the study of values, and the very assumption that scientific studies of values are impossible, to the fact that the habitual approach to the subject has involved highly abstract terms like truth, beauty, justice, and goodness. For successful scientific value-research he recommends coming down the ladder of abstraction.[3] Still another explanation is offered by Dewey and Humber who maintain in their social psychology text that inasmuch as the social sciences are new and their legitimacy as sciences is still contested, social scientists tend to "worship" the physical and biological sciences and strive to outdo them in abjuring values.[4]

Whatever the merits of the foregoing explanations, part of the resistance to undertaking the scientific study of values arises from the belief (among both philosophers and social scientists) that qualitatively unlike values are not quantitatively commensurable.[5]

This presumption of incommensurability has been disputed by various writers, some of whom have cited convincing arguments.[6] Heretofore the debate has not involved putting the matter to direct empirical test. The present paper is intended to supply such evidence, by means of three empirical tests of the hypothesis that qualitatively unlike

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[1] See G. A. Lundberg, "Human Values—A Research Program," *Proceedings of the Pacific Sociological Society*, Research Studies of the State College of Washington, Pullman, September, 1950.

[2] Raymond B. Cattell, *An Introduction to Personality Study*, London: Hutchinson, 1950, p. 14.

[3] Lundberg, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

[4] Richard Dewey and W. J. Humber, *The Development of Human Behavior*, New York: Macmillan, 1951, pp. 712–13.

[5] See, for example: C. I. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Pub. Co., 1946, p. 537; George D. Birkhoff, *Aesthetic Measure*, Cambridge; Harvard U. Press, 1933, p. 11; Joseph Mayer, *Social Science Principles in the Light of Scientific Method*, Durham, N. C., Duke U. Press, 1941, pp. 175–7; J. A. Hobson, *Economics and Ethics*, New York: D. C. Heath & Co., 1929, p. 109; and W. T. Stace, "What Are Our Values," *Montgomery Lectures on Contemporary Civilization*, Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1950, p. 2.

[6] See the following: A. Edel, "The Evaluation of Ideals," *Journal of Philosophy*, 42 (1945), p. 561; John Laird, *The Idea of Value*, Cambridge, 1929, pp. 31, 353–7; Leslie T. Wilkins, "Incentives and the Young Male Worker in England," *International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research*, 4 (1951), p. 561; L. L. Thurstone, "The Indifference Function," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 2 (1931), p. 146.

values are incommensurable. The first of these three tests makes use of data from a published study of another problem, while the second and third tests involve new data.

THE COMPARISON OF BATTLES AND BABIES

The hypothesis of incommensurability was tested first against data obtained from the second volume of the *American Soldier* series. In that volume, surveys are described on which the "point system" for determining priorities in demobilization was based.[7] In one of these surveys, four candidate items were appraised by the method of paired comparisons. These were: length of time in the Army, age, overseas service, and dependents. Each item was compared with each other item, and respondents were asked to check which member of each possible pair should be considered more heavily in determining whether a man was to get out of the Army.

While the question of commensurability was not directly involved in the Army study, Stouffer does describe the survey as comparing the relative importance of "battles and babies." These certainly have the appearance of qualitatively unlike values, and hence the data from that study are convenient for our present purposes.

If qualitative dissimilarity really interferes with co-measuring such items, then preference responses should tend to be random when the items are presented in all possible pairs. On the other hand, if commensurability obtains, then we would expect a hierarchical pattern among the responses. Such hierarchy would consist of assigning three preferences to one item, two to another, one to another, and none to the fourth. Thus the item considered most important would be judged to be more important than any of the other three; the second most important item would be judged more important than two others, but less important than the first; and so on. Stouffer tells us that over 90 per cent of the respondents produced this perfectly hierarchical pattern.

This result can be evaluated by referring to the work of the mathematical biophysicist, Landau, who has published a formula for an index of hierarchy, h. It has a range from zero (where there is no hierarchy) to unity in the case of perfect hierarchy. His formula is:[8]

$$h=\frac{12}{n^3-n}\sum_{j=1}^{n} v_j-\left(\frac{n-1}{2}\right)^2$$

where n = the number of items and v_j = the number of preferences for the jth item. The v_j values can be summarized in a score vector, V. The following table, showing the possible forms of V, and their respective values of h and probability of occurrence, is adapted from Rapoport:[9]

TABLE 1. SCORE VECTORS, HIERARCHY INDICES, AND PROBABILITIES AMONG FOUR ITEMS

Score vector, V	Hierarchy index, h	Probability by random response
3,2,1,0	1.0	.375
2,2,2,0	.6	.125
3,1,1,1	.6	.125
2,2,1,1	.2	.375

For such a distribution the mean h equals .6, with the standard deviation being .692.

While more than 90 per cent of the 20,000 soldier-respondents exhibited perfect hierarchy in their six responses to the four items taken in pairs, Stouffer does not report the actual response patterns of the roughly 10 per cent remaining. To be conservative we may assume that all of them departed from hierarchy as far as was mathematically possible. Their responses would then have had h = .2. By weighted average, our most conservative estimate, then, of the mean h for the 20,000 respondents would be .92, which is .32 greater than the mean from the tabled distribution of h for random responses. The mean for that distribution can be regarded as our null hypothesis; it is the mean we would expect from a large mass of responses if the items responded to were in fact incommensurable.

We can compute a standard error for our

[7] Stouffer, et al., The American Soldier, vol. 2, *Combat and its Aftermath,* Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1949, pp. 521–2.

[8] H. G. Landau, "On Dominance Relations and the Structure of Animal Societies: I.," *Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics,* 13 (1951), p. 4.

[9] Anatol Rapoport, "Outline of a Probabilistic Approach to Animal Sociology: I.," *Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics,* vol. 11, pp. 194–5.

mean from the standard deviation of the tabled distribution and the size of Stouffer's sample. This standard error is .00489, which is quite small. In fact, the departure of our empirical mean index of hierarchy from the null hypothesis is *over sixty-five times this standard error.* Since the probability of drawing such a sample from a universe in which the null hypothesis was true is infinitesimal, we may conclude with reasonable confidence that, in the minds of World War II American soldiers, such values as battles and babies were not incommensurable.

COMPARISON OF FIVE TWO-DOLLAR VALUES

A second empirical test of the hypothesis of incommensurability was undertaken in an experiment designed and carried out by the writer. This experiment involved a paired comparisons questionnaire administered to two introductory sociology classes. Five desiderata were selected which were thought by the experimenter to be each worth approximately two dollars, thus holding their economic value constant, and each *qualitatively* quite different from the others. The five items selected were: (1) a ticket to a concert, (2) a steak dinner, (3) a ticket to a ball game, (4) a pair of gloves, and (5) a carton of cigarettes.

Respondents were instructed to think in terms of all five items being equally priced at two dollars each. The concept of qualitative dissimilarity was explained orally to them, using the example of a plate of beans versus a shower bath to illustrate different *kinds* of satisfaction. On the questionnaire the numbers 1 through 5 were printed at the left of each pair of items. The label "very similar" was attached to the number 1, and "very dissimilar" was attached to the number 5, with the three intervening numbers left unanchored. Respondents were instructed to circle the number which indicated their opinion of the degree of *qualitative* similarity or dissimilarity for a given pair—the degree of likeness or unlikeness *in kind* between those two items.

To the right of each pair of items the respondent was asked to indicate, with a check mark, which of the two items he preferred. He was asked to express his preference in three ways for each pair: (1) which item he would "walk farthest to get"; (2) which item he would "act quickest to get"; and (3) which item he would be most willing to "miss class to get." More than 89 per cent of the "act quickest" responses were identical to the corresponding "walk farthest" responses. Similarly, slightly over 89 per cent of the "miss class" responses were identical to the "walk farthest" ones. This degree of rephrasing reliability was obtained even though the respondents had folded each set of answers out of sight before going on to the next phrasing of the preference question. Because of this near identity, only the data from the first phrasing ("walk farthest") were used in the analyses.

For the fifty-eight respondents in the two classes, the mean similarity-dissimilarity rating for all ten pairs of desiderata was 3.9, where 1.0 would be "very similar" and 5.0 would be "very dissimilar." The amount of dissimilarity, in the eyes of the respondents themselves, then, was considerable for the average pair of items. The nature of the five items used would also in itself suggest the *relevance* of the hypothesis of incommensurability which we are seeking to test. The contrast between a steak dinner and a pair of gloves, for example, is analogous to the difference between "a hat want and a champagne want" which Mayer cites as an argument for the incommensurability hypothesis.[10]

Of the fifty-eight respondents, fifty-six returned completed schedules, the other two having one or more unmarked pairs. Fifty-four of the completed schedules yielded score vectors which represented perfect hierarchies: (4,3,2,1,0). The other two yielded score vectors of (4,2,2,2,0) and (4,2,2,1,1). These latter result in hierarchy indices of .8 and .6, respectively, with the fifty-four cases of perfect hierarchy each giving an index of 1.0, of course. Thus the mean hierarchy index for the fifty-six complete schedules is .990.

To evaluate this we can again refer to

[10] Mayer, *op. cit.,* see especially pp. 175–6, where Mayer contends that "Without empirical evidence, one has no more right to assume a quantitative comparison between a hat want and a champagne want than to assume that a drink of champagne will serve the purpose of a head covering, although in a sense known only to the initiated several drinks might serve an otherwise impossible purpose."

Rapoport,[11] from whom the following table is adapted. This table shows the probability of occurrence of each score vector in a universe of random response, and the hierarchy index corresponding to each vector.

TABLE 2. SCORE VECTORS, HIERARCHY INDICES, AND PROBABILITIES AMONG FIVE ITEMS

Score vector, V	Hierarchy index, h	Probability by random response
4,3,2,1,0	1.0	.117
3,3,3,1,0	.8	.039
4,2,2,2,0	.8	.039
4,3,1,1,1	.8	.039
4,2,2,1,1	.6	.117
3,3,2,2,0	.6	.117
3,3,2,1,1	.4	.235
3,2,2,2,1	.2	.274
2,2,2,2,2	0.0	.023

The mean h for this distribution is .5, with a standard deviation of .274. The experimental mean was .49 larger than this mean h which is our null hypothesis. With fifty-six cases involved in the computations, the standard error of the mean is .0366, so that the experimental mean is *over thirteen standard errors greater* than the hypothetical mean. The chance of obtaining so large a mean h from fifty-six persons *responding randomly* (as they would be expected to do if the five desiderata were incommensurable) is infinitesimal. Again, then, with fair confidence it can be concluded that the five rather dissimilar desiderata used in the experiment are not incommensurable.

Further analysis of the data from this experiment was possible, based on postulation of a syllogistic relationship among commensurable desiderata, as follows: If A is preferable to B, and B is preferable to C, then A is preferable to C. For any two desiderata A and C, the preference of a respondent for A over C can then be inferred if he prefers A to B, and B to C, *whatever* B represents. In the above experiment, then, for each of the ten pairs of items there were three middle terms for the syllogism, by each of which the relationship of A to C might be deduced. In addition, of course, each of the ten pairs had been subjected to direct comparison. Thus it was possible to compare as many as three *implied* preferences for any given pair of items with the *stated* preference, and to do this for every respondent. For each pair, for all respondents, the proportion of implied preferences which matched the respondent's stated preference could be determined, and taken as another measure of the commensurability of that pair.

These measures of pair-commensurability were computed. For each pair of items there was also a mean similarity-dissimilarity rating. The correlation between these two indices should indicate the *degree* of dependence of commensurability on qualitative similarity. The correlation, for the ten pairs, turned out to be .22, with a standard error of .30. The correlation is obviously not significant, so commensurability does not seem to depend statistically on qualitative similarity.

MEASURING "INFINITE" VALUES

Since the desiderata used in the above experiment were rather trivial (relatively unimportant either to human welfare or to sociological theory) it might be argued that rejection of the hypothesis of incommensurability in that experiment was of little theoretical or practical significance. For this and for other reasons, the author felt that a similar experiment should be conducted, using values of a somewhat higher order of abstraction, and of perhaps somewhat greater significance. As a conclusion to one of the early empirical studies of valuing, Thorndike had pointed out the necessity for any scheme of value-measurement to "take account of certain . . . wants . . . and certain . . . aversions . . . which are infinitely strong in the sense that the person in question in the situation in question does not treat the [desideratum] in question as a quantity to be weighed in comparison with others, but as something utterly desirable or intolerable."[12] He applied the term "obsessional behavior" to such infinite desiring.

Some problems raised by infinite values were mentioned by Blanshard in his criticism of pacifists' opposition to violent coercion of our World War II enemies. He said, "If you pointed out that the avoidance

[11] Rapoport, *op. cit.*

[12] E. L. Thorndike, "Valuations of Certain Pains, Deprivations, and Frustrations," *Journal of Genetic Psychology*, vol. 51, 1937, pp. 235–6.

of such coercion would mean more widespread violence and an indefinitely greater cost in human life, they were helpless, hurt and bewildered; they were being called upon to balance infinites against each other. . . ."[13]

If Blanshard's observations are valid we may well ask if it is possible to "balance infinites against each other" *without* simply becoming "helpless, hurt and bewildered." The conclusion seems to follow from the experimental study described below that it is possible, even though such balancing and choosing contradicts the meaning of the term "infinite."

For purposes of the present study of the commensurability of allegedly infinite values it was felt that the most useful data would be obtained from a population to whom the concept "infinite" is an everyday word. Clergymen seemed to constitute such a population, so a list of Protestant ministers from which samples could be drawn was obtained from the Seattle Church Council. Prior to drawing the samples the list was stratified into broad denominational groups. These groups were then each divided randomly into four sub-groups, thus producing four denominationally stratified samples of the whole population. Two samples consisted of 72 ministers each, while the other two consisted of 71 each.

The first step in the study consisted of mailing to the members of Sample 1 a mimeographed letter which asked them to list on an enclosed sheet of paper the values which they thought were *of infinite worth to human beings*. A stamped, addressed return envelope was enclosed.

Only eighteen of the ministers in this sample complied with the request, but many of these produced lengthy lists of "infinite" values. Several of them enclosed mimeographed statements of their personal faith, and others sent printed religious tracts. A content analysis was made by which the responses were reduced to six abstract kinds of values. These six abstract values, which seemed to the writer to subsume nearly everything suggested by the respondents, were:

(A) Human life itself
(B) Man's creative achievements (such as art, democracy, and philosophy)
(C) Wholesome cooperation with our fellow men for a happier life for all
(D) Worship of God and acceptance of God's will
(E) Fullest development of the moral character of mankind
(F) Fullest development of human intelligence and human abilities

Three questionnaire forms were then constructed. One form presented these six abstract values in paired comparisons (15 pairs in all), another asked to have the six values ranked, and the third form simply asked the respondent to indicate which of the six values were, in his opinion, of "infinite worth."

These forms were mailed, with appropriate covering letters and stamped and addressed return envelopes, to the second, third, and fourth of the denominationally stratified samples of ministers, respectively. Questionnaires were returned by 52 per cent of Sample 2, 61 per cent of Sample 3, and 66 per cent of Sample 4. There were some denominational differences in the proportion of questionnaires returned. The Methodists were the most cooperative, returning 77 per cent of their questionnaires, while the Assembly of God ministers returned only 40 per cent. Other strata ranged fairly evenly between these extremes. These denominational rates of return were roughly comparable from sample to sample, indicating the legitimacy of comparisons of the results obtained from the three samples by the three questionnaire forms. The frequencies, however, were too small to permit rigorously testing intersample comparability by chi-square.

Since three different questionnaire forms were used in the study, it was desirable to make some comparison between the results obtained by the three different approaches. To do this each item was assigned a rank—first on the basis of the number of items to which it was preferred by a majority of the sample who received the paired comparisons form, second on the basis of the mean of the ranks assigned to it by the sample which filled out the ranking form, and third on the basis of the percentage stating on the third form that it was of infinite worth. These three rank-orderings are compared in Table

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[13] Brand Blanshard, "Theology and the Value of the Individual," in *The Scientific Spirit and Democratic Faith,* New York: Kings Crown Press, 1944, pp. 84–5.

3, where it can be readily seen that they correspond almost exactly. Only items (A) and (C) show any rank-order discrepancies.

In what follows, the six abstract values will be referred to as "infinite" values. What justification is there for this terminology? It can be seen in Table 3 that, in the sample whose questionnaire asked them simply to state which items were infinitely valuable, there were for *each* of the six items at least *some* respondents who asserted that it was of infinite worth to human beings. In this sense, then, each of these values will be referred to as "infinite."

In addition to the above described assessment of the reliability between the three different methods of measurement, which in itself suggests that the six "infinite" values are not incommensurable, a further analysis was made of the responses on the twenty-eight paired comparisons questionnaires in which *all* of the pairs were responded to. (There were thirty-seven questionnaires returned from this sample altogether, but nine of them had one or more pairs unmarked.) Of the twenty-eight *fully completed* schedules, twenty-five exhibited perfect hierarchy in their responses, with score vectors of (5,4,3,2,1,0). Two of the remaining three schedules yielded score vectors of (5,4,2,-2,2,0), and the third produced a score vector of (5,3,3,3,1,0).

If the worth of each of these six "infinite" values was *infinite,* in the literal, mathematical sense of the word, then it would be impossible for even clergymen to discriminate between them *on the basis of their worth.* In other words, they would be *incommensurable* with regard to worth, just as the more trivial items in the previous experiment were hypothesized to be. In such a case the forced choices demanded in the questionnaire should have been randomly distributed.

But these responses were *not* random. The mean index of hierarchy for the twenty-eight completed questionnaires from Sample 2 was .989. Our null hypothesis, the mean index of hierarchy for six items by chance, would be, according to a table given by Landau, .429, which is the mean h to be expected if respondents were unable to discriminate between the worths of the six allegedly infinite values. From Landau's table[14] a standard error of the mean for twenty-eight cases can be computed, and it turns out to be .0418, so that the difference between the observed mean and the mean by random response is over thirteen times its standard error.

Since the ministers' responses to the six "infinite" values on the paired comparisons questionnaire were not random, it can therefore be concluded that the respondents were able to discriminate between the relative worths of the different items. Each of these items was alleged by several ministers in a comparable sample however to be of infinite worth to human beings.

From such evidence it seems reasonable to infer one of two things: (1) that "infinite" values can be measured according to established scaling techniques, or else (2) that clergymen are a bit unrigorous in their use of the term "infinite" (that is, they do not use it in a sense comparable to its mathematical meaning). In a way these are merely two phrasings of the same inference.

TABLE 3. RANK ORDER OF SIX "INFINITE" VALUES, AS DETERMINED BY RESPONSES OF COMPARABLE SAMPLES OF SEATTLE MINISTERS RESPONDING TO THREE DIFFERENT QUESTIONNAIRE FORMS

Rank:	By paired comparisons (Sample 2) N=37	By method of mean rank (Sample 3) N=44	By percentage saying "infinite" (Sample 4) N=47
1	(D) 5 majority preferences	(D) 1.17	(D) 100
2	(E) 4 " "	(E) 2.88	(E) 74
3	(C) 3 " "	(C) 3.61	(A) 63
4	(A) 2 " "	(A) 3.86	(C) 26
5	(F) 1 " "	(F) 4.51	(F) 19
6	(B) 0 " "	(B) 4.97	(B) 14

[14] Landau, *op. cit.,* p. 10.

The inference might be more precisely stated thus: certain values, even if they are alleged by generally accepted authorities to be of infinite worth to human beings, are nevertheless measurable by standard scaling procedures applied to the responses of those very authorities.

The social-psychological significance of this finding is emphasized by the fact that many of the respondents in all three samples wrote protests on their questionnaires. These protests suggested that the respondents did feel somewhat "helpless, hurt and bewildered" when confronted with the task of discriminating between the six values under study. Nevertheless they went ahead and filled out the questionnaire, and their responses formed orderly and meaningful patterns.

One example of their bewilderment had a striking statistical counterpart. Quite a number of the ministers objected that the phrase "human life itself"—item (A)—was ambiguous; it did not specify to their satisfaction whether mere *biological life* was intended, or whether *spiritual life after death* was also included. Those who assumed "spiritual life" was meant rated the item high among the six values, while those who assumed that only "biological life" was meant rated it low. The distributions of ranks assigned to each of the items by the members of Sample 3 were clearly unimodal for each of the other five items, but the distribution for "human life itself" was distinctly bimodal. The ability of a mere frequency distribution to reflect this biological-theological ambiguity was an interesting by-product of the experiment, consistent with and lending support to its more general finding.

CONCLUSION

On the basis of the three empirical tests of the hypothesis of incommensurability here reported, it can be concluded that human values, including those which are regarded by certain authorities as being of infinite worth, become measurable relative to each other in exactly the same manner as other verbal stimuli—by application of Thurstone's law of comparative judgment.[15]

The measurability of any class of values, "infinite" or otherwise, may thus be regarded as a function of the ingenuity of the experimenter in devising techniques for obtaining discriminal responses to those values, of the sort described by the law of comparative judgment. The mere fact that the stimuli in question are labelled "values" does not make them non-measurable, nor does the fact that responses to such stimuli are called "value judgments" prevent them from displaying empirical regularities which may enable social scientists to make predictions.

[15] J. P. Guilford, *Psychometric Methods*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936, p. 217.

HEROES, VILLAINS AND FOOLS, AS AGENTS OF SOCIAL CONTROL

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SOCIAL types comprise a relatively unappreciated field of popular culture. Though certain ones have been intensively studied from special points of view,[1] and the role of stereotypes has been long recognized, there has been little effort to catalog, classify, or even adequately consider the vast number of highly significant types to be found in common speech, jokes, comics, popular fiction, folklore and the like. These conceptions, appearing wherever the popular mind finds expression, are truly collective in nature rather than the property of individual authors, "coins" of thought as Sumner phrased it, serving to express group judgments, facilitate consensus, and define roles. This article is concerned with three especially significant generic figures, the hero, villain and fool, and aims to state a theory of their normative nature, role as sanctions, and mutual contribution to consensus and social control, a relationship which has been only casually considered in sociological literature.

One who long considers these types can hardly fail to feel that their role goes beyond the theatre, that they have a part to play in institutions, movements, political regimes, historical periods and everyday life. When a person is called a hero, villain or fool, this has important implications for his status, influence and the kind of treatment he will receive. An effort is here made to bring them into theoretical relationship as norms representing certain kinds of deviance from average or conventional conduct, carrying appropriate punishments or rewards, and calling for certain modes of collective action. The present article is intended as a suggestive and exploratory statement rather than as a report of finished research.

One may begin with the observation that epithets are sanctions indicating social approval or disapproval, and that many of these, especially the strongest, can be rather readily classified into three generic categories. For instance, a daredevil might be called a hare-brained fool, a criminal endangering the lives of others, or a fearless superman. Some indication of the categories of epithet likely to be applied to extreme deviants is perhaps given by the following lists:

Hero	Villain	Fool
underdog	bully	crackpot
champ	liar	fanatic
big shot	cheat	simpleton
smart operator	traitor	sissy
Robin Hood	two-timer	cheapskate
father-of-his-country	bad nigger	blowhard
	racketeer	butterfingers
protector	Red	sap
emancipator	grafter	yes-man
he-man	dictator	sucker
race hero	Bluebeard	Mutt
Uncle Bim	Fu Manchu	Happy Hooligan
Lone Ranger	Simon Legree	Sad Sack
Superman		

[1] For instance, C. Wright Mills, *White Collar,* New York: Oxford University Press, 1951; or D. W. Riddle, *The Martyr, a Study of Social Control,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931. For a statement of the method and review of the earlier literature of social types, as well as an empirical study of certain ones functioning in American Negro communities, see Samuel M. Strong, "Social Types in the Negro Community of Chicago," diss., University of Chicago, 1940; "Social Types in a Minority Group: Formulation of a Method," *American Journal of Sociology,* XLVIII (1943), pp. 563–73; and "Negro-White Relations as Reflected in Social Types," *American Journal of Sociology,* LII (1946), pp. 23–30. Significant earlier papers include George E. Vincent, "Rivalry of Social Groups," *Ibid.,* XVI (1916), pp. 469–84; and Louis Wirth, "Some Jewish Types of Personality," *Proceedings of the American Sociological Society,* XXXII (1926), pp. 90–96. Comparative studies of hero, villain and fool types in folklore and popular culture are incompletely provided in Orrin E. Klapp, "The Hero as a Social Type," diss., University of Chicago, 1948; "The Folk Hero," *Journal of American Folklore,* LXII (1949), pp. 17–25; "Creation of Popular Heroes," *American Journal of Sociology,* LIV (1948), pp. 135–141; "The Fool as a Social Type," *Ibid.,* LV (1949), pp. 157–162; "Clever Heroes," *Journal of American Folklore,* 1953 (forthcoming); and *Heroes, Villains and Fools: A Study of Social Types and Popular Symbols,* book to be published.

In general, leaders tend to be regarded as heroes by their followings, whereas criminals, rebels, traitors, subnormals, and extreme eccentrics usually receive villainous or foolish designations, indicating that the direction of their deviation is censured by the group. When a person is denominated by such epithets, they clearly act as a means of control, operating to classify him invidiously, treat him in certain ways, exert pressures, and call down various kinds of punishment or reward upon him.

The relationship of hero, villain and fool types is perhaps best understood by considering them as kinds of deviance from a normative center of conventional conduct. Aristotle defined virtue as a mean, but it may be noted that heroism goes to extremes. The fool and the hero, said Alexandre Dumas, are *deux classes d'imbéciles qui ont beaucoup de choses en commun.* Each represents a striking departure from ordinary behavior. The three directions of deviation might be described as (1) better than, (2) falling short of, or (3) antagonism to the standards required of all group members. That is, the fool is subnormal, by defect of intelligence, sobriety, and competence; whereas the villain is counter-moral; and the hero might be called supernormal, from the titles applied to him, such as invincible champion, demigod, superman. We might consider such types as ways by which a group attempts to understand problematical behavior—whether because bizarre, amazing, incomprehensible, disturbing to routine or decorum, dangerous, or otherwise offensive to mores or propriety —by reducing them to simple concepts, familiar to all and indicating proper modes of response. One might say, in this connection, that appropriate behavior toward a hero includes recognition of his unusual achievement, commemoration, holding him up as an example, and otherwise converting him into a cherished collective symbol. The adjectives "absurd" and "funny," on the other hand, applied to the fool indicate that the appropriate treatment of him is ridicule, whereas that of the villain is obviously more severe punishment. Since departures from convention and crises are more or less inevitable, a group will be disorganized unless it has simple, reliable concepts by which to handle (and roles to play toward) such deviations which seem to bring them within a framework of comprehensibility and control.

This, in brief, is the theory of the present paper, which endeavors in more detail to consider the nature of such social types and modes of heroization, vilification and fool-making. The colorful acts of a deviant give people "something to talk about." They strive to interpret the meaning of his behavior and, upon consensus, act toward him in certain commonly understood and often primitive ways. One point should be reiterated. These roles are created and assigned by collective processes. A man can act in any way that he will, but only a group can make him a hero, villain or fool. Our problem here is (1) to describe more fully the normative nature and types of the hero, villain and fool; (2) to distinguish kinds of conduct and other factors which lead to recognition, or justify ascription, of the types; (3) to describe the social processes of heroization, vilification and fool-making organized by such symbols; and (4) to indicate their operation within personality as agencies of inner control and major functions for society.

THE TYPES

Heroes may be defined as personages, real or imaginary, who are admired because they stand out from others by supposed unusual merits or attainments. A sociological definition should include the fact that they are recognized as such and occupy an honored status, to which behavior such as homage, commemoration, celebration and veneration is appropriate. Because the hero exceeds in a striking way the standards required of ordinary group members, as has been said, he is a supernormal deviant, his courage, self-abnegation, devotion, and prowess, being regarded as amazing and "beyond the call of duty." Because of the requirement of transcending the mediocre, he must prove himself by exceptional acts, and the most perfect examples of heroes are to be found in legendary or mythical personages who represent in a superhumanly exaggerated way the things the group admires most. Because of their superior qualities, heroes dominate the scene of human action, symbolizing success, perfection and conquest of evil, providing a model for identification by the group—one might say its better self.

The most common patterns or roles of heroism include: the Conquering Hero, an invincible figure of power who seemingly can do anything; the Clever Hero, a trickster who wins by cunning rather than force; the Cinderella or Unpromising Hero; the Quest Hero or idealistic seeker; the Deliverer, Defender or Avenger; the Popular Benefactor; the Culture Hero; and the Martyr.[2] These themes seem sufficiently common in life, literature, drama and folklore to be designated as well-nigh universal.

If heroes are not realistic images of average human nature, no more are villains, who appear in fiction, folklore and life as idealized figures of evil, who tend to countermoral actions as a result of an inherently malicious will. Despite human form, they are at heart monsters, hated and shunned as enemies of social organization, of the good, and of the weak. Perfect legendary villains would be exemplified by the Giant of St. Michel's Mont, Grendel, Pharaoh, Ganelon, or the witches and ogres of folktales. If the hero is a defender of mores, the villain is an offender, his acts creating a crisis from which society is saved by a hero, who arrives to restore order to the world. Though villains are quite various, their roles, as with heroes, can be classified into common types, among these being: the Persecutor, a powerful figure of evil who oppresses the weak; the Traitor, a contemptible person who sells out a group value or overcomes a hero by unfair means (Judas, Delilah), including variants such as the renegade, subverter and heretic; the Mores-flouter, who seems to take a perverse pleasure in outraging decency and rebelling against order and authority; the Fiend, an incalculable monster whose acts exceed comprehensibility (Jack-the-Ripper); and the Rogue, whose depredations have certain saving graces of wit or humor.[3] Though villains are in some ways comparable to heroes—being, for instance, often strong enough to make martyrs of the latter—their black traits otherwise place them in total opposition to the hero. They are not superhuman but by absence of sympathy, conscience, loyalty and good will, inhuman. Contemporary popular types such as the gangster and dope-fiend belong among the villains, but the closest thing in real life approximating an ideal villain would probably be a psychopathic criminal. As with heroes, the best examples are to be found in folklore.

It is likewise apparent that fools are not realistic representations of average human nature but shrunken caricatures of it in the direction of defect and weakness, falling ludicrously below the standards of intelligence, courage, and grace, set for ordinary group members. Common types can be differentiated as the Antic, Rash, Clumsy, Deformed, Simple, Weak, Small-minded and Pompous Fool; the Comic Butt, Comic Rogue, and Mock Hero.[4] If the villain opposes the hero by exaggerated evil traits, the fool does so by weaknesses, his *metier* being failure and fiasco rather than success. Though an offender against decorum and good taste, he is too stupid or ineffectual to be taken seriously. His pranks are ridiculed rather than severely punished.

RECOGNITION

Definition of the roles of heroes, villains and fools suggests the ways in which they are recognized as deviants from conventional standards. The colorful exploits of the hero, the crimes of the scoundrel, and buffoonery of the fool attract immediate attention. How are they to be classified? There seem to be three principal role-alternatives, dramatically, for the person who strives to be exceptional in the popular mind: he can slay the dragon; stab Siegfried in the back; or fall off his horse, armor and all, onto the surprised dragon. Persons continually in the public eye are in inherent danger of being made fools or villains if they do not rise to the stature of heroes, especially in times of crisis.

The first factor which helps to point out such types is visibility[5] or color. This is not mere publicity (many have been in the limelight without acquiring special status) but

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2 Defined in "The Hero as a Social Type," "The Folk Hero," and "Creation of Popular Heroes," *op. cit.*

3 Defined and exemplified more extensively in "Heroes, Villains and Fools," *op. cit.*

4 Defined more fully in "The Fool as a Social Type," and "Heroes, Villains and Fools," *op. cit.*

5 Stressed by Gordon Allport, *ABC's of Scapegoating*, New York: Anti-Defamation League of B'nai Brith, 1948, p. 42.

rather a kind of conspicuous individuality or distinction. Any marked departure from the usual — eccentricity, exciting actions, peculiarities, stunts, scandals — tends to accomplish this.[6] Attention is drawn to such a person and he gets talked about. His fame and legend are in the making.

A second requirement is apparent conformity to a type established in the popular mind. The behavior of a deviant such as St. Simeon Stylites is interpreted in terms of the known categories. His ascetic excesses in that period[7] mark him as a saint rather than a fool. The hero characteristically "pushes the mark up higher," conforming to the champion or some other type of special value. But the pattern of John Wilkes Booth's act immediately defined him as a villain of the Judas type, though in his own eyes he was a defender of the South. Bright eyes, a hunched back, or personal ugliness, have helped to define people as witches, just as Lombrosian features have marked many a criminal.

Third is the social opportunity for playing a certain role provided by the group and its definition of the situation. Heroes, as Carlyle observed, have their season. The same act performed too soon or too late or in the wrong scene may make a person a fool rather than a hero. Crises, especially conflicts, tend to produce heroes, villains and fools, depending upon the success or failure, type and value of roles. A social expectation often sets a limit or a predilection for certain roles, for example, the underdog in an unequal contest or the practical joker on All Fool's Day. The tournament is an institution specifically designed for the creation of champions by contests, just as courts provide a drama conducive to the definition of criminals. Scapegoating and hero-worship indicate the power of situational pressures in creating such types.

It is obvious that a person need not *actually* possess the traits or perform the roles which make him a hero, villain or fool. Such a definition in the popular mind can be accomplished by a joke, rumor, epithet, slander, publicity trick, or news story. Movie stars heroized by a film role do not necessarily have such attributes in real life. A poem by John Greenleaf Whittier made a heroine out of Barbara Frietchie. The imputation of such types occurs through an impression conveyed by a drama or story rather than a mere matter of fact. This helps to explain some of the caprices of history and legend regarding certain figures.

Rationality, therefore, should not be stressed as a factor in the recognition of heroes, villains and fools. Although logical procedures and evidence may result in the making of such, as in the awarding of a military decoration or a canonization, most of such typing probably occurs by a spontaneous popular definition in which there is little reflective thought, as in the laughter at a clown at the circus. Indeed, rational procedures often only certify *ex post facto* a hero or antihero who has already been chosen by the public. Among the important nonrational processes which help to form heroes and antiheroes are gossip, rumor, propaganda, journalism,[8] "guilt by association," social crisis mentality, and the accidents of publicity and opportunity which have helped make some men famous and have obscured others equally deserving of credit or infamy. By such non-rational processes over a period of time, a real historical personage can grow into an almost entirely mythical figure.

It is usual for a problematic person at the outset to be defined in several contradictory ways at once. For example, reformers are often seen as crusaders (heroes), radicals (villains attacking the *status quo*), and crackpots (fools). It is also quite possible that an individual may begin as one type in the popular mind and develop into something opposite. Lindbergh began as a "Flying Fool," became the "hero of the air," and then, for a period prior to World War II was vilified as a "pro-Nazi." There is likely in the case of a controversial person, such as Senator Joseph McCarthy, to be a dialectic of role-imputation, that is, a competition of claims, charges, guesses, suspicions,

[6] Eccentricity has been noted as helping create the reputation of "genius." Wilhelm Lange-Eichbaum, *The Problem of Genius,* New York: Macmillan, 1932; and *Genie, Irrsinn und Ruhm,* Munich: Ernest Reinhardt, 1928.

[7] See John M. Mecklin, *The Passing of the Saint,* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941.

[8] Dozier C. Cade, "Witch-Hunting, 1952: the Role of the Press," *Journalism Quarterly* (Fall 1952), pp. 396–407.

rumors and refutations, from which the public selects those which seem most true, apt or socially useful. There is, in spite of conflicting definitions, a strong tendency toward consensus, if only because of the collective need for an interpretation upon which to act. Public figures usually eventually find that they have been simplified or typed in some way by the popular mind, for better or worse, as genius, saint, criminal, man of the people, or clown.

SOCIAL RESPONSE

Once defined as a hero or antihero, the popular tendency is to treat a person in an appropriate way. The essence of such collective response seems to be, after definition, role-playing toward a certain status. In the case of heroes, this status is, of course, high, exclusive and honorific. They are set apart, placed on a pedestal, rewarded with special privileges, and regarded with an awe that verges on veneration, having in many ways the ritual place of an ikon.[9] Because of belief in their unusual merits, they are powerful leaders, with charismatic[10] authority, widely imitated and followed. They acquire a circle of devotees who sing their praises, keep parts of their person or property as relics, and commemorate or enshrine them after death. Tales and memoirs of their exploits will be preserved as cherished legends. The purpose of hero-worship behavior seems to be to convert a selected individual into an ideal, a durable symbol of supernormal performance —to capture and make a norm of the exceptional.

Toward parties defined as villains, of course, the collective tendency is in many ways the reverse of that toward a hero, the former occupying a detested and punishable rather than an honorific status. Instead of elevating and preserving, the aim is essentially to reduce and destroy villains in status and person, as illustrated by the ideal fate of the ogre in the folktale who is boiled in his own pot. While such a primitive goal is not usually admitted as the rational purpose of penal procedures, implicit aims of status-damage and personal injury seem only too apparent in treatment involving shaming, ostracism, stripping of rank, public corporal punishment, removal of civil rights, tarring-and-feathering, exposure in stocks, branding, and so on. Enlightened reformatory methods often do little more than hold in check the primitive punitive tendencies toward the villain. In short, it seems almost impossible to remove the stigma of vilification from criminal, or even from similar proceedings, for that matter, where there is any implication of guilt. The basic primitive attitude toward a villain results from the fact that he is conceived as a monster incompatible with social organization, a wilful and inveterate enemy of mores, who must be expelled or destroyed if society is to be safe. The appropriate responses to such a creature are punitive and militant. Only when the villain concept begins to break down do humane and rational considerations seem to have much weight.

In times of moral crisis, vilification movements tend to arise spontaneously as an urge to find and punish culprits. In such periods, there is a general mood of villain-making;[11] prosecutors work with greater zeal, judges feel it incumbent upon them to be severe and set examples, and witnesses have more versatile memories. The need for culprits may be so great as to provoke outright scapegoating. A vilifying movement seems to arise typically from a widespread feeling of moral alarm, resulting perhaps from flagrant crimes, a military threat, or the failure of an institution. If no villain is at hand, a search ensues, undertaken by officials or unofficial representatives of the people. The air is filled with

[9] For cult aspects of hero-worship, see Charlotte Gower, "The Supernatural Patron in Sicilian Life," diss., University of Chicago, 1928; Riddle, *op. cit.;* Stefan Czarnowski, *Le culte des heros et les conditiones sociales,* Paris: Alcan, 1919; L. R. Farnell, *Greek Hero Cults,* Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1921; Hippolyte Delehaye, *Sanctus; essai sur le culte des saints dans l'antiquité,* Bruxelles: Société des Bollandistes, 1927; O. E. Klapp, "Hero Worship in America," *American Sociological Review,* XIV (1949), pp. 53–62.

[10] Max Weber, *Theory of Social and Economic Organization, trans.* A. M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons, New York: Oxford University Press, 1947, pp. 358–363.

[11] For depictions of such periods, see F. L. Allen, "The Big Red Scare," *Only Yesterday,* N. Y. Harper, 1931, pp. 61–93; Carey McWilliams, *Witchhunt: the Revival of Heresy,* Boston: Little, Brown, 1951; Jerome Davis, *Character Assassination,* N. Y.: Philosophical Library, 1950; Marion L. Starkey, *The Devil in Massachusetts,* N. Y.: Knopf, 1949.

vituperation, suspicions and investigations. During this period, no one who deviates conspicuously from conventional patterns is quite safe, for, being invidiously visible, attention may fall upon him. He may have to explain and defend himself, largely without benefit of the presumption of innocence. During such a period, the punishment of culprits acquires a distinctly ritualistic character, receiving considerable vicarious participation. It is directed as much to giving public satisfaction as solving the problem. Later, when the crisis is over, general vilification declines as spontaneously as it began.

Fools also belong among the scapegoats. For such the appropriate treatment is status-reduction by mockery and ridicule. Although he is amusing, we do not sympathize with the buffoon but stand off and laugh at his fate. Even in the professional reward of clowns and comedians a sanction is hidden, for they must endure humiliations as butt as well as maker of jokes for the sake of the applause of the crowd. "Clowning" includes the reception of indignities as duties of the fool, who performs his office of jester in a degraded but tolerated status. Since the essence of fool-making is comic deflation of an ordinary person's status (as in the practical joke), to become a fool in real life may have serious consequences, amounting to loss of important privileges or removal from a position of leadership, competence and responsibility, for no one trusts or wishes to follow a fool. Such spontaneous status-reduction works as a check on the power of leaders, being a kind of popular impeachment. If the treatment of the fool is gentler than that of the villain, this is only because he is regarded as too silly or senseless to mean what he does or accomplish his aims; but he is nonetheless an offender against norms of propriety, and hence is a sufferer of comic justice. His downfall, disgrace and belittlement are real punishments—not lightly to be dismissed. Many fear the sanction of ridicule as much as physical injury or death.

Thus we have briefly distinguished three kinds of collective response organized by concepts of the hero, villain and fool. These processes involve a definition of role, status-assignment, and treatment of such types, being from the viewpoint of social control forms of non-rational discipline, representing society's effort to reward, positively or negatively, deviations of which it approves or disapproves, and to symbolically utilize same.

FUNCTIONS

There remain to be summarized some of the major personal and group functions performed by heroic and antiheroic types, deriving from their role as collective concepts and characters in the theatre of the self.

(1) It should be evident that they operate within personality as norms of self-judgment and roles for emulation or avoidance. A person retains memory-images of heroes as models, and in critical choices holds up various self-images and decides which type he will try to be or avoid. Even though he does not himself live up to the champion, defender, or martyr, in real life, he affirms himself vicariously through those he selects as heroes, and he accepts them as leaders. Though villain and fool roles are not likewise voluntarily assumed (except by entertainers), they work within the normal self in dramatic support of the heroic role—to adequately play the part of deliverer or avenger it is necessary to have a strongly defined concept of an aggressor, traitor, or public enemy, against whom to draw one's sword. Where a villain is poorly defined, military morale, insofar as it depends upon role-taking, is likely to be weak. How, it may be asked, can one whole-heartedly play an underdog if one's opponent is not conceived as a bully, or be a martyr for liberty unless one's fight is against a tyrant?

(2) The group functions of such types include the organization and simplification of collective response, in several respects. A ready form of non-rational consensus is provided by which the group can act along clearly defined lines. Multiple, confusing or unknown factors are simplified by ascription to one great man or scapegoat, and complex issues are personified as conflicts between champions and villains. Leaders, remote and inaccessible as personalities, become more familiar and understandable as types. Dramatic involvement in collective events and actions is increased, because the types figure in significant plots with structure, suspense, and climax, and provide identification-models which give to prosaic routines and

incidents a feeling that what is going on is exciting and worthwhile. They enlist interest in causes and create mass followings, hence being of great service as tools of propaganda and public relations. The rallying function of heroic and antiheroic types includes heightened we-feeling as comrades-in-arms and strengthening of morale[12] by giving added purpose and point to militant or punitive efforts, such as wars, feuds, law-enforcement and struggles against persecution—the memory of a traitor like Benedict Arnold, for instance, being of as real a service in sustaining the sentiments of the American Revolution as a hero like Nathan Hale or George Washington. The types also serve to assign roles to members of the group, and guide, facilitate, measure and sanction correct role-playing in terms of success, cowardice, folly and the like. When a major drama is going on, everyone knows his part. Leaders rise on a heroic pattern, and members are enabled to play unusually strenuous roles, epitomized by slogans such as "blood, sweat and tears," a "period of austerity," the "stab in the back," an "all-out effort," a "last stand," "heroic retreat," and so on.

(3) Following Durkheim and Fauconnet, one may also see in heroization, vilification and fool-making, rituals of solidarity and norm-affirmation. People draw together to applaud a hero,[13] fight a villain or laugh at a fool. Theatres, courts, news, public forums, and gossip, are all arenas for such collective ritual, in which at the same time common values are affirmed and potentially disruptive hostilities are sublimated by scapegoats.

(4) Indeed, if one looks at heroes, villains and fools as symbolic figures in tradition, it can be seen that they help in the perpetuation of collective values, to nourish and maintain certain socially necessary sentiments—pride in great men, admiration of courage and self-sacrifice, hatred of vice, contempt for folly, a sense of national destiny, the historic continuity of a church militant, and the like. The memory of a great hero or antihero, thus, is like an heirloom, for example, Moses, Aeneas, Judas, Satan.

In sum, we have tried to explore some of the implications of heroic and antiheroic types, seeing in them not merely dramatic figures but collective symbols with important functions for group organization and control. They are elements of primitive, not rational, discipline. Where there are no such figures or processes, one might expect control and morale, in spite of the best rational structure, to be weak—in ways often characterized as community indifference, job-fatigue, apathy and the like. Strong organizations, such as the Marine Corps, use them effectively to support their rational structure.

[12] Defined here as the capacity to persist in a collective goal. Herbert Blumer, "Morale," in W. F. Ogburn (ed.) *American Society in Wartime*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1943, pp. 207–232.

[13] Regarding the cult-making power of heroes, see particularly Czarnowski, Farnell, Riddle, Delehaye, *op. cit.*

SOCIOLOGY IN FINLAND

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Before World War II, scientific sociology in Finland was very meager and undeveloped. An economically poor country, with her population long accustomed to harsh climatic and topographic conditions, Finland has for centuries been isolated by geography and linguistic barriers. Her economic and cultural elite has been of Swedish stock since the twelfth century. After living under the domain of the Russian Czar from 1809 until the First World War, the Finns became independent as a nation in 1917. A great impetus was given to industrial, agricultural, and educational efforts, but academic sociology *per se*

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remained as dormant as it was in Britain at that time.

Since World War II, the misconception of Finland as an "Iron Curtain" country, together with the fact that few scholars visiting Scandinavia cross the intervening Baltic, has still tended to maintain the relative isolation of her culture from that of Western Europe and North America.

Despite the nineteenth century Czarist period, the dominant influences upon the Finnish social milieu have been Swedish and German, and Finnish sociology in its early stages was typically European with emphasis upon philosophical speculation combined with anthropological research, as in the work of Westermarck and his two disciples, Landtman and Karsten, both of whom had studied in Germany. In the later years of the nineteenth century, the chief frame of reference was ethnological, anthropological, and folklorist, a trend that continued until as recently as 1945.

In 1938, Barnes and Becker, describing sociology in Scandinavia, gave only scant attention to Finland, noting that although Rafael Karsten, an evolutionary anthropologist and professor of moral philosophy at the University of Helsinki, did much interesting work in ethnography, and though Hilma Granquist had made a remarkably able study of marriage conditions in Palestine, their respective endeavors merely bordered on sociology, and the central fields of the discipline remained uncultivated and received no official recognition.[1] Similarly, sociology in Finland is nowhere referred to in Gurvitch and Moore's *Twentieth Century Sociology* (1945). Westermarck enjoyed an international reputation, but as a moral historian rather than sociologist *per se*. Ragnar Numelin showed sociological tendencies as early as 1918 in an investigation into the causes of migration on simpler cultural levels, but was primarily an ethnologist. Yrjo Hirn, who died in February, 1952, was known for his early work on the sociology of art, but could not be strictly classed as a sociologist.

The historical background of Finnish sociology, consisting almost entirely of anthropological, folklorist, and ethical-historical studies, is important for an understanding of the present trends. The main cultural center of Finland has traditionally been, and still is, the University of Helsinki, with which Westermarck, Landtman, Karsten, and Granquist were all associated. But Westermarck's becoming the first Rector (1918) of the Swedish Abo Academy, in western Finland, made this institution of equal importance in the historical development of sociology. At that time sociology was considered a part of the philosophy of values, its principal doctrine being anthropological evolutionism, which in a later stage was combined with an emotionalistic theory of moral values, derived by Westermarck in part from Adam Smith and in part from Westermarck's contemporary and friend, Alexander Shand. During Westermarck's teaching career at Abo (1918–1932), sociology was officially named "practical philosophy" and all graduate courses were under the heading of philosophy. Westermarck had been appointed docent at the University of Helsinki in 1890, but until 1927 the science had no official position in the academic hierarchy. The same applied to the University of Turku where Uno Harva was appointed as professor in 1926. Sociology as a separate subject of instruction, unconnected with philosophy, has been taught at Abo Academy since 1937, but it was not until 1942 that a professorship in sociology was established. The slow start made by Finnish sociology is partly related to the fact that the pupils of Westermarck were nearly all ethnographers. Modern currents in psychology and anthropology (such as functionalism, behaviorism in a broad sense, gestaltism, and the newer trends in psycho-analysis) were little-known or acknowledged.

The 1930s represented the diminution era for the Westermarckian influence, but this still remains to the extent that he is remembered as one of Finland's greatest scholars; *Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* is still prescribed reading at the University of Helsinki.

POSTWAR ACADEMIC DEVELOPMENTS

A chair of sociology was established in 1945 at Helsinki, in a new Faculty of Social Science. It has been held by Veli Verkko who

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[1] Barnes and Becker, *Social Thought from Lore to Science,* Vol. II, 1938, p. 942.

came to sociology after a distinguished career as a criminal statistician. His recent research has centered around homicides and suicides in Finland and their dependence on national character, published in a work of that title in 1951. Dr. Verkko's thesis is that elements in the Finnish national character, related to excessive alcoholism, are conducive to a high homicide and suicide rate. This hypothesis has stimulated much discussion and debate in Scandinavian academic circles. Its author is also known in several countries by virtue of his participation in a UNESCO crime report.

The chair of social policy at Helsinki is held by Heikki Waris, whose research includes a study of the resettlement and adjustment of Karelian refugees (one of Finland's major postwar problems). Dr. Waris is also the author of a recent (1947) work, *The Structure of Finnish Society,* and is currently engaged upon problems of industrial relations. Hugo E. Pipping, nephew of Westermarck and vice-rector of the University of Helsinki, has pursued socio-economic investigations into the concept of standard of living and its place in economics. At the time of writing (February, 1953) a work of this title is in the press. Since his retirement from the university, Rafael Karsten has pursued anthropological studies in South America and authored a recent book on the religion of the Lapps. Various monographs on the Lapps have periodically appeared in Finland, as have earlier studies dealing with the racial heritage of the Finns, though evidence in this latter field is very inconclusive and little material of a scientific nature has been forthcoming.

Current enrollment in sociology at the University of Helsinki is approximately 160, a figure which would probably be much higher if employment opportunities were greater for sociology graduates. At present journalism, secondary school teaching, and social work furnish the main occupational outlets. Opportunities for academic careers in sociology are very restricted, as are facilities for social research in government or industry. Notwithstanding, the development of scientific sociology within the last eight postwar years has been remarkable, especially in view of its retarded prewar status. The establishment of a cultural exchange scheme with America, based on the allocation of Finnish World War I payments, making U. S. texts available to the Finns, has played its part in this advance. While no one sociologist, American or European, can be said to exert a dominant influence in Finland, the list of authors prescribed for sociology honors courses at Helsinki includes the following: Bogardus, Cantril, Ellwood, R. E. L. Faris, Hollingshead, House, the Lynds, Lundberg, Malinowski, Myrdal, Ogburn and Nimkoff, Parsons, Sorokin, Sutherland, Taft, Lloyd Warner, Kimball Young, and Pauline Young. Texts by various Scandinavian scholars are also prescribed, but the foregoing list is indicative of the extent to which "Americanization" of sociological theory and research is taking place in Finland.

The introduction of texts by the above writers and the replacing of German with English as the second foreign language in Finland are partly responsible for the advances made since the end of the war. During this time several young Finnish scholars have been enabled to spend a year at American universities, notably Southern California, Chicago, and Wisconsin, and have taken back to Finland new knowledge of and enthusiasm for empirical research techniques.

Courses offered in 1951–52 at the University of Helsinki included General Sociology, Criminology, Social Politics, Sociological Research Techniques, Contemporary Trends in United States Sociology, and History of Sociological Theory. Papers read and discussed at graduate seminars during 1951–52 included a survey of the prison as a community, the effect of movies on youth, anti-Semitism in Finland, problems of societal organization, and the structure of small groups, together with several papers giving critical expositions of contemporary sociological writing. A seminar in Social Policy dealt with the following representative research topics: the changing function of the church in industrial society, employment of social science graduates, emigration from Lapland, organization and history of public assistance, and illegitimacy in Helsinki.

Since 1947 more than sixty masters' theses have been completed in sociology at Helsinki, in such fields as social theory and methods, the family, social class, group sur-

veys, rural and urban studies, criminology, and social pathology. Selected titles include: methodological problems of public opinion polls; a critique of Mannheim's sociology of knowledge; war-time morale among Finnish soldiers; student attitudes toward the military profession; Parliament as a channel for social mobility; and the ecology of Finnish crime. Two sociology doctorates have been given since 1951: Erik Allardt investigated environmental variations in marriage stability, and Armas Nieminen dealt with problems of marriage and sex in Finland, 1860 to 1920. Doctoral dissertations in progress include a survey of the class-structure of a Costa Rican community, mortality among Karelian re-settlers, frustration-situations in industry, emigration from northern Finland to the U.S.A., drinking mores among Finnish industrial workers, and the social structure of the Finnish Conservative Party.

At Abo Academy, a small institution, enrollment in sociology is low but several Ph.D. dissertations are in progress, centering upon the following areas of research: religious proselytizing movements; a study of foster-children; popular sports; and postwar emigration from Finland to Sweden. A recent doctorate was granted to Knut Pipping whose research dealt with the military organization as a societal group. Courses have been offered in General Sociology, Sociology of Religion, and Sociology of Values, with seminars in selected sociological and psychological problems. The cultural exchange program has resulted in American texts being widely used at Abo, though since this was Westermarck's academic home for twenty years his influence there has by no means disappeared. The chair of sociology is held by K. Rob. V. Wikman, a folklorist and ethnologist whose current research embraces folk-religion, mores, and beliefs. He has recently been occupied in a study of Catholicism in Austria. Reference should also be made to Rolf Lagerborg, a Durkheimian student and author of a new comprehensive biography of Westermarck (in Swedish).

At the Finnish University of Turku, Uno Harva's successor since 1951 has been Esko Aaltonen, a folk-lorist and religious historian, and author of a definitive history of the Finnish cooperative movement. His current research also involves a study of acculturation processes in the social structure of rural Finland. Graduate investigations at Turku are currently concerned with stratification of the European intelligentsia, status-systems among Finnish youth, analysis of non-voting groups, interaction in a veterans' suburb, time-study in factory work, juvenile gangs, and analysis of United States rural and urban sociology. One-third of the students in the humanities at Turku are currently enrolled in sociology classes. As at Helsinki, interest would be greater if there were more employment opportunities for sociologists. Postwar lecture courses have been given in social psychology, rural and urban sociology, and community leadership. American texts are used, and attempts are being made to establish an Institute of Sociology during 1953; work on a larger scale would then be made possible, particularly in industrial sociology, in which as yet no Turku studies have been made.

The School of Social Sciences in Helsinki, a small institution, offers preparation for social work, journalism, local government, and personnel management. Until his death in 1950, Antero Rinne was well-known as a student of the Finnish cooperative movement. Onni Wiherheimo offers courses in social process and theoretical problems of social psychology. American texts prescribed in sociology are mainly those by Ruth Benedict, R. E. L. Faris, E. T. Hiller, Krech and Crutchfield, Elton Mayo, and Lewis Mumford.

The only other center of university rank in social science is the School of Advanced Educational Studies at Jyvaskyla, where research is carried on in cognate fields, notably by Niilo Mäki in abnormal psychology, but its offerings in sociology *per se* are not extensive.

The main professional sociological body in Finland is the Westermarck Society, founded in 1940. Volume I of its *Transactions* (1947) contained a previously unpublished article written by Westermarck just before his death in 1939, a study by Uno Harva on "The Finno-Ugric System of Relationship," a philosophical essay, "Society and Humanity," by K. Rob. V. Wikman, and "Messengers, Heralds and Envoys in Savage Societies," by Ragnar Numelin, author of

an authoritative social-anthropological study, *The Beginnings of Diplomacy*.

An active group is the Finnish Social-Political Society, for the study of social legislation and problems. But it is hampered by the national lack of research amenities.

Valvoja, a Finnish periodical of scientific, cultural, and political interest, has since the war published articles on suicide in the northern countries, the role of pathological individuals in society, and male sex behavior. Another Finnish journal, *Suomalainen Suomi*, has been the outlet for studies of the ecology of suicide, communication as a means to understanding, contemporary trends in sociology, the strike as a sociological phenomenon, societal change, Finnish regionalism, deviating behavior patterns and alcoholism, and writers as social types. *Nya Argus*, a Swedish publication, has since 1946 carried articles on ethnology in Norway, cultural relativity, sociology in relation to psychoanalysis, and the ideal type methodology in social science. But there is no regular official journal devoted entirely to sociology in Finland, or in Scandinavia generally. Volume I of the Westermarck Society *Transactions* was anthropological and philosophical in approach. Volume II is currently in the press.

NON-ACADEMIC RESEARCH

Outside of the university centers in Finland, research in sociology is restricted by lack of funds and facilities. A notable exception, however, is investigation into the sociological aspects of alcoholism. In addition to the study of social pathology made by Veli Verkko, the Finnish State Liquor Monopoly (ALKO) has instituted a department of research where field surveys have been initiated in order to determine government policy on the social effects of liquor distribution. Studies have been made of alcoholism in relation to the national cultural patterns, and field investigations have attempted to measure and evaluate alcoholic consumption according to occupational and other group affiliations, educational and economic levels, and leisure-spending patterns.

One major survey carried on in 1951 was concerned with the effects of beginning the distribution of alcoholic beverages in a locality that previously had no authorized distribution. Interviews and representative sampling methods were used to ascertain observed changes. A study project designed to classify excessive alcoholics in Finland by the use of psychiatric, medical, psychological, and sociological-legal data, is also in progress. Research is also under way to estimate the prevalence of different types of excessive drinkers, to study the etiology of alcoholism, and to suggest means of offering necessary guidance and treatment to each type. The project has been divided into two parts, one of which, directed by a psychiatrist, seeks to delineate the psychiatric and clinical aspects, and the other attempts to assess cultural factors by the use of attitude-measurements and socio-economic scales. Further research is in progress concerning the effect of controls over alcoholic purchasers, together with minor studies of public opinion changes related to the introduction of modified prohibition measures.[2]

Another promising research project was initiated in 1948 by the Suomi-Seura, a society organized to promote home ties with Finns living abroad. This investigation covers the history of the overseas emigration movement from Finland. A committee of supervising delegates has been set up with representatives from the University of Helsinki, the Ministry of Education, and various cultural organizations. For three years the history of emigration to America has been studied from many angles; statistics have been collected and data compiled from hundreds of persons currently or previously resident in America. This survey is preliminary to a larger project dealing with the history of overseas emigration from Finland generally, including migration to Lapland and South Ostrobothnia.

A Finnish polling organization, *Suomen Gallup*, has recently initiated several attitude surveys, including a 1951 opinion sampling study of anticipated impressions of Finland

[2] Prohibition of the private sale of alcohol in Finland ceased in 1932. Although Finnish consumption of alcoholic beverages per capita is smaller than in most other countries, the injuries caused by it and the arrests for drunkenness still tend to be among the highest in the countries for which comparable statistics are available. An official committee has been appointed by Parliament to prepare a report on suggestions for the gradual liberalization of liquor control. The need for further research on this aspect of Finnish social pathology is acutely felt.

received by Olympic visitors. Other typical opinion research has dealt with proposed legislative changes and consumer purchasing habits.

Since the war the Statistical Bureau of Helsinki has pursued research in the fields of gerontology and the leisure-time behavior patterns of Finnish youth. Mention should also be made of the governmental Central Statistical Bureau.[3]

For several decades Finland has been an outstanding country as a source of folk-lore studies. Her National Museum is rich in folk-lore and ethnographic collections relating to the Lapps and Fenno-Ugric peoples. The University of Helsinki library is also replete with historical and anthropological material dealing with the folk-lore of Finland and pre-1917 Russia. Before World War II close co-operation existed with Ireland in folk-lore research.

FUTURE PROSPECTS OF FINNISH SOCIOLOGY

Speculation concerning future trends in Finnish sociology, as with all aspects of her culture, has to take into account the delicate political situation in which geography has placed her. Presupposing the continuity of her present political status, advances in Finnish sociology can be confidently expected. The rapid emergence of English, as opposed to German, as the second foreign language, the ASLA cultural exchange program with America, her recent entry into the Fulbright program, and a postwar faculty exchange scheme with the London School of Economics and Political Science, all augur well for the future. An increased interest in postwar societal problems and in U. S. sociology is very marked among Finnish students, but a cultural factor that may militate against the rise of sociology is a strong nationalism which is not conducive to objective investigation of societal phenomena.

Sociology in Finland is so new that as yet no one trend or school of thought is predominant. Sociological leadership at Abo Academy is wedded to the view that future trends should involve a merging of two approaches, the anthropological (in the Westermarckian sense) and the sociological, and that the main problem is to unite both of these approaches. Thus Dr. K Rob. V. Wikman maintains[4] that in Finland the older rural culture and the primary groups pertaining to it are so extensive that it would be impossible to dispense with the anthropological-folklorist approach and concentrate wholly on the industrialized conditions of urban Finland. To do so would give a false analysis of Finnish society. On the other hand, a union of the two approaches, the Westermarckian-anthropological and the more specifically sociological, would yield a comprehensive sociological theory without destroying the connections, both theoretical and methodological, between sociology as a science and a normative approach to social pathology. Dr. Wikman avers that "if philosophical problems are entirely disconnected from sociological thinking, the pioneering of Westermarck would have been made in vain." Professor Wikman further notes that the scientific tradition in Finland is older than in other Nordic lands and there is therefore good reason not to adopt everything now being advocated as novel in the Scandinavian countries where sociological research is newer. "We must . . . take into account the anthropological side of our research and not wholly forget the philosophical grounds of it, even if the old evolutionism of long ago is passed. It would be better to have good and broad descriptions of social facts than narrow psychometrical researches of individual facts and purely laboratory results."[5]

There is, notwithstanding, a trend away from Westermarckianism at the University of Helsinki, especially among the post-graduate students who have had the opportunity to study at American universities. A keen group of young scholars and investigators are accumulating empirical data by research techniques gained both in Finland and the States. It would appear very probable that this newer scientific-empirical emphasis will continue. If it can transcend the crude posi-

[3] Finland and Sweden were among the first countries to keep statistical records of their populations.

[4] In correspondence with the writer; quoted by permission.

[5] *Ibid.* For a discussion of this issue, see the present writer's "Social Science and Philosophy: the Unfortunate Divorce," *Social Science,* 28 (January, 1953), pp. 3–9.

tivism inherent in much of the earlier American research, through a judicious synthesis of sophisticated methodology with breadth of scholarship and strong theoretical frameworks, there will be reason to believe that future historians of sociology will be compelled to give more notice to Finnish achievements than has hitherto been the case.

AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF SELF-ATTITUDES *

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Although the self has long been the central concept in the symbolic interaction approach to social psychology, little if anything has been done to employ it directly in empirical research. There are several reasons for this, one of the most important of which is that there has been no consensus regarding the class of phenomena to which the self ought to be operationally ordered. The self has been called an image, a conception, a concept, a feeling, an internalization, a self looking at oneself, and most commonly simply the self (with perhaps the most ambiguous implications of all). One of these many designations of the self has been as *attitudes*. We do not have space here to discuss the theoretical clarification which results from the conscious conceptualization of the self as a set of attitudes [1] except to point out that this conceptualization is most consistent with Mead's view of the self as an object which is in most respects like all other objects, and with his further view that an object is a plan of action (an attitude).

If, as we suppose, human behavior is *organized* and *directed*, and if, as we further suppose, the organization and direction are supplied by the individual's *attitudes toward himself*, it ought to be of crucial significance to social psychology to be able to identify and measure self-attitudes. This paper is intended to provide an initial demonstration of the advantages to empirical research from thus treating the self as attitudes.

PROBLEMS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF A SELF-ATTITUDES TEST

The obvious first step in the application of self-theory to empirical research is the construction and standardization of a test which will identify and measure self-attitudes.

The initial consideration in designing such a test is the question of accessibility. Would people give to investigators the statements which are operative in identifying themselves and therefore in organizing and directing their behavior? Or would they be inclined to hide their significant self-attitudes behind innocuous and conventional fronts? Those following symbolic interaction orientation have apparently guessed the latter to be the case for they have seldom if ever asked direct questions regarding self-attitudes, and have tended to assemble self-attitudes of those they were studying from diverse kinds of statements and behavior through the use of long and dubious chains of inference.

One of the present authors, in an earlier attempt to identify and measure self-attitudes among groups of Amish, Mennonite and Gentile school children,[2] made the assumption that self-attitudes might be studied

* The investigation on which this paper is based was made possible by a grant from the Graduate College of the State University of Iowa. The paper is a part of an extended examination of self-theory given before the social psychology section of the Midwest Sociological Society at Omaha, April 25, 1953.

[1] A paper dealing with this view is being prepared by the present authors for publication elsewhere.

[2] Manford H. Kuhn, "Family Impact upon Personality," Chapter Five of *Problems in Social Psychology: An Interdisciplinary Inquiry*, edited by J. E. Hulett, Jr. and Ross Stagner, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953, esp. pp. 50–52. A more comprehensive report of this study is to be included in a symposium on culture and personality, edited by Francis L. K. Hsu, to be published in the spring of 1954.

in a fairly direct manner by collecting statements of role preference and role avoidance, role expectations, models for the self, and the like. While this investigation yielded results which corresponded to the cultural differences involved, it was clear that the self-statements which the children gave were specific to the role situations asked for and that therefore *general* self-attitudes still had to be (somewhat tenuously) inferred from them.

Subsequent pilot studies were made comparing the contents of extended autobiographies of university students with paragraphs written in answer to the question "Who are you?" These paragraphs contained virtually all the items which were yielded by rough content analyses of the self-attitudes in their corresponding autobiographies. This applied to painful and self-derogatory materials as well as to self-enhancing materials. Thus we concluded that it might be profitable to construct a test which was aimed directly at self-attitudes.[3]

The device which we then used, and upon the use of which this research report is in major part based, consisted of a single sheet of paper headed by these instructions:

"There are twenty numbered blanks on the page below. Please write twenty answers to the simple question 'Who am I?' in the blanks. Just give twenty different answers to this question. Answer as if you were giving the answers to yourself, not to somebody else. Write the answers in the order that they occur to you. Don't worry about logic or 'importance.' Go along fairly fast, for time is limited."

APPLICATION OF THE "TWENTY-STATEMENTS" TEST

This test was given to 288 undergraduate students at the State University of Iowa. It was administered during regular class meetings of introductory courses given in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology at various times during the spring of 1952. In a few classes the instructions were presented orally rather than in writing. In every instance students were given twelve minutes in which to complete the test. The students were naïve in the sense that they had not received instruction in the area to which this research was directed.

The number of responses per respondent evoked by these instructions varied from the twenty requested to one or two (with the median being seventeen responses). The responses took the general form "I am . . . ." Frequently "I am" was omitted, the responses consisting of phrases (*e.g.*, "a student," "an athlete," "a blonde") or of single words (*e.g.*, "girl," "married," "religious.").

The responses were dealt with by a form of content analysis. They were categorized dichotomously either as *consensual* references or as *subconsensual* references.[4] These content categories distinguish between statements which refer to groups and classes whose limits and conditions of membership are matters of common knowledge, *i.e., consensual;* and those which refer to groups, classes, attributes, traits or any other matters which would require interpretation by the respondent to be precise or to place him relative to other people, *i.e., subconsensual.* Examples of the consensual variety are "student," "girl," "husband," "Baptist," "from Chicago," "pre-med," "daughter," "oldest child," "studying engineering"; that is, statements referring to consensually defined statuses and classes. Examples of the subconsensual category are "happy," "bored," "pretty good student," "too heavy," "good

[3] The social scientist, unlike the Freudian, assumes that most human behavior is organized and directed by internalized but consciously held role recipes. See, for example, Theodore Newcomb, *Social Psychology*, New York: Dryden, 1950, for his excellent discussion of the relation of attitudes and symbols to the *direction* of behavior (pp. 77–78, 82), and his discussion of the *directive* (versus the expressive) organization of behavior (pp. 343–344). Those absorbed in the present fashion of projective testing would seem to have the cart before the horse, for relatively few of their subjects have been studied in terms of their directive and overt attitudes. It would seem much more reasonable to run out the implications of findings from tests of such attitudes before attempting to uncover deeplying, unconscious or guarded attitudes. We have concluded that much time is wasted debating *in advance* to what extent people will hide their "true attitudes," whether they be self-attitudes or attitudes toward other objects or states of affairs.

[4] The precise working definitions of the two categories are given in detail in Thomas S. McPartland, *The Self and Social Structure*: *An Empirical Approach*, Iowa City: State University of Iowa Library, 1953, p. 147, Ph.D. Dissertation, microfilm.

wife," "interesting"; that is, statements without positional reference, or with references to consensual classes obscured by ambiguous modifiers.

The assignment of responses to these dichotomous content categories was highly reliable between different analysts, differences in categorization between two judges occurring less than three times in one hundred responses.

When the content was dichotomized in this way several interesting and useful features emerged:

First, from the ordering of responses on the page it was evident that *respondents tended to exhaust all of the consensual references they would make before they made (if at all) any subconsensual ones;* that is, having once begun to make subconsensual references they tended to make no more consensual references (if indeed they had made any at all). This ordering of responses held whether a respondent made as many as nineteen consensual references or as few as one.

Second, the number of consensual references made by respondents varied from twenty to none. Similarly the number of subconsensual references made by respondents varied from twenty to none. However, the number of consensual and subconsensual references made by any given respondent did not stand in a simple arithmetic relation (such as the number of consensual references plus the number of subconsensual references equals twenty). This resulted from the fact that many respondents made fewer than twenty statements. For example, a respondent might make ten consensual statements and then leave the remaining ten spaces blank, while another might make two consensual references, twelve subconsensual references, and then leave the last six spaces blank.[5] In the analysis on which this report is based, all consensual references are on one side of the dichotomy, while "no-responses" are combined with subconsensual references on the other. An individual's "locus score" is simply the number of consensual references he makes on the "Twenty-Statements" Test.

These characteristics of the responses to the "Twenty-Statements" Test satisfy the definition of a Guttman scale. "The scalogram hypothesis is that the items have an order such that, ideally, *persons who answer a given question favorably all have higher ranks on the scale than persons who answer the same question unfavorably.*"[6] In applying this criterion it is necessary to keep in mind that "a given question" refers in this case to a specified one (by order) of the twenty statements, and that a "favorable response" would refer to a statement with a consensual reference—one that places the individual in a social system.

"The items used in a scalogram analysis must have a special *cumulative property.*"[7] Again it must be kept in mind that "the items" must in this case be interpreted in terms of the content analysis and not in terms of the raw responses to the open-ended question. Since a person who, let us say, makes a consensual statement as his seventh has also (in more than ninety per cent of the instances) made consensual statements in his first six, and since "consensuality" or "locus" refers to anchorage or self-identification in a social system, a variable which is numerically cumulative, we may regard the criterion of cumulativeness as being satisfied in this test. Guttman states, "A third equivalent definition of a scale is the one upon which our practical scalogram analysis procedures are directly based. It requires that each person's responses should be reproducible from the rank alone. A more technical statement of the condition is that each item shall be a simple function of the persons' ranks."[8] This is true for the test under consideration.

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[5] The variables which result from these characteristics of responses to the "Twenty-Statements" Test are presently being utilized in further research with special reference to clinical use. There are some interesting indications that those with few if any *consensual* statements to make have symptoms of emotional disturbance, while those having few statements *of any kind* to make are of Riesman's "radar" type, taking their cues from each specific situation, and (in the phrase of John Gould) "taking their 'immediate others' to be their 'significant others.'"

[6] S. A. Stouffer, L. Guttman, E. A. Suchman, P. F. Lazarsfeld, S. A. Star, and J. A. Clausen, *Studies in Social Psychology in World War II, Volume IV: Measurement and Prediction,* Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950, p. 9.

[7] *Ibid.,* p. 10.

[8] *Ibid.,* p. 62.

Scores can therefore be assigned which indicate not only *how many* consensual references were made by each respondent, but *which* of his responses fell into the consensual category. The coefficient of reproducibility for this scale, based on 151 respondents, is .903. The test-retest reliability of the scale scores is approximately + .85.

Both for convenience and because consensual references are references to subjective identification by social position we have called the consensual - subconsensual variable the *locus* variable. Table 1 is a summary of the "scale of locus," and shows among other things the number of respondents approximating each scale type. For example, the first row in Table 1 indicates that 19 respondents most closely approximated Scale Type 20, *i.e.*, making twenty statements of the consensual reference variety. Of their 380 responses there were 41 errors (that is, randomly distributed nonconsensual statements), giving a coefficient of reproducibility of .892 for this scale type. At the other end of the scale there were three respondents who belonged in Scale Type O, which is that of making no consensual statements, thus giving a perfect coefficient of reproducibility, 1.00.

TABLE 1. THE SCALE OF LOCUS, SHOWING SCALE-TYPES, FREQUENCY, TOTAL RESPONSES[1] IN EACH SCALE TYPE AND THE COEFFICIENT OF REPRODUCIBILITY FOR EACH SCALE TYPE

Scale Type	Frequency	Total Response	Errors	C. R.
20	19	380	41	.892
19	5	100	13	.870
18	1	20	1	.950
17	4	80	7	.913
16	1	20	3	.850
15	6	120	24	.800
14	8	160	9	.937
13	8	160	19	.875
12	4	80	10	.875
11	13	260	21	.915
10	7	140	15	.893
9	9	180	19	.895
8	9	180	15	.912
7	7	140	9	.936
6	10	200	15	.925
5	11	220	24	.891
4	8	160	11	.932
3	12	240	24	.900
2	2	40	5	.875
1	4	80	8	.900
0	3	60	0	1.000
	151	3020	293	.903

[1] Includes failure to respond to a blank as a response.

VALIDITY OF THE TEST

The problem of validity of a test in a hitherto uninvestigated area is a difficult one. There are generally recognized to be two related but distinct methods of assessing validity. One is by examining the logical relatedness of the test with the body of theory on which it rests. This subsumes the test of validity by correlating test results with the criterion behavior indicated by the theory. The other method is through correlation of the results of the test with other (already standardized) tests of the problem under investigation. When—as in this case—an area has not been previously investigated by inductive research there are no other tests to use as correlational checks. We need not be held up unduly by this consideration, however, for this is apparently a very much misused method of assessing validity in the field of personality research.[9]

[9] There has been a considerable tendency to validate each new personality test by correlating its results with those obtained by the already existent ones, without inquiring into *their* validity.

There are two kinds of demonstration required to deal properly with the problem of the consistency of the test with its antecedent body of orientational theory. One is that of making explicit the chains of logic which went into the designing of the test, the test operations and the manipulations of the data obtained through its application. The other is that of showing that the test results correlate in some consistent patterns with the kinds of behavior which the orientation asserts are related.

With respect to the first kind of demonstration we need indicate only that the question "Who am I?" is one which might logically be expected to elicit statements about *one's identity;* that is, his social statuses, and the attributes which are in his view relevant to these. To ask him to give these statements "as if to himself" is an endeavor to obtain from him *general* self-attitudes rather than simply ones which might be idiosyncratic to the test situation or those which might be uniquely held toward himself in his relation to the test administrator. The request in the test for as many as twenty statements of self-identity stems from a recognition by the investigators of the *complex* and *multifarious* nature of an individual's statuses, their curiosity regarding the question of whether the *ordering of responses* correlates with the individual's particular anchoring in society, and their interest in exploring the *range* of self-attitudes.

The manipulation of the responses by assigning them to dichotomous categories, that of consensual reference and that of subconsensual reference, rests on the self-theory view that the self is an interiorization of one's positions in social systems. One may assume from this orientation that variations in such self-identifications are equivalents of variations in the ways in which the individuals in a society such as ours have cast their lot within the range of possible reference groups.

There is an alternative hypothetical mechanism which might be advanced to explain the salience of the consensual reference statement. It is this: our society requires such a volume of census information from its citizens that the salience of consensual references in the replies to the "Twenty-Statements" Test is, according to this hypothesis, simply a superficial carry-over from other questionnaires and forms. On this view those responses which are treated in our investigation as subconsensual are "deeper" self-attitudes, and hence those which lie closer to the "authentic individual."

We do not agree with this view. It is our belief that the ordering of responses is a reflection of the make-up of the self-conception.[10] The fact that the volume of

See Leonard W. Ferguson, *Personality Measurement,* New York: McGraw-Hill, 1952. Ferguson points out (p. 178) that the Bernreuter Personality Inventory was validated by correlating its scales with scores on the Allport Ascendance-Submission scale, the Bernreuter Self-Sufficiency Scale, the Laird Introversion-Extroversion Schedule and the Thurstone Personality Inventory. The correlations were high. But the Laird and Thurstone tests had been through *no validation process whatsoever,* and the other two were unsatisfactorily validated! He points out, later, that the Bell Adjustment Inventory was validated against the Allport, Thurstone and Bernreuter tests (p. 232), thus pyramiding still another validation on the original shaky base. And so it goes until people have completely forgotten all details of the construction of the earliest tests on whose validity the whole series rests as far as this variety of validation is concerned.

We should note parenthetically that we were not interested in validating this test operation of ours against any of the existent personality tests not alone for the reasons involved in the argument above, but more basically because these other tests were designed from orientations quite foreign to ours. One has only to check the items on any current personality test to see how seldom is there any logical relation to self-theory.

[10] In the ordering of responses we are dealing essentially with the dimension of *salience* of self-attitudes. Theodore Newcomb (in his *Social Psychology,* New York: Dryden, 1950, p. 151) says of salience that it "refers to a person's readiness to respond in a certain way. The more salient a person's attitude the more readily will it be expressed with a minimum of outer stimulation. It seems reasonable to assume that a very salient attitude—one expressed with great spontaneity—has more importance for the person expressing it than does an attitude which he expresses only after a good deal of prodding or questioning. The weakness of direct questions is that they provide no way of measuring the salience of an attitude; we never know whether the attitude would have been expressed at all, or in the same way, apart from the direct question." Thus when a respondent, in reply to the "Who am I?" question on the "Twenty-Statements" Test, writes "I am a man," "I am a student," "I am a football player," it is

consensual responses (corresponding to social anchorings) varies greatly from respondent to respondent is taken to give indirect confirmation of our position. Another and more direct empirical confirmation is to be found in the fact that three- and four-year-old children when asked "Who are you?" give, in addition to their names, their sex and occasionally their ages; in their instances one cannot allege a carry-over from the giving of census data. Of course only the pragmatic success or failure of the technique here under consideration will give a dependable answer, and the latter part of this report is devoted to an account of one such pragmatic test. This pragmatic test of the usefulness of the scale scores of the "locus" component of self-attitudes may serve also as the second kind of demonstration of the validity of the instrument.

VARIATIONS IN SELF-ATTITUDES BY "KNOWN GROUPS"

The behavior which we tested for correlation with locus scores derived from our self-attitudes test is that of differential religious affiliation. It is simply one of a multitude of possible investigations which now need to be undertaken to answer the larger question "What values of this variable (locus) are related to what kinds of behavior and to what trains of social experience?"

Our orientation indicates that the self-conception should vary with differential social anchorage in (a) large, conventional, "respectable," accepted and influential groups; (b) small, weak or different, ambivalently viewed, marginal or dissident groups; or (c) no groups at all (in institutional areas in which a large fraction of the society's membership belongs and is identified by status in one or another of the existent groups). Religious groups and corresponding affiliation by our respondents fitted this model admirably so that we might check differentials in their self-attitudes against differentials in their religious group affiliations. Some religious groups in our society are "majority groups," while others are groups whose subcultures contain norms which set their members at odds with the norms of the larger society. Then, too, a large fraction of the population either has no religious reference group or no religious group membership.

Reports of membership in religious groups in our sample were collected by means of the direct question: "What is your religious affiliation or preference?" The numbers of each variety of affiliation are given in the column under the heading "N" in Table 2. The mean locus scale scores were computed for each of these religious groups and are given in the next column. The mean scale scores ranged from 11.89 (for Catholics) to 5.75 (for "nones"). These scale scores are simply the mean number of consensual reference statements made by respondents in each of the religious groups.

Analysis of variance revealed a relation between religious affiliation and scale scores significant beyond the one per cent level. The differences between group means of Roman Catholics on the one hand and Methodists, Presbyterians, and persons reporting no affiliation on the other, were significant beyond the two per cent level. Taking the group reporting no affiliation as the base, we found significant differences between this group-mean and the group-means of Roman Catholics, "small sects," "Protestants," Congregationalists, Lutherans, Christians and Jews. Although the N's were relatively large, Methodists and Presbyterians did not differ significantly from "nones" at any usually accepted level of statistical significance. The results of this analysis appear in the last two columns in Table 2.

These results indicate clear differences in the relative strength of the more directly socially anchored component of the self-conception among affiliates of certain religious subcultures, but leave open the question of the antecedent correlates of these differences. If one postulates that Roman Catholics have in common with members of small Protestant denominations, Lutherans and Jews the characteristic that religious

reasonable to believe that we have far more solid knowledge of the attitudes which organize and direct his behavior than if, on a checklist and among other questions, we had asked "Do you think of yourself as a man?" "Do you think of yourself as a student?" and "Do you think of yourself as an athlete?"

affiliation is picked out as "important" and differentiating; and that Methodists, Presbyterians, and "indifferentists" have in common the characteristic that religious affiliation is not "important" or that it is taken for granted, then the two clusters of denominations by scale scores make sense.

If this postulate is sound, then Roman Catholics, Jews and members of small sects should carry religious references more saliently in the self-conception. The "Twenty-Statements" Test provides data on this point.[11]

The salience of a self-reference may be understood as the relative spontaneity with which a particular reference will be used as an orientation in the organization of behavior.[12] In this research salience of religious reference in the self-conception was measured by the rank of religious reference (if any was made) on the page of twenty statements, mention of religious affiliation in first place being scored 20, mention in last place scoring 1, and omission of reference to religious affiliation arbitrarily scored zero.

The mean salience of religious references on the "Twenty-Statements" Test ranged from 7.4 for Roman Catholics to 1.82 for "Christians." Analysis of variance of religious references showed salience scores to be related to religious affiliation beyond the one per cent level. The analysis of the significance of the difference between group means appears in Table 3.

TABLE 2. VARIATIONS IN SELF-ATTITUDES BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OBSERVED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN LOCUS SCORES OF AFFILIATES OF VARIOUS RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS

Denomination	N [1]	Denominational Mean	Significance of Difference [2]	Significance of Difference [3]
Roman Catholic	38	11.89	..	$P < .001$
"Small Sects" [4]	20	11.00	not sig.	$P < .01$
"Protestant"	21	10.47	not sig.	$P < .01$
Congregationalist	13	10.30	not sig.	$P < .01$
Lutheran	33	10.09	not sig.	$P < .01$
"Christian"	11	9.81	not sig.	$P < .02$
Jewish	19	9.57	not sig.	$P < .05$
Methodist	73	8.94	$P < .02$	not sig.
Presbyterian	32	8.18	$P < .01$	not sig.
"None"	28	5.75	$P < .001$*	..

[1] The total N is 238. These 288 include the 151 on whom the locus scale, reported in Table 1, was established, plus 137 cases obtained subsequently.

[2] Computed from the Roman Catholic group mean as the base.

[3] Computed from the group mean of "Nones" as the base.

[4] Includes Baptists, Episcopalians, Evangelicals, Mennonites, Nazarenes, Reorganized Latter Day Saints, Unitarians.

* While this and the other measures of statistical significance of difference are such as to give great confidence that the differences are not due to chance, it will only be through repeated correlations of locus scores with other behavior with respect to representative samples that we will be able to discover the theoretical import of the *magnitude* of the difference.

TABLE 3. DIFFERENTIAL SELF-ANCHORAGE IN RELIGIOUS GROUPS: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF OBSERVED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEAN SALIENCE SCORES OF RELIGIOUS REFERENCES AMONG AFFILIATES OF VARIOUS RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS

Denomination	Denominational Mean	Significance of Difference [1]
Roman Catholic	7.39	..
Lutheran	7.09	not significant
"Small Sects"	7.04	not significant
Jewish	6.68	not significant
Congregationalist	5.54	not significant
Presbyterian	4.47	$P < .01$
Methodist	3.22	$P < .01$
"Christian"	1.82	$P < .01$

[1] Computed from the Roman Catholic group mean as a base.

[11] This, obviously, is a use of data from the "Twenty-Statements" Test in an altogether different way than through the use of them to obtain locus scores. There are, in fact, almost unlimited numbers of ways in which these self-statements may be treated, but each would constitute essentially a new test.

[12] The comments and quotation in footnote 10 above apply equally here.

TABLE 4. REFERENCE GROUP EVIDENCE: THE DICHOTOMOUS DIVISION OF 116 RESPONDENTS ON THE BASIS OF RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION AND IDENTIFICATION WITH RELIGIOUS GROUPS

	Religious Reference Present	Religious Reference Absent	
Catholics and Jews	13 (5.5)	7 (14.5)	20
All others	19 (26.5)	77 (69.5)	96
Total	32	84	116

Chi Square: 17.03
Q: .875
P less than .0001

A completely independent operation was conducted to test this finding of the relation between the social "importance" of group affiliation and "importance" in the self-conception; 116 undergraduates, whose religious affiliations were known, were asked to answer one of two alternative "reference-group" questions: "With what groups do you feel most closely identified?" or "I am proudest of my membership in ———." When respondents were cross-classified (a) by religious affiliation and (b) by their giving or not giving religious affiliation references in response to these direct questions, Table 4 resulted. Since we had obtained, from the self-attitudes research done previously, an empirically derived gradient of "differentism," we used this to make a finer subdivision of these responses, which yielded Table 5.

These independently-derived data support the hypothesized relation between salience in the self-conception and socially defined importance of group membership at high levels of statistical significance.

TABLE 5. REFERENCE GROUP EVIDENCE ON THE GRADIENT OF DIFFERENTISM: THE DICHOTOMOUS DIVISION OF RESPONDENTS BY RELIGIOUS IDENTIFICATION AGAINST A TRICHOTOMOUS DIVISION BY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION

	Religious Reference Present	Religious Reference Absent	
Catholics and Jews	13 (6.2)	7 (13.8)	20
"Small Sects"	9 (6.2)	11 (13.8)	20
"Large Denominations"	10 (19.6)	53 (43.4)	63
Total	32	71	103

Chi Square: 19.45
T: .37
P less than .0001

CONCLUSIONS

The evidence provided by the "Twenty-Statements" Self-Attitudes Test and by its application to "known groups," in this case religious groups, gives support to the following empirically grounded inferences which have, in our view, rather large theoretical implications:

(1) The consensual (more directly socially anchored) component of the self-conception is the more salient component. Stated differently, consensually supported self-attitudes are at the top of the hierarchy of self-attitudes.

(2) Persons vary over a rather wide range in the relative volume of consensual and subconsensual components in their self-conceptions. It is in this finding that our empirical investigation has given the greatest advance over the purely deductive and more or less literary formulations of George Herbert Mead. Stated in terms of the language of this test, people have locus scores which range from 0 to 20. The variable involved here is one which we can correlate with a wide variety of other attitudes and behavior.

(3) The variation indicated in (1) and (2) can be established and measured by the empirical techniques of attitude research—specifically, the Guttman scaling technique. This gives a dual advantage in that it furthers the presumption that the locus variable is a unitary one and also in that it facilitates the further manipulation of values of the variable with respect to other quantitative problems.

(4) Locus scores vary with religious affiliation, as our initial validation test shows, members of the "differentistic" religious groups having significantly higher locus scores than do members of the "conventional" religious groups (using an independent source of information to establish the fact of membership in religious groups).

(5) Religious affiliation references are significantly more salient among the self-attitudes of members of "differentistic" religious groups than among members of "majority" or conventional religious groups.

(6) Corroboratively, the religious group as a reference group appears far more frequently as an answer to a direct, reference-group type of question among those made by members of "differentistic" religious groups.

This is a first (and only partially completed) effort to build a personality test consistent with the assumptions and findings of social science. The social science view is that people organize and direct their behavior in terms of their subjectively defined identifications. These in turn are seen as internalizations of the objective social statuses they occupy, but for prediction we need to have the *subjective* definitions of identity, in view of the looseness between the social systems and the individual occupants of statuses in them in a society such as ours, characterized by alternatives, change, and collective behavior—in short, a society toward the secular end of the scale. Our test elicits these self-definitions.

To complete a comprehensive personality test on this basis we will need to know, in addition to the subjects' subjective identifications in terms of statuses, their roles, role preferences and avoidances and role expectations, their areas of self-threat and vulnerability, their self-enhancing evaluations, their patterns of reference-group election (their "negative others" as well as their "positive others"), and probably their self-dissociated attitudes. Questions such as "What do you do?" "Who do you wish you were?" "What do you intend to do?" "What do you take the most pride in?" "As a member of what groups or categories would you like to count yourself?" are a few of the indicated types in the directions suggested of building a soundly grounded approach to a science of personality and culture.

CLASS, LEISURE, AND SOCIAL PARTICIPATION *

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In the course of an investigation into levels of aspiration and social class,[1] the decision was made to include materials on leisure activity and social participation because of their special relevance to the general problem. Some of the impetus for designing the study to include these materials came from the availability of a substantial amount of related information and evidence on the subject.[2] The combined findings of a number of separate studies seemed clearly to support the existence of a positive relationship between social class position on the one hand, and the character and extent of leisure activity and social participation on the other. Those in "higher" class positions were more active and diverse in their participation than those in "lower" positions. Phrased in somewhat less rigorous terms, this can be interpreted to mean that the middle class [3] generally tends to domi-

* The writer gratefully acknowledges financial assistance at various phases of this study from the Social Science Research Council and from the Tulane University Council on Research. Indebtedness to the late Professor Paul K. Hatt can only be acknowledged but never fully repaid.

[1] Leonard Reissman, "Levels of Aspiration and Social Class," *American Sociological Review,* 18 (June, 1953), pp. 233–242.

[2] The following are referred to: W. A. Anderson, "Family Social Participation and Social Status Self-Ratings," *American Sociological Review,* 11 (June, 1946), pp. 253–258; Floyd Dotson, "Patterns of Voluntary Association Among Urban Working-Class Families," *American Sociological Review,* 16 (October, 1951), pp. 687–693; Genevieve Knupfer, "Portrait of the Underdog," *Public Opinion Quarterly,* (Spring, 1947), pp. 103–114; Mirra Komarovsky, "The Voluntary Associations of Urban Dwellers," *American Sociological Review,* 11 (December, 1946), pp. 686–698; Olaf F. Larson, "Rural Community Patterns of Social Participation," *Social Forces,* 16 (March, 1938), pp. 385–388; William G. Mather, Jr., "Income and Social Participation," *American Sociological Review,* 6 (June, 1941), pp. 380–383; Gresham M. Sykes, "The Differential Distribution of Community Knowledge," *Social Forces,* 29 (May, 1951), pp. 376–382.

[3] This is not the place to become overwhelmed by the variety of theory and procedure in desig-

nate the organizational activity, the intellectual life, and the leadership of the community. The immediate problem is one of accounting for differences in patterns of behavior and attitude by differences in class position. In other words, can the extent and character of the participation be explained in some measure by the class position of the participants? The more far-reaching implication is one of values, control, and dominance. What are the implications in having much of the community's effective voice spring from the middle class rather than from some other segment or from a more varied representation of the community population? The first problem forms the major basis for the present paper; the second, important as it is, can only be noted.

The several studies of class and participation cannot be considered as replications in any strict methodological sense. The research design and procedures used in each are different and do not follow the rigorous mold of statistical theory demanded for replications. Nevertheless, it should also be noted that they do exhibit a satisfactory degree of plausible comparability based in large measure upon the use of common categories of analysis; a factor partly taken into account in the design of the present research. The most apparent lack of comparability is evidenced by the use of different variables to determine class position and by the reliance on medians of the separate distributions to allow for a division into a "higher" and a "lower" class group. For example, in a rural sample, an income of 100 dollars a month might be used to divide that sample into a "higher" and a "lower" group, while in an urban sample, these two groups might be designated by an occupational grouping of professionals, white-collar, and business-men into one category and laborers into the other. On the surface, the two samples would appear to be too different to allow for any comparison between them. However, these differences need not be viewed as insurmountable, if analysis can be directed toward a comparison of individuals *within* a community rather than *between* communities, yet considering the two as special instances of a more general research problem. If it is found, for example, that the leaders in the rural community come from the higher income group in that community, and that those in the urban community come from the higher occupational group in their community, then there would seem to be a measure of justification for considering these findings as some evidence of the character of community leadership generally. It is this kind of comparison which is made in the present paper.[4]

This research report has two purposes. First, to enhance the comparability between previous investigations by testing the relationships on a single sample alternately with three commonly used class variables—income, occupation, and education. If a similar pattern can be found regardless of the class variable used, it can be argued that the manifest differences between the previous studies, in this respect, are not especially crucial. Second, the formulation of the basic relationship between class and participation is expanded to include aspirations as an additional dimension.

It would be advisable to summarize briefly the findings of previous studies at this point. An earlier summary can be found in an excellent paper by Knupfer,[5] and some of her material has been incorporated here. Following her procedure, and in the light of the cautions expressed above, designations of "high" and "low" for class position are used throughout, regardless of differences that might be found in the procedures of the separate studies.

Organizational Activity. The dominance of the higher class in the formal organizational life of the community is clear in every instance. Not only do they, more frequently than the lower class, belong to at least one organization, but they also tend to belong to a variety of organizations. In one case it was found that only 3.1 per cent of the higher class did not belong to any organizations as

nating "class." Important as these matters are for the study of class, it would seem advisable to rely upon approximations for the present. In this case, "middle class" seems to this writer to be a satisfactory substitute for the "higher" class position referred to in this and previous studies.

[4] Partly, the justification for such combination comes from the suspected correlation between the class variables of occupation and income. Partly too, there is an element, which might be called "community status," that represents the more general statement of the relationship.

[5] Knupfer, *op. cit.*

compared with 25.7 per cent of the lower class without any organizational affiliations.[6] In another instance, it was found that 25 per cent of those in the higher class belonged to three or more organizations, compared to less than 2 per cent of the lower class.[7] Finally, among the higher class group, 72.5 per cent were found to belong to more than one type of organization as compared with 34.4 per cent of the lower class.[8] Warner has summarized this relationship in reference to his "Yankee City" study, "As the class rank increases, the proportion of its members who belong to associations also increases; and as the position of a class decreases, the percentage of those who belong to associations decreases." [9] These percentages indicate both the greater diversity and the wider range of organizational activity of the higher class, or what in most cases can be considered as the middle class segment of the community.

Organizational Leadership. Considering leadership as the holding of an office in an organization, the dominance of the higher class group is again evident. In two studies reporting upon this point, it was found that the lower class group did not generally assume, nor wish to assume, such office.[10] An apparent implication, of course, is that the higher class group can dominate and dictate the activities and direction of the organization itself from the vantage point of the office it holds.[11] The more limited representation of the lower class plus its unwillingness to assume leadership roles would seem to relegate it at best to a silent and passive "participation."

Church Attendance. The higher class group shows more frequent church attendance than does the lower class. In one reported instance, 61.1 per cent of the former attended at least once a month, while only 35.3 per cent of the latter attended as frequently.[12] These differences are no indication of the comparative religiosity of the two groups because they refer only to activity in a formal denominational sense. The more intensive, more covert religious feelings often attributed to lower class individuals can neither be supported nor denied by this relatively simple finding. "Church attendance" in the present context should be interpreted more in the sense of formal organizational activity rather than in a somewhat more complex social psychological dimension.

Visiting and Friendship Patterns. The evidence that lower class individuals appear to have fewer intimate friends and engage in less visiting among friends, has been dramatically pointed up by Knupfer.[13] Further substantiation for this conclusion is given in two other studies, which bear out the same point.[14] The lower class person tends to limit his social interaction more to his immediate family, in contrast to the higher class person who more willingly ranges outside of the family, outside of his own neighborhood, and at times outside of his own community.[15] The implication is clear. Not

[6] Mather, *op. cit.*, p. 380.

[7] Komarovsky, *op. cit.*, p. 689. These figures were arrived at by combining Komarovsky's occupational groups of "white-collar," "business," and "professional" into the higher class, and "all labor" into the lower class.

[8] Mather, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

[9] W. Lloyd Warner and Paul S. Lunt, *The Social Life of a Modern Community*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941, p. 329.

[10] Mather, *op. cit.*, p. 381; Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

[11] An interesting observation is made on this point by Warner and Lunt, *op. cit.*, p. 334. "These two classes (upper-upper and lower-upper) are more active in the associational structure within the limits of their size than are any others. The smallness of their numbers permits persons of the upper classes to make an effort as a group to exert control over the society through this medium. Although the members of these two classes often do not hold offices in the controlling hierarchies of the various groups, they nevertheless effectively exercise certain pressures upon those who do."

[12] Mather, *op. cit.*, p. 381.

[13] Knupfer, *op. cit.* referring to R. S. and H. M. Lynd, *Middletown*, and H. F. Kaufman, *Prestige Classes in a New York Rural Community*.

[14] Dotson, *op. cit.*, p. 691; Anderson, *op. cit.*, p. 256.

[15] John Useem and others, "Stratification in a Prairie Town," quoted in Knupfer, *op. cit.*, p. 107. The point might be made that the restricted range of interaction of the lower class person in Prairieton (the subject of the study in this note) is perhaps more indicative of a rural rather than an urban area. The urban dweller generally, is more likely to travel outside of his family and neighborhood than would the lower class person in Prairieton, with a population of 3500. The Lynd's finding in *Middletown*, however, would seem to suggest that the greater geographical mobility of the urban person does not necessarily mean greater and more intimate social contacts.

only is the range of personal acquaintance likely to be broader for the higher class person, but thereby too his potential involvement with others, and consequently, his opportunity to exert some effect on the social structure of his community. The contrast suggested here is a striking one, somewhat like that between the hail-fellow-well-met and the social hermit. The former can be, and usually is, heard.

Reading. It has been pointed out a number of times that the higher class person tends to read more books and magazines than the lower class one. In addition, it has been found that the former tends to be more interested in "serious" (such as *Time*) rather than in "light" (such as *True Confessions*) reading materials.[16] This difference can be incorporated into the emerging picture of the higher class group. It would tend to show that the higher class is more likely to take advantage of the mass media as a channel for information about its environment and its activity within it. This proposition can be supported further by the analysis of opinion polls, which show that the higher class individual is more likely to have knowledge of and interest in national and international affairs.[17] Furthermore, Sykes found that higher class individuals in his sample were more informed about local community affairs than was the lower class group, even in one of the suburbs of a large city.[18]

Certainly, having information about a political or social issue does not mean necessarily taking action on the issue. Riesman's analysis bears on this point when he notes that it is characteristic of our time for some individuals to be contented only to *know* about political affairs rather than become involved *in* them.[19] Nevertheless, it might be argued that an awareness of the situation or the issue, such as that evidenced by the higher class, is a necessary prerequisite to action even where that awareness may be based upon biased or spurious information.

The pattern of differences between the participation of the higher class and the lower class should be evident from this summary. In general, the picture that emerges is a consistent one of greater potential community control and dominance and of greater possible awareness and appreciation of community affairs by individuals of the higher class.

CLASS AND PARTICIPATION

The present research is based upon a sample of white, male, native-born adults selected from the city of Evanston, Illinois by means of a modified areal sample.[20] One objective of the present paper, as stated earlier, is to test the relationship between class position and participation along lines of analysis suggested by previous investigations. For the purposes of this analysis, "class" is determined by means of three commonly used variables—occupation, income and education. More specifically, this sample of adults was divided into "higher" and "lower" class groups at the median of each of the three distributions, and then compared, separately for each variable, on a number of items concerned with social participation and leisure activity. The reasoning followed in this comparison can be phrased as follows: If a consistent pattern of differences between the "high" and the "low" class groups is evident regardless of which variable is used, then it might be considered as further support for the conclusions reached by previous studies as discussed above. The relevant information is summarized in Table 1.

A word of explanation is necessary before the information in Table 1 can be evaluated. Most divisions, both in rows and columns, have been made as close to the median as possible for each distribution. "High" and "low" groups for occupational prestige, income and education are based upon the

[16] *A Qualitative Study of Magazines* by the McCall Corporation, quoted in Knupfer, *op. cit.* p. 108.

[17] Knupfer, *op. cit.*, p. 109.

[18] Sykes, *op. cit.*, p. 378.

[19] David Riesman (in collaboration with Reuel Denney and Nathan Glazer), *The Lonely Crowd*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1950, pp. 177–ff. Within the context of politics, Weber's distinction between the "professional" and the "occasional" politician is also very much to the point. Cf. *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, transl. and edited by H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, New York: Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 83 ff.

[20] *Cf.* Reissman, *op. cit.*, p. 235 for a fuller description of the sample and how it was drawn.

medians of each of these three distributions as indicated in footnotes to Table 1. The "higher participation levels" for each of the eight activities listed in the stub of the table are the upper half of the distribution and are based upon the medians of the entire sample in most instances. In the case of "leadership" and "attendance at organizations," where only two and three response categories respectively were involved, the division was more arbitrarily designated on the basis of the meaning of those categories.

Careful inspection of Table 1 indicates that a relatively consistent pattern of differences in participation and leisure activity is present. In other words, regardless of whether occupation, income or education is used to measure class position, the higher class groups tend to show higher participation levels in most of the activities. In only two instances is this not the case. No differences are present between the "high" and the "low" educational groups for time spent in hobbies, and a very slight difference appears between the occupational groups for this activity. Second, more time is spent in radio and television listening by all of the lower class groups than is spent by the

TABLE 1. A COMPARISON BETWEEN OCCUPATIONAL PRESTIGE GROUPS, INCOME GROUPS, AND EDUCATIONAL GROUPS OF A SINGLE SAMPLE, FOR SELECTED ACTIVITIES

High Participation Levels in:	Occupational Prestige Groups [1]			Income Groups [2]			Educational Groups [3]		
	High	Low	Diff.	High	Low	Diff.	High	Low	Diff.
Number of Cases	65	56		61	60		67	54	
	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent	Per Cent
Book reading (2 or more in a 3 months period)	50.8	35.7	15.1	50.8	36.7	14.1	52.2	33.3	18.9*
Magazine reading (4 or more read regularly)	67.7	39.3	28.4*	72.1	36.7	35.4**	67.2	38.9	28.3**
Radio-T.V. listening (5 hours or more per week)	43.1	58.9	15.8	36.1	65.0	28.9**	40.3	63.0	22.7*
Hobbies (Spends 3 hours or more per week)	46.2	46.4	.2	52.5	40.0	12.5	46.3	46.3	0
Church attendance (Several times a month or more)	50.8	30.4	20.4*	44.3	38.3	6.0	46.3	35.2	11.1
Organizations (Belongs to 2 or more)	66.2	39.3	26.9**	59.0	48.3	10.7	56.7	50.0	6.7
Leadership (Holds or has held office in organization)	52.7 (N=55)	33.3 (N=45)	19.4*	57.4 (N=54)	28.3 (N=46)	29.1*	53.6 (N=56)	31.9 (N=44)	21.7*
Attendance at Organizations (Attends "frequently")	47.2 (N=55)	42.2 (N=45)	5.0	46.3 (N=54)	43.5 (N=46)	2.8	53.6 (N=56)	34.1 (N=44)	19.5*

[1] Based upon North-Hatt occupational scale. "High" includes scores of 70 and 80, i.e., generally those who are professionals, managers, etc.

[2] "High" includes those who earn 125 dollars a week or more.

[3] "High" includes any college attendance.

(A single asterisk indicates 5 per cent level of significance, and two asterisks indicate 1 per cent level of significance.)

higher class groups. Since no information was obtained on the program interests of the different groups, it is impossible to assess this reversal of the general pattern adequately.

The general pattern of dominance by the higher class group, in every instance except the two noted, seems to be more than simply a random one. They read more books and magazines, attend church more frequently, belong to more organizations, attend with greater frequency, and tend more often to hold office in those organizations. This holds true for each of the three variables used to index class position.[21] This finding can be used to substantiate the combined findings of previous studies summarized above. The close similarity between the pattern of participation in this sample and those noted before tends to support the general images of the higher and lower class groups that have been presented.

CLASS AND ASPIRATIONS

The second objective of the present paper is the analysis of information on the aspirations of the higher and lower class groups as an extension of the pattern of differences discussed previously. The suggestion for including such information comes from the article by Knupfer, in which the conclusion is drawn that lower class individuals generally tend to hold lower levels of aspiration to "make life tolerable."[22] The basic information on the aspirations of the present sample has been reported by the writer,[23] and need not be repeated in its entirety. However, the problem now being posed requires a different analytical perspective. The present problem can be phrased as follows: What differences can be found in the aspirations held by the higher and by the lower class groups, and how can these differences be related to the information on participation and leisure activity of the two groups?

The format for the analysis of aspirations follows that presented for the materials on participation and leisure. The sample is again analyzed alternately on the basis of "high" and "low" groups for occupation, income, and education. Eleven items were included in a question asking the respondent to indicate how important each of them would be in considering a possible upward occupational move. These items, as listed in the stub of Table 2, dealt with health, family, leisure time, friendship, and the like. Table 2 summarizes the perecentages of each group indicating that the particular item mentioned "wouldn't matter" to them in considering an upward occupational move.

The information that is given in Table 2 is of interest primarily because of the ***pattern*** of differences it presents rather than the *degree* of difference in individual comparisons. It has been designed primarily to give some insight into the relationship between a series of aspiration choices and class characteristics of this sample. By duplicating the form of analysis used in the earlier section of this paper, it should be possible to include some description of the aspirations of the class groups, whose social participation and leisure activities have been discussed. The central focus here is upon how the different class groups respond to the relative importance of the aspiration items, rather than upon the magnitude of the differences that might occur in individual comparisons.

The class groups were ranked on each of the eleven aspiration items according to the percentages of each group that indicated the particular item "wouldn't matter" to them. The "high" groups in occupation, income and education ranked highest in five of the items. The "low" groups ranked highest in three of the items. For three items, no consistency such as this was found.

A glance at Table 2 indicates that on the following five items the "high" groups for occupation, income and education showed larger percentages than any of the "low" groups of those who said these items

[21] A question might be raised at this point concerning the degree of correlation between these three variables inasmuch as a single sample is being analyzed. The following correlation coefficients for the three variables are as follows:

Occupation-income	$.42 \pm .074$
Occupation-education	$.50 \pm .068$
Income-education	$.42 \pm .074$

Although there is some relationship between these variables, it is not sufficient to justify combining any two or more of them.

[22] Knupfer, *op. cit.*, p. 113. Her conclusions are based in large measure on information obtained from an opinion study by Richard Centers and from the M. Lazarsfeld-Yahoda and H. Zeisel study, ***Die Arbeitslosen von Marienthal.***

[23] Reissman, *op. cit.*

"wouldn't matter" to them in considering a possible upward move:

Learn a new routine
Work harder than you are now
Take on more responsibility
Endanger your health
Leave your family for some time

Taken together, these items imply a realistic awareness of what is involved in occupational mobility. The first three—learn a new routine, work harder, take on more responsibility—can be considered as a necessary prerequisite for mobility. Considerations of health and family can be evaluated as possible risks that might have to be undertaken in some situations. In other words, the higher class, in its response to this question, establishes its aspirations on a somewhat more realistic basis than does the lower class. The higher class, either through past experience or through general awareness, seems to hold a standard in its aspirations that reflects some knowledge of the prerequisites for occupational mobility.

The "low" groups for occupation, income, and education, rank highest in the percentages indicating "wouldn't matter" on three of the items listed in Table 2:

Leave your friends
Keep quiet about your political views
Keep quiet about your religious views

In other words, the lower class appears to be relatively unconcerned about matters of friendship, politics and religion; considerations upon which the higher class, conversely, places a major emphasis. This indicated unconcern creates an image of the lower class that is noticeably different from the image gained of the higher class. Where the latter expresses realism, the lower class does not. Where the lower class expresses indifference, the higher class shows firmness and conviction. The remaining three aspiration items in Table 2—leisure time, moving around the country, and leaving the community—show no consistent pattern of dominance by either the "high" or the "low" groups on all three variables and therefore are not included in this discussion.

The patterns of preference of the higher class and of the lower class, as they have emerged in this analysis of aspirations, cannot be considered as conclusive. Nevertheless, those patterns do exhibit an intriguing and meaningful consistency that can be related plausibly to the information presented

TABLE 2. PERCENTAGES OF OCCUPATIONAL, INCOME, AND EDUCATIONAL GROUPS OF A SINGLE SAMPLE INDICATING ITEMS "WOULDN'T MATTER" IN A POSSIBLE OCCUPATIONAL ADVANCE

Item	Occupational Prestige Groups [1]		Income Groups [2]		Educational Groups [3]	
	High	Low	High	Low	High	Low
Learn a new routine	76.9	67.9	75.4	70.0	79.1	64.8
Leave your community	41.5	48.2	44.3	45.0	44.8	44.4
Leave your friends	41.5	55.4	45.9	50.0	44.8	51.9
Work harder than you are now	69.2	66.1	68.9	66.7	77.6	55.6
Endanger your health	10.8	5.4	9.8	6.7	9.0	7.4
Keep quiet about political views	43.1	51.8	44.3	50.0	44.8	50.0
Leave your family for some time	18.5	17.9	19.7	16.7	20.9	14.8
Move around the country a lot	26.2	35.7	31.1	30.0	26.9	35.2
Take on more responsibility	84.6	75.0	82.0	78.3	90.0	68.5
Give up leisure time	38.5	57.1	50.8	43.3	53.7	38.9
Keep quiet about religious views	46.2	57.1	49.2	53.3	50.7	51.9

[1] Based upon North-Hatt occupational scale. "High" includes scores of 70 and 80, i.e., generally those who are professionals, managers, etc.
[2] "High" includes those who earn 125 dollars a week or more.
[3] "High" includes those with any college attendance.

in the first part of this paper. The contrast can be stated simply as follows: The higher class group appears to hold a realistic assessment of what is necessary to achieve upward mobility; the lower class does not. Furthermore, the latter appear to be without ideals in important areas. They would not let friendship be an important consideration in a possible occupational advance, nor would they consider that their political and religious views are important enough to defend in such a situation.

These latter implications bear a suggestive relationship to what has been discussed previously about the participation and leisure activity of the lower class. In the analysis of visiting patterns, it was found that the lower class person had fewer intimate friends than the higher class person.[24] If it can be assumed that this is generally characteristic of the lower class, then it can be seen that a counterpart of this fact is its relative unwillingness to "leave their friends" for a possible upward occupational move.

It was found previously that lower class persons were not as well read nor showed as much knowledge about political affairs as did the higher class. Furthermore, the latter showed more frequent church attendance. Politics and religion would not appear to be as important for the lower class and consequently, tend to be sacrificed more readily in order to take advantage of an upward occupational move. The higher class, on the other hand, appears to hold to a meaningful pattern in its aspirations. Higher class persons show a readiness to undertake the necessary steps for mobility and at the same time hold firm at a point where personal ideals might be endangered. This has been interpreted here to imply that the higher class person is more realistic in assessing his situation and the possibilities within it. The whole pattern of his activity and his aspirations would seem to point to this conclusion.

CONCLUSIONS

Two objectives formed the basis of the present paper. First, it was found that regardless of the variable used to measure class position—occupation, income or education—the higher class shows a higher degree of participation and involvement in the community. That is, individuals in this class read more books and magazines, attend church more frequently, belong to more organizations, and more often hold office in those organizations. The present study thereby lends further support to previous studies on that relationship. Phrased in more general terms, it can be said that the middle class, on the whole, tends to dominate the organizational activity, the intellectual life, and the leadership of the community. Secondly, it was found that the higher class is more realistic in its aspirations, as seen by its greater willingness to recognize the necessary steps for an upward occupational move. The lower class, on the other hand, shows a startling lack of ideals in this matter, part of which might be traced to a lesser degree of involvement in and knowledge of the affairs and social mechanisms of the community. Not only are they less active in the life of the community, but also are more willing to sacrifice their personal views to take advantage of an opportunity for upward mobility. This willingness is misplaced, in a sense, since it does not seem to be founded upon a recognition of the more realistic prerequisites for mobility. An alternative explanation might be that the lower class feels it has nothing at stake in its present situation, that "getting ahead" is all that counts in order to measure up to a satisfactory success ideal. It is, of course, impossible to pin down the validity of either explanation with the data available, yet it might be worth noting that both views connote a somewhat unrealistic attitude—the first in that the lower class does not seem to appreciate sufficiently some of the basic steps for successful mobility; the second in that the lower class has simply subtracted out a single element of the mobility process without due regard apparently for the balance between striving and integrity.[25]

The political and social implications of these differences were mentioned earlier.

[24] The Lynds found in *Middletown* that 47 per cent of the lower class had no intimate friends as compared with only 16 per cent of the higher class. Quoted in Knupfer, *op. cit.*, p. 106.

[25] This conclusion depends upon whether one has an optimistic or a cynical view of how one "gets ahead" in the American status structure. This question, like the one to which it refers, cannot be answered simply and validly here.

This is a problem with far too many facets to be resolved in a brief conclusion, although some further mention must be made of it if the information presented in this paper is to cast any light on the far-reaching aspects of the problems it raises. The ideal of a fully democratic process is strongly modified if it can be admitted that a single segment of the population, regardless of its numerical size, retains the effective voice and the intellectual dominance of the American community. In an age when policy often depends upon information which is both subtle and technical, knowledge and not "sympathetic understanding" is a necessary prerequisite for participating in the formation of that policy. It would seem from the information presented here that the higher class (middle class), much more than the lower class, tries to achieve the necessary background.[26] Furthermore, there must also be the willingness to become involved. Here too, the higher class appears to be more fully immersed in the community and shows a greater willingness to exercise leadership and concern with its problems. Perhaps the difficulties of labor union leaders in trying to achieve a measure of coherent political strength at the polls among the membership of their unions is an instance of this point on the relative indifference of the lower class with matters not immediately and directly within its grasp.

Further implications arising from the situation presented are suggested, but can only be noted: (1) How is the content of the mass media affected by the indicated class differences in magazine readership and radio-television listening? (2) What are the consequences for the conduct of community affairs in the light of differential participation by class position? (3) What are the spheres of influence within relevant political groupings based upon social class division? These suggestions are offered, in an admittedly general way, to help point out the questions which might be asked in further research on social class and participation.

[26] Certainly, this does not mean that the higher class is wholly objective and unswayed by personal biases in its understanding of policy issues.

NOTES ON RESEARCH AND TEACHING

TWO KINDS OF CRYSTALLIZED OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE BEHAVIOR: A PROBLEM IN DELINEATION AND RELATIONSHIP

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In a recent study,[1] Ginzberg and associates develop a theory of occupational choice in which choice is conceived of as a process. Three main periods are described: the fantasy, the tentative and the realistic. This latter period is divided into three stages: the ***exploratory*** (no occupational field chosen), the ***crystallized*** (occupational field chosen), and the ***specified*** (occupation chosen from broad occupational field). In the latter two stages, serious action-level occupational choices are made. In terms of predicting choice behavior, therefore, precise knowledge of the characteristics of these two stages is of decided import to sociologists as well as vocational counselors. It is not sufficient to accept ostensibly direct and overt indications by a respondent that an occupation is crystallized, for as Ginzberg *et al.*, point out, subsequently frequent shifts in choice may take place, indicating that not "true" but "pseudo-crystallization" of an occupational choice has occurred.

Although Ginzberg *et al.*, recognize this problem, they do not develop an operational approach for discriminating between these two kinds of crystallized choice behavior. Moreover, they do not explore related sociological and psychological background factors in any systematic fashion.[2] Nor do they concern themselves with the extent of "pseudo-crystallization". Such knowedge is needed to enhance systematic understanding of the choice process.

The present study was so designed that a heuristic dichotomy of "true" and "pseudo-crystallized" groups could be developed. Such a dichotomy serves the dual purpose of (1) indicating criteria related to one or the other kind of crystallization and (2) allowing for tests of hypotheses regarding sociological and psychological background factors associated with each kind of choice behavior.

Data for this analysis consist of responses of a stratified random sample of 403 Washington State College undergraduates to a 14-page occupational choice questionnaire administered in the fall of 1952.[3]

DELINEATION OF THE TWO KINDS OF CHOICE BEHAVIOR

Students were asked to indicate whether or not they had decided upon an occupational field. Those who had were labelled "crystallized"; those who had not yet chosen an occupation (16 per cent) were designated "exploratory" and excluded from the analysis.

The delineation of "true" and "pseudo-crystallized" groups was operationally made on the basis of responses to three questions (Table 1).

The rigor of this procedure resulted in the classification of 22 per cent of the sample as "true" crystallized, 17 per cent as "pseudo" crystallized and the remainder either exploratory (16 per cent) or of indeterminate classification.

The justification for this delineation is purely empirical, for if true crystallization is, in fact, characterized by a resolute, "unswerving attitude"[4] toward the choice, and pseudo-crystallization is further characterized by lack of understanding of the essential elements involved in the choice and by incomplete acceptance of the commitments involved,[5] then these two groups should behave differently on certain other criteria of choice behavior. Six questions

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[1] Eli Ginzberg, *et al.*, *Occupational Choice*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1951.

[2] *Ibid.*, pp. 107 ff.

[3] A 20 per cent random sample was selected from the student body, of which 33 per cent responded without follow-up. A 15 per cent sample was then selected at random from the non-respondents in the original sample in order to adjust the sample statistics for bias. The N of 403 is the combined total of sample and subsample; the statistics cited in the text have been weighted by the different sampling ratios in the manner suggested by Morris H. Hansen and William N. Hurwitz, "The Problem of Non-response in Sample Surveys", *Journal of the American Statistical Association,* (XLI) (December, 1946), pp. 517–528. Males and females were included in the sample because of the increasing importance of women in the labor forces, but sex differences were not controlled in the analysis because these differences proved to be non-significant with regard to kind of crystallized choice behavior.

[4] Ginzberg *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

[5] *Ibid.*, pp. 108–109.

were used as criteria to test the value of this delineation.

Analysis[6] of these criteria (see Table 2) indicates that the true-group as opposed to the pseudo, can be characterized as (1) having concrete-realistic knowledge of a chosen occupational field, (2) looking forward to working at their chosen occupation, (3) wanting no shifting around of occupations during work years and (4) having difficulty in making a change if forced to do so. It is also more characteristic of the true group than the pseudo (5) to get information on current job opportunities and (6) to get a lot of information while they are at it.

These results support the Ginzberg hypothesis that the true and pseudo crystallized groups need to be treated as substantially different behavioral entities.

TABLE 1. QUESTION CATEGORIES USED IN THE DELINEATION OF TRUE AND PSEUDO-CRYSTALLIZED GROUPS

		Kind of Crystallization	
Question*		True	Pseudo
C7b.	Certainty of college major	"Positive"	Less than "positive"
C11a.	Satisfaction with present major	"Very satisfied"	Less than "very satisfied"
D19.	Information obtained on occupational field of interest	"A lot"	"Little" or "None"

* Question numbers are listed as they are in the questionnaire.

ETIOLOGY OF THE GROUP DIFFERENCES

A question of sociological significance which also needs more exploration and elaboration than given it in the Ginzberg study has to do with the etiology of the differences between the true and pseudo-groups. That study states that an important factor involved in pseudo-crystallized choice is identification with the father or other key persons. This is explained as a symptom of the emotional needs of the individuals in the choice process—the influenced and the influencer.[7]

Limitations of the present data make it possible to test only the symptom of these emotional needs. The data do not substantiate the Ginzberg hypothesis; the true group is more likely than the pseudo to rate their father's occupation as ideal and to give evidence of influence in the choice process by such prestige figures as teachers and prominent acquaintances (See Table 3).

The present data also test a hypothesis not proposed in the Ginzberg study; namely, that the pseudo group is a more ambitious, striving group than the true (See Table 4). This may explain, in part, the readiness of the pseudo-group respondents to declare a choice.

The data support the hypothesis. The pseudo group is more likely than the true; (1) to want a better income than their fathers, (2) to be interested in money and security as occupational goals, goals not directly related to occupational satisfaction, and (3) not be too concerned with continued interest in the work itself. In addi-

TABLE 2. PROPORTION OF TRUE AND PSEUDO-CRYSTALLIZED STUDENTS RESPONDING TO SELECTED CRITERIA QUESTIONS

		Per cent	
Question category		True	Pseudo
E5a	Concrete realistic knowledge (of occupational field)	30	24
	Stereotyped or oversimplified knowledge	70	76
E5c	"Very much" (look forward to working at chosen vocation)	99	65*
	"Somewhat" or less	1	35
H5	Occupational permanence	90	57*
	Occupational mobility or not sure	10	43
D10	Difficult (to choose another occupation if forced to do so)	45	33
	Not difficult	43	50
D11a	Information on current job opportunities	95	68*
	No information	5	22
D11b	Much information on job opportunities	88	31*
	Little or none	12	69

* Indicates a significant difference at the .01 level. Chi-square tests used.

[6] The specific proportions of response by each group to the items discussed is noted in the relevant tables. In every case where a relationship is significant, the probability level will be indicated. Where the p is omitted, the difference falls short of significance or the cell frequency is too small for such a test, but is stated because it is indicative of a consistent configuration. Although some probability levels are beyond .01, the latter figure is here considered high enough to be significant.

[7] Ginzberg *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 109 ff.

TABLE 3. PROPORTION OF TRUE AND PSEUDO-CRYSTALLIZED STUDENTS RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS ON PERSONAL INFLUENCES IN CHOICE PROCESS

	Per cent	
Question category	True	Pseudo
G3 Rate parent's occupation as ideal for own choice	29	19
Rate father's occupation as unsatisfactory for own choice	64	79
D7 Acknowledge choice influenced by teachers and prominent acquaintances	21	5

tion, despite less awareness of job information than the true-group, the pseudo-group respondents are more likely to have chosen a college major mainly because of a good job market in that field; the true-group respondents are more likely to have chosen a major because they have developed interest out of personal experience in this field.

This drive for material success on the part of the pseudo-group may, in turn, be explained, in part, by its relatively unfavorable socio-economic position in an open-class society driven by the success motive (Table 5). The pseudo-group in this sample is more characteristically working class, and the true-group more characteristically upper and middle class. The pseudo-group parents also have a lower annual income, are less likely to be doing professional, white-collar work, and have less schooling than true-group parents.

TABLE 4. PROPORTION OF TRUE AND PSEUDO-CRYSTALLIZED STUDENTS RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS RELATING TO OCCUPATIONAL ORIENTATION

	Per cent	
Question category	True	Pseudo
Kla Want better income than father's	47	71*
H1 Occupational goals of money and security	36	57†
Occupational goal of continued interest in work	44	26
C9 Good job market in field as main reason for choice of college major	5	24*
D6 Interest developed out of personal experience in occupational field as main reason for choice	64	37*

* Significant at .01 level.
† Significant at .05 level.

This finding tends to support Super's hypothesis regarding the importance of socio-economic factors in occupational choice determination.

TABLE 5. PROPORTION OF TRUE AND PSEUDO-CRYSTALLIZED STUDENTS RESPONDING TO QUESTIONS DEALING WITH SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

	Per cent	
Question category	True	Pseudo
K8 Working class	11	38*
Middle and upper class	75	58
J24 Parents' annual income 5,000 dollars or over	63	39*
Parents' income less than 5,000 dollars	32	57
I8 Father does professional, white collar work	78	69
Father does manual work	21	30
I12 Father has some college or better	42	34
Father has high school or less	56	50

* Significant at .01 level.

The fact that these choices are often not choices in the true sense of the word, but the result of economic pressure, is frequently not recognized by young people even though their explanations make it clear that they feel such pressure. . . . In this category, too, should be mentioned the desire for prestige; often manifesting itself as a desire for economic gain, the principal method of winning prestige in our competitive society, this is, in fact, the result of social and not strictly economic pressure.[8]

IMPLICATIONS

These data suggest another hypothesis that merits further testing; namely, that the pseudo-group, once out of college, is more likely to continue shifting jobs, using occupation as a means to material success. The true crystallized group gives evidence of being the group which will make a more stable occupational adjustment and be more concerned with occupation as an important source, per se, of life satisfaction.

This study is so designed that follow-ups of these students can be made periodically. A follow-up is planned to examine the comparative social and psychological adjustment of the two groups after college.

[8] Donald Super, *The Dynamics of Vocational Choice*, New York: Harper and Bros., 1942, p. 149.

NEWS AND ANNOUNCEMENTS

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The American University at Cairo has announced the establishment, under a Ford Foundation grant, of a new Social Research Center. The objectives of the Center are: (1) to gather, appraise, and make available accurate and scientifically determined information about social conditions in Egypt and the adjacent Arab world; (2) to train Near East students in the techniques of social research; (3) to encourage, guide and assist social research scholars, both Near Eastern and foreign, in specific research projects.

Two village studies are now in progress under the direction of American anthropologists with the assistance of Egyptian interviewers.

Mr. Hanna Rizk, Egyptian Demographer, is Director of the Center, and Dr. Frank Dorey, on leave from Howard University, is Research Chairman. The Center is interested in communicating with American graduate students and scholars interested in doing social research in the Middle East.

International Sociological Association. The Association held its second World Congress at the University of Liege, August 24–31, 1953, under the auspices and with the support of UNESCO and the Belgian Government. The Congress was attended by 281 registered participants from 34 countries; 65 from Belgium, 34 from the United States, 32 from France, 28 from Germany, 23 from the United Kingdom, 22 from the Netherlands, 8 from Italy, 7 from India, and smaller contingents from countries as widely scattered as the Argentine, Australia, Iceland and Yugoslavia.

A full account of the proceedings of the Congress will appear in a special issue of the International Social Science Bulletin for the Winter, 1953. The scientific sessions were divided into four principal sections: Social Stratification and Social Mobility (*rapporteur* Professor David Glass, London School of Economics), Intergroup Conflicts (*rapporteur* Professor Arnold Rose, University of Minnesota), Recent Developments in Sociological Research (*rapporteur* Mr. Donald MacRae, London School of Economics), and Professional Activities and Responsibilities (*rapporteur* M. Jean Treanton, Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques de Paris).

During the Congress the Council of the Association held its second session and elected a new Executive Committee: President, Robert C. Angell, University of Michigan; Vice Presidents, Georges Davy, Member of the Institut de France; Morris Ginsberg, London School of Economics; and Leopold von Wiese, University of Cologne; Members, Pierre de Bie, University of Louvain; K. A. Busia, University College of the Gold Coast; L. A. Costa Pinto, University of Brazil; G. S. Ghurye, University of Bombay; Kunio Odaka, University of Tokyo; Torgny Segerstedt, University of Uppsala; and H. Z. Ulken, University of Istanbul.

The Executive Committee appointed as Executive Secretary for the period 1953–56, Mr. T. B. Bottomore, London School of Economics. The Secretariat is now at Skepper House, 13, Endsleigh Street, London, W. C. 1.

The Council also discussed plans for the Third World Congress to be held in 1956, which will have as its main theme "The Problems of Social Change."

The program of research to be sponsored by the Association for the period 1953–56, includes further cross-national studies of social stratification and social mobility. It is hoped to hold a second Working Conference in connection with these studies during 1954.

The Association will continue its collaboration with UNESCO and with the International Committee on Documentation in the Social Sciences in the publication of *Current Sociology,* and trend reports will be published in this series during the next three years on urban sociology, the sociology of religion, electoral sociology, criminology, and the methods of the social sciences, among other subjects.

District of Columbia Association for Public Opinion. A local chapter of the American Association for Public Opinion Research has been organized in the District of Columbia. Its main purpose is the interchange of information on developments in opinion research. At the first meeting of the group, held on October 8, 1953, the following officers were elected: Martin Kriesberg of the U. S. Department of Agriculture, President; W. Phillips Davison of the Rand Corporation, Vice-President; and Robert T. Bower of the Bureau of Social Science Research, The American University, Secretary-Treasurer.

Eastern Sociological Society. The 1954 annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society will be held on April 3–4 at the Henry Hudson Hotel in New York City. Program suggestions should be addressed to Dr. Ira de A. Reid, President, Eastern Sociological Society, Haverford College, Haverford, Pennsylvania. Annual dues of $2.00 and inquiries about membership or the meetings should be sent to Vincent H. Whitney, Secretary-Treasurer, Eastern Sociological Society, Department of Sociology, Brown University, Providence 12, Rhode Island.

Institute of International Education. Werner J. Cahnman, formerly with the Evaluation Staff of the International Broadcasting Division, Depart-

ment of State, has been appointed adviser to the Italian-American Student Exchange Program of the Institute.

National Institute of Mental Health. Participation of sociologists in research and in program development has advanced markedly in the past two years. Major research activities of the Laboratory of Socio-environmental Studies include a project on the impact of mental illness on the family of the patient, an investigation of the aspects of social isolation among functional psychotics, and a projected program of research on the social structure and functioning of treatment services within the new Clinical Center in Bethesda. Participating in the family study are John A. Clausen, Leila C. Deasy, Marian Radke-Yarrow, Charlotte G. Schwartz, and E. Grant Youmans. The research on social isolation is being conducted in Hagerstown, Maryland by Melvin L. Kohn, using certain materials available from previous Public Health Service studies in that community as a basis for control group selections. Initial exploratory studies within the Clinical Center are being conducted by Mrs. Schwartz and Lyman C. Wynne.

Richard H. Williams of the Professional Services Branch has been primarily concerned with program development in the field of psychiatric rehabilitation. He is maintaining close liaison with pilot studies in progress, at the Boston State Hospital at the Harvard School of Public Health, designed respectively to analyze the rehabilitation processes in the setting of a large state hospital and to determine basic factors affecting the rehabilitation of the patient after leaving the hospital.

The Laboratory of Socio-environmental Studies may have available one or two post-doctoral research fellowships for advanced training in the application of sociological research techniques and concepts to the field of mental health research. Stipends would be 3,400 dollars for single fellows and somewhat more for those with dependents. Those interested in applying should write to Dr. John A. Clausen, Chief of the Laboratory, indicating their background and interests in the field.

Pennsylvania Sociological Society. The Society held its annual meeting October 10, 1953 at the Pennsylvania State College. Officers for 1954 are Brother D. Augustine McCaffrey, LaSalle College, President; David B. Rogers, University of Pittsburgh, Secretary; Charles Bornman, Cedar Crest College, President-elect; and Duane Ramsay, Pennsylvania State College, Secretary-elect.

University of Arkansas. The Institute of Science and Technology and the Sociology Department have edited and published the *1953 Proceedings of the Southwestern Sociological Society*. The papers are in the fields of social theory, population, rural and urban sociology, and the teaching of general social science courses at the college level. A limited number of copies are available for nonmembers upon request, from Donald D. Stewart.

University of California at Berkeley. Reinhard Bendix has been awarded a Fulbright Research Grant for 1953–54 to continue his study on Managerial Ideologies in Industry in Germany.

Margaret T. Hodgen has received a Guggenheim Fellowship to work on a study of the history of the social studies in the seventeenth century, which she is carrying on at the Huntington Library, San Marino, California.

William Kornhauser, who has been instructor at Columbia University, joins the department as instructor and will handle work in the field of political sociology. Duncan MacRae has been appointed as assistant professor and will be in charge of statistical instruction. During the past two years Dr. MacRae has been attached to the Laboratory of Social Relations at Harvard University. William Petersen, of Columbia University, has been appointed acting assistant professor for the 1953–54 academic year. Donald Foley, formerly at Syracuse University, has been appointed lecturer and will give one-third of his time to the Department of Sociology and Social Institutions and two-thirds to the Department of City and Regional Planning.

University of Chicago. Three 4,000 dollar post-doctoral fellowships in statistics are offered for 1954–55 by the University of Chicago. The purpose of these fellowships, which are open to holders of the doctor's degree or its equivalent in research accomplishment, is to acquaint established research workers in the biological, physical, and social sciences with the role of modern statistical analysis in the planning of experiments and other investigative programs, and in the analysis of empirical data. The development of the field of statistics has been so rapid that most current research falls far short of attainable standards, and these fellowships (which represent the fourth year of a five-year program supported by the Rockefeller Foundation) are intended to help reduce this lag by giving statistical training to scientists whose primary interests are in substantive fields rather than in statistics itself. The closing date for applications is February 15, 1954. Instructions for applying may be obtained from the Committee on Statistics, University of Chicago, Chicago 37.

Emory University. Allen D. Albert, Jr. has assumed his new duties as Executive Director of the Trustees Committee on Development for the University.

James W. Wiggins, Associate Professor, has been named Chairman of the Department of Sociology.

William C. Rhodes, Research Associate, has joined the department on temporary loan from the Georgia State Department of Public Health to develop a multidisciplinary research group focusing on community and family aspects of mental health.

Charles D. McGlamery joined the department in September on appointment as Assistant Professor of Sociology.

Jerry W. Combs, Jr., Assistant Professor, joined the staff of the U. S. Air Force Human Resources Research Institute in August.

College of the Holy Names. Allen Spitzer has been appointed research professor of sociology and

will study social research at the School of Social Welfare, University of California, Berkeley.

Florida Southern College. Robert A. Chapman, Head of the Division of Social Studies, taught in the summer session at Farmington State Teachers' College, Farmington, Maine.

Roland D. Elderkin has resumed teaching duties in the Department of Sociology. He spent the academic year 1952–1953 in graduate study in library science at Columbia University.

John E. Owen, formerly of the University of Maryland Overseas Program, has joined the department as associate professor.

Human Resources Research Institute. C. A. McMahan, formerly associate professor of sociology at the University of Georgia, joined the Institute as Chief of its Manpower Research Division in June 1953. John K. Folger, Chief of the Institute's Technical Services Division, was granted three months leave this summer to work on a project for the Southern Regional Education Board in Atlanta, Georgia.

Jerry W. Combs, Jr., assistant professor of sociology at Emory University for the last two years, joined the Institute's Manpower Research Division on September 1. Thomas R. Ford, formerly on the faculty of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology of the University of Alabama, joined the staff of this division on October 1.

The Human Relations Division of the Institute has recently added Dr. Glenn C. McCann, of the University of Washington to its staff. He will continue an analysis of the attitudes of airmen of the Air Defense Command which he initiated at the University of Washington.

During the summer the staff of this division was augmented by Dr. E. William Noland, of the University of North Carolina, and Dr. Edward E. Cureton, of the University of Tennessee. Both have now returned to their respective universities.

The research staff of this division now consists of Abbott L. Ferriss, Chief; Major Robert L. Beers, Executive Officer; Stuart N. Adams and George W. Baker, Assistant Program Officers; Robert W. Hites, Daniel L. Camp, and Alfred S. Moore, Project Officers; Lts. James J. Boylan, Jr. and Louis M. Herman, Assistant Project Officers; and M/Sgt. Angelo Orlandella and S/Sgt. Frederick H. Esch, Research Technicians.

University of Illinois. Several postdoctoral fellowships for research in personality are offered by the University of Illinois under a grant from the Ford Foundation. These postdoctoral fellowships (4,500 dollars) offer an opportunity for study and research either independently or in collaboration with staff members in social anthropology, education, psychology and sociology. The program is under the interdisciplinary committee from these fields with Lyle H. Lanier as chairman. Inquiries should be directed to Dr. J. McV. Hunt, Department of Psychology, University of Illinois, Urbana, Illinois, as administrative secretary of the program. The committee would like applications by February 1, 1954. Anyone wishing to be considered for a fellowship for 1954–55 must have his application completed by February 15, 1954. The committee hopes to notify applicants by April 1, 1954.

Indiana University. Following the resignation of Clifford Kirkpatrick as Chairman of the Department of Sociology, John H. Mueller has been appointed Acting Chairman. Kirkpatrick continues as Professor of Sociology and is devoting himself to teaching and research.

A. R. Lindesmith has returned after a year in India on a Fulbright grant. While in India, Lindesmith taught sociology at Indore Christian College.

University of Kentucky. C. Paul March began his duties July 1 as assistant rural sociologist. He came from Cornell University, where he has been a graduate student.

Sidney Kaplan has joined the staff as instructor in sociology. He recently received the Ph.D. degree from Washington State College, Pullman, Washington. The full-time professional staff in sociology and rural sociology now numbers eleven, in addition to one part-time and one emeritus professor.

In further integration of the work in the departments of Rural Sociology (College of Agriculture and Home Economics) and Sociology (College of Arts and Sciences), joint college assignments have now been made to Howard W. Beers, James S. Brown, A. Lee Coleman, and Irwin T. Sanders, so that each has duties in Experiment Station research and in general teaching.

Irwin T. Sanders, distinguished professor of sociology, has resumed his duties at the University, after a year in Greece.

At the August commencement the University granted the first Ph.D. in Sociology to Abdul Nonem Nour, who has returned to his native Egypt as a United Nations employee.

James S. Brown and A. Lee Coleman have been promoted to the rank of associate professor and associate rural sociologist.

During the latter part of August, Willis A. Sutton, Jr., assistant professor of sociology, was engaged in a field analysis of the process whereby Cairo, Illinois changed its school system from one that was segregated to one in which Negroes were integrated into white schools. The study was one of a series of similar community studies which constituted one phase of a larger project financed by the Fund for the Advancement of Education. The purpose was to secure information helpful to the South and the nation on all aspects of segregation and desegregation in education.

University of Massachusetts. Frederick B. Lindstrom has accepted an assistant professorship at Arizona State College.

Thomas O. Wilkinson and Gertrude Wright McPherson have been appointed instructors.

The Board of Trustees has approved a Master of Arts program in sociology.

University of Michigan. Amos H. Hawley, Chairman of the Department of Sociology, is spending the year teaching and consulting at the University of the Philippines, under a special pro-

gram developed by the Mutual Security Administration. Following his year in the Philippines, he will spend two months in research in Japan.

Ronald Freedman served as acting chairman of the department during the summer and Horace M. Miner is acting in this capacity during the academic year 1953–54.

The University of Michigan is one of five American universities which have received grants from the Ford Foundation for Self-Study in the Behavioral Sciences. Ronald Freedman is devoting part-time to the work of the Committee which is conducting the study at Michigan.

Harlan W. Gilmore of Tulane University has been appointed visiting associate professor of sociology during the academic year, 1953–54. Earl Johnson of the University of Chicago was visiting professor of sociology during the summer session, 1953. Morris Axelrod, Director of the Detroit Area Study, has been appointed lecturer in sociology, as have Leonard Blumberg, Donald Trow and Basil G. Zimmer. Robert O. Schulze has been appointed instructor in sociology.

Theodore M. Newcomb has received a research grant from the Rockefeller Foundation for the study of small group properties including the testing of a series of hypotheses concerning interrelationships among communicative acts, common attitudes, perceived consensus and interpersonal attraction.

Ronald Freedman and Morris Janowitz have been promoted to the rank of associate professor.

Basil G. Zimmer has been appointed Director of the Social Science Research Project and replaces J. Douglas Carroll who was recently appointed Director of the Detroit Metropolitan Area Traffic Study.

Michigan State College. The School of Graduate Studies offers the following appointments to qualified students, predoctoral and post-doctoral. Inquiry should be directed to the Dean, School of Graduate Studies, Michigan State College, East Lansing, unless other directions are given.

Graduate Assistantships: Stipends range from 1,000 dollars to 1,400 dollars with a few at higher values, depending upon the nature and extent of service required. Direct inquiries to the appropriate department heads.

Tuition Scholarships: These appointments carry remission of fees and in the case of some foreign students, an additional award of 75 dollars per quarter.

Pre-doctoral Fellowships. About twenty such appointments are made each year. Stipends range from 500 dollars to 1,200 dollars and in most but not all cases fees are waived. No service to the College is required.

Post-doctoral Fellowships. One of these, carrying a stipend of 3,000 dollars is awarded each year for research in a field for which the College has appropriate facilities.

University of Minnesota. F. Stuart Chapin has voluntarily retired from the staff and has taken up residence at Asheville, North Carolina.

Lowry Nelson, professor, is serving this year as Chairman of Section K and Vice-President of the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Arnold Rose attended the International Sociological Congress at Liege, Belgium, and was appointed to the Research Committee.

Theodore Caplow, associate professor, received a grant from the Graduate School to continue the research on internal orientation as a dimension of large-scale organization begun in June, 1952, under the sponsorship of the Air Force. This grant will make possible the preparation of a series of papers on internal orientation in collaboration with Leo G. Reeder and George A. Donohue.

John Sirjamaki, formerly at Yale University, has joined the staff of the department as associate professor.

Henry W. Riecken, formerly at Harvard University, has joined the staff as associate professor, and will assume his duties in February, 1954.

Roy Francis, assistant professor, has returned from a one-year leave of absence as an SSRC post-doctoral Fellow in mathematics at Harvard University.

George A. Donohue has been appointed as an instructor in the department.

Richard Emerson and Sol Haberman have been appointed as half-time instructors in the department.

University of Missouri. C. Terence Pihlblad is in Oslo, Norway, for this year, doing research under a Fulbright grant. During his absence he is being replaced by Harry V. Ball, most recently of the University of Hawaii.

The Institute for Research in the Social Sciences has been awarded approximately twelve thousand dollars by the American Nurses Association to study the work of the general duty nurse in non-metropolitan Missouri hospitals. Robert Habenstein and Edwin Christ of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology will conduct the study under the direction of Charles E. Lively, Director of the Institute and chairman of the Department of Rural Sociology.

New instructors in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology include Josephine M. Holik and Morris Sunshine.

Robert L. McNamara spent three months in Thailand during the fall of 1952. He was technical adviser to the Point IV Program of the Mutual Security Administration, and was located at Bangkok.

C. E. Lively spent the month of February in Puerto Rico, where he was consultant to the Agricultural Experiment Station located at Rio Piedras. While there he laid the plans for a proposed study of the economic and social significance of disabling illness among agricultural workers in selected type-of-farming areas. Mrs. Lively accompanied him on the trip.

During the summers of 1952–53, field work was completed in 141 rural townships, as a part of the study of the rural church as a social institution. This was under the supervision of Lawrence M.

Hepple and was supported by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation.

John H. Lane, Jr., has resigned to accept the position of field secretary with the Texas Mental Health Association.

John B. Mitchell, instructor in rural sociology, has accepted a position as rural sociologist at Rhode Island State College, Kingston, R. I.

Charles M. Coughenour has joined the department as assistant professor for the year 1953–54.

Mr. Edward W. Hassinger has joined the staff of the department as research instructor. He has recently been doing graduate work at the University of Minnesota.

Notre Dame University. After serving twenty-five years as Head of the Department of Sociology, Professor Raymond W. Murray has retired from this position. He is engaged in research in anthropology and will continue to offer courses in the department. John J. Kane, associate professor, has succeeded Dr. Murray. Professor Kane has been on the faculty five years. He is continuing research on interreligious tensions in the field of education under a grant from the National Conference of Christians and Jews.

E. K. Francis was given a leave of absence this summer to study Spanish-Americans in the upper Rio Grande Valley under a university grant obtained from the Rockefeller Foundation.

John Hughes, formerly instructor in sociology at the University of Pennsylvania, joined the faculty this September.

John Martin, Director of the Correctional Administration Program, has announced that several grants-in-aid are available to students wishing to obtain master's degrees in this field.

Purdue University. There has been an administrative realignment which has taken sociology out of the now defunct Division of Education and Applied Psychology and made it a separate department in the School of Science, Education and Humanities.

Present staff members are as follows: Harold T. Christensen, Head; Elizabeth K. Wilson; Dwight W. Culver; J. Roy Leevy; J. E. Losey; Louis Schneider; Allan A. Smith; Walter Hirsch; Gerald R. Leslie; Rilma Buckman; and Hanna Meissner. Dr. Leslie is on a temporary leave of absence substituting for Reuben Hill in family sociology at the University of North Carolina.

Two staff members had visiting teaching appointments in New York City this past summer: Louis Schneider at Columbia University and Walter Hirsch at Queens College.

Harold T. Christensen and Dwight W. Culver have been assisting on a study of Negro-white integration in the school systems of seven Indiana communities. This was part of a larger study by the Fund for the Advancement of Education, Ford Foundation.

The next annual meeting of the Ohio Valley Sociological Society will be held at Purdue, March 19 and 20, 1954. Harold T. Christensen is president of the organization and Dwight W. Culver is general program chairman. This meeting will be held in conjunction with a session of the Central States Anthropological Society.

The Seventeenth Annual Groves Conference on Marriage and the Family will be held on the Purdue campus, April 28–30, 1954. The program chairman is Harold T. Christensen.

Queens College. The Department of Anthropology-Sociology at Queens College now consists of the following: Hortense Powdermaker, associate professor; Sidney Axelrad, Chairman, assistant professor; Elizabeth K. Nottingham, assistant professor; Paul Neurath, assistant professor; Ernestine Friedl, instructor; Erich Rosenthal, instructor; George Grosser, instructor; Natalie Joffe, substitute; and Tamara Obrebska, substitute.

Hortense Powdermaker is spending the current year as a Guggenheim Fellow and is engaged in field research in Northern Rhodesia. In order to devote herself more fully to research activities, Dr. Powdermaker relinquished the chairmanship of the department at the end of the academic year 1951–52. Sidney Axelrad was elected chairman.

Professor Axelrad is continuing work on the validation of the Glueck scale and is completing a study of social and psychological characteristics of unmarried mothers. He is currently serving as consultant to the Jewish Board of Guardians in a program of research in mental hygiene and delinquency.

Elizabeth K. Nottingham is spending her sabbatical leave in the British West Indies and is planning to complete her manuscript on the sociology of religion.

Paul Neurath, who is in charge of the statistical training program, participated in the Summer Institute of Mathematics of the Social Science Research Council at Dartmouth.

Ernestine Friedl is Secretary-Treasurer of the American Ethnological Society, an office she assumed two years ago.

Erich Rosenthal came to the department in the fall of 1951 from the University of Chicago and is developing work in urban community studies.

George Grosser, formerly of Harvard University and the University of Indiana, has joined the department and will teach courses in criminology and social psychology.

Natalie Joffe, who was associated with the Columbia University Project on Contemporary Cultures, is teaching Dr. Powdermaker's courses, and Tamaro Obrebska is replacing Dr. Nottingham for the year.

University of Rhode Island. L. Guy Brown, Professor of Sociology and Head of the Department of Sociology, is taking sabbatical leave during the year 1953–54. He is spending the year at Winter Park, Florida, where he plans to complete a writing project. Duties as acting head of the department are assumed by Irving A. Spaulding. As associate professor, Spaulding is currently engaged in resident teaching and in research with the Agricultural Experiment Station. Robert V. Gardner, assistant professor of the resident

teaching staff, continues in that capacity. Robert G. Brown joined the teaching staff as instructor on July 1, 1953. During the preceding year, Brown was a member of the research staff of the Rhode Island Governor's Commission to Study the Problems of the Aged. On September 1, 1953 the staff was joined by John B. Mitchell who, as instructor, assumes responsibilities as a resident teacher and as specialist in rural sociology of the Agricultural Extension Service.

University of Southern California. Roger Yoshino, who has been studying during the past year in Japan under a Ford Foundation Grant is returning to the University of Southern California this fall where he has been appointed lecturer in the Asiatic Studies Department. Mr. Yoshino studied the social changes which occurred in the village of Suye-Mura since the close of World War II. Bruce M. Pringle has been appointed assistant professor of sociology at Southern Methodist University for the fall of 1953. Tom Hoult has been appointed to the staff of the Sociology Department at Wayne University. Nick Massaro has been appointed to the staff of Long Beach City College. Vernon A. Snowbarger, a graduate student in the department and who is on leave from Bethany-Peniel College, has been appointed part-time instructor at Occidental College.

Stetson University. Andrew Wade has been appointed assistant professor in the Department of Sociology. Melvin J. Williams has been appointed as professor and head of the department.

Vanderbilt University. Harold McDowell has been appointed research associate in the Department of Preventive Medicine and lecturer in the Department of Sociology. This research appointment has been made possible through the sponsorship of a sociological internship in the School of Medicine by the Russell Sage Foundation.

Emilio Willems, Professor of Anthropology, rejoined the department after a year of teaching and research in the Department of Anthropology at the University of Michigan.

Jay W. Artis joined the department as an assistant professor with the opening of the fall term. He will offer the course work in demography and rural sociology and direct the Sociology Laboratory.

Alan C. Kerckhoff joined the department with the opening of the fall term and will offer the course work in social psychology. Kerckhoff comes to the department after spending two years studying personality adjustment among Chippewa Indian adolescents under fellowships from the Ford Foundation and the Social Science Research Council.

University of Washington. George A. Lundberg resigned his administrative duties on October 1. He will continue his duties as a professor. Robert E. L. Faris has been appointed Executive Officer of the department.

Wayne University. An undergraduate major in anthropology was instituted in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology in the fall of 1952, and today some dozen undergraduate majors are enrolled.

Stephen C. Cappannari has been advanced in rank to assistant professor. After working as the Consultant for the Workshop in Supervision at San Jose State College in the summer session of 1952, he taught in a post-session course at San Francisco State College. For the past year he has served as anthropological consultant and lecturer to the psychiatric staff of Northville (Michigan) State Hospital.

James B. Christensen gave an area course on Africa at the Mission Institute at Fordham University during the summer. Christensen had done field work in West Africa among the Fanti of the Gold Coast. He attended the conference on contemporary Africa sponsored by the National Research Council at Princeton University in October.

Norman D. Humphrey spent the academic year 1952–53 as a field man for the Committee on Cross Cultural Education of the Social Science Research Council interviewing Mexican nationals who had attended American universities. He participated in the conference on findings of domestic and foreign staff members of the SSRC Committee held at Ithaca during August, 1953. Humphrey taught a seminar in personality and culture during the spring quarter of 1953 at Mexico City College.

Harry H. Josselson, associate professor of Slavic Languages recently was appointed American member of the Committee on Quantitative Linguistics of the Permanent International Committee of Linguists.

Gabriel Lasker and Bernice A. Kaplan have returned from a brief summer field trip to Mexico. With Charles Leslie, Dr. Kaplan made a study of the methods of mescal manufacture in Mitla. Lasker collected demographic data in connection with his studies of the size of breeding populations. Lasker recently assumed the editorship of *Human Biology*, a quarterly journal of research devoted to human genetics, growth and aging, bioanthropology and demography.

University of Wisconsin. William W. Howells has been appointed Chairman of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology for the year 1953–54.

George Herzog of Indiana University was visiting professor of anthropology during the second semester of the past year. John P. Gillin was visiting professor of anthropology during the summer session of this year. David A. Baerreis has been appointed co-editor of the *American Anthropologist.*

T. C. McCormick has returned to teaching from a semester's research leave.

Burton Fisher will be at the University of Oslo on a Fulbright research grant during the year 1953–54. Milton Barnett has returned to the university from a year's research in the Venezuelan Andes.

Douglas G. Marshall has been appointed Chair-

man of the Department of Rural Sociology for the coming year.

William H. Sewell was elected President of the Midwest Sociological Society and Douglas G. Marshall was elected Second Vice-President. Eugene Wilkening has been appointed Book Review Editor of *Rural Sociology*.

John H. Kolb has returned to the university from six months in Brazil as a technical assistant to the Government of Brazil for the Food and Agricultural Administration of the United Nations. Charles P. Loomis was visiting professor of rural sociology during the summer session.

Ralph Thomlinson of Columbia University and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company has joined the staff, replacing Theodore Anderson who has accepted a position at Yale University.

James Silverberg has accepted a position at the University of Venezuela in Caracas; Alan C. Kerckhoff and Jay W. Artis at Vanderbilt University; Gene W. Carter at Pacific School of Religion; Kenneth G. Lutterman at St. Olaf College; Donald J. Newman at St. Lawrence University, and William G. Dyer at Iowa State College.

Donald L. Quatsoe has been appointed sociologist at the Illinois State Reformatory.

* * *

John Ben Holland

Dr. John B. Holland, age 43, died June 28, 1953 in Havana, Cuba. He was a social scientist on the staff of the Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Science in accordance with a contractual relation with the Michigan State College. He was associate professor at Michigan State College with a dual appointment in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology in the School of Science and Arts and in the Department of Social Science in the Basic College. He was a graduate of the University of Tulsa and was granted the Ph.D. degree by Michigan State College in 1950. In addition to teaching Dr. Holland participated in research projects of the Social Research Service of the Department of Sociology and Anthropology, including the studies of minority groups and community health action.

Dr. Holland was on the threshold of a very promising career. His brilliant mind and unusual ability to direct his energies in fruitful channels were readily recognized by his colleagues and students. He was the cherished friend of all who knew and worked with him. Michigan State College and the social sciences suffered a great loss in his untimely death.

Frederick Konrad Kruger

Frederick Konrad Kruger died of a coronary involvement on June 26, 1953 at Valparaiso, Indiana. He was born in Kottbus, Germany in 1887. He was educated at the Royal Friedrich Gymnasium, Kottbus; the University of Berlin, 1907–1908; University of Nebraska, A. M. in sociology and political science, 1908; University of Tübingen, Germany, Ph.D. in government and economics, 1910. He came to the United States in 1907 and was naturalized in 1930. His academic career carried him through the following institutions: lecturer at the University of California, 1912–15; professor of political science, Midland College, Fremont Nebraska, 1915–16; same at University of Omaha, 1919–23; professor of political science at Wittenberg College, Springfield, Ohio, 1923–43; professor of sociology at Valparaiso University, Indiana 1945–53. He also served on occasion as exchange professor at the University of Göttingen and University of Berlin, Germany. He was a member of the editorial board of *The Cresset*, monthly journal or the arts and affairs of Valparaiso University.

His special interest in sociology was in the field of criminology. He was adviser to the judge of the Porter County (Indiana) Juvenile Court and to the Indiana legislative committee for the revision of the state penal laws.

BOOK REVIEWS

☆

Working Papers in the Theory of Action. By TALCOTT PARSONS, ROBERT F. BALES, and EDWARD A. SHILS. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953. 269 pp. $3.75.

The communication between scholars working on the same problems in different universities is usually slow and fragmentary. In this book the authors and the Free Press give us an important experiment in improving the speed of communication. Work done on the theory of action in the fall of 1952 was published in the spring of 1953.

These are *working* papers. They are offered, frankly, in the authors' knowledge that gaps exist in the thinking they have done; gaps that will be spotted only after many efforts to use their work.

We are given five papers in the order of their completion. They are joined together by the cumulative development of a single core of ideas. Since the last three are likely to be of greatest interest to sociologists, the others are given only brief treatment here. Pressures of space force the reviewer, like the authors, to assume that his readers are acquainted with the earlier works of Parsons, Bales, and Shils.

We begin with a reprint of Parsons' paper on "The Superego and the Theory of Social Systems." This is an extension of his earlier work and is least directly related to the new ideas of the present collaboration. His effort is largely to show how the nature of social systems and culture may be used to evaluate the psychoanalytic idea of superego and its place in intrapersonal dynamics. This results in a new version of the relation of ego and superego, a broadened conception of the contents of ego itself, and a modified account of the relation of the individual to objects.

Parsons also wrote the second chapter, "The Theory of Symbolism in Relation to Action." It joins his earlier work to the papers that follow it.

Broadly, he wants to show that the contents of symbolic acts, since they are one variety of acts in general, can be fitted to the pattern variable categories for their most general representation. He also urges that any symbol, like any act, has both a cognitive and an attitudinal content (or, in the terms of this scheme, a situational or object component and a motivational component). Then comes the recognition that two pattern variable elements, a cognitive and an attitudinal expression of the same theme, must always be used to establish the content of any or any symbol. Inspection of the pattern variables suggests that they contain four natural pairs of this sort:

Cognitive Object Component	*Attitudinal Component*
1. universalism	1. specificity
2. particularism	2. diffuseness
3. achievement	3. affectivity
4. ascription	4. affective neutrality

How are these combinations determined? As an example of the linking of categories across the object-attitude line we may take the tying of achievement (Parsons now prefers the terms quality and performance to ascription and achievement) to affectivity on the grounds that the former signifies a release of impulse. Achievement is, in this sense, the same thing as affectivity, but seen from an observer's point of view. The actor is seen as an object rather than as an agent. The old self-collectivity orientation of the pattern variables now appears different from the others because "it conceptualizes the *convergence* of the two fundamental orientation components in the structure of the social system itself" (p. 52).

All of this enables a contribution to the problem of generalization in behavior. It suggests that whenever behavior generalizes from one object to another, as in displacement, substitution, or projection, the movement must be toward an object in the same object-attitude pair of behavioral categories.

But it is in Parsons and Bales, "The Dimensions of Action-Space," in their paper with Shils, "Phase Movement in Relation to Motivation, Symbol Formation, and Role Structure," and in Bales's empirical paper on "The Equilibrium Problem in Small Groups" that we get to the climax of the new work. Its understanding requires a little history.

For at least six years, Bales has been interested in the system properties of interaction. To study system properties, he had first to develop a comprehensive method of observing interaction—comprehensive in the sense that every interaction that might occur would be given positive definition and there would be no miscellaneous categories. This, in turn, forced him to clarify a theoretical scheme that would

give such definition to a set of categories. The theoretical scheme on which he built was that of the stages in the action process: the stages of latent predispositions to act, overt instrumental activity, consummatory goal gratification, and the re-integration of the actor.

We have just seen the combinations of object and attitudinal components of pattern variables that Parsons makes for studying generalization. A major theme of the paper on "Dimensions" is to show that these four combinations and Bales's four steps in the action process (here called four "system problems") are different ways of stating the same thing.

Parsons and Bales feel that the four Bales's system problems give us a comprehensive definition of the steps in action systems. Parsons' polar constructs make each of these problems into a dimension along which we may locate the action process. Each dimension location may be viewed as reflecting the deprivation-gratification balance of the actor and of his relation to his situation. To locate an act on all four dimensions simultaneously, is to place it in a four dimensional space.

From these definitions of a space, and from such additional definitions as those for the units located in space, for the nature of change in the location of units, and for the systems of units moving interdependently with respect to location, direction, and rate of change of location, certain equilibrium laws fitting such a set of conditions are presented. The first three laws are identical with those of classical mechanics. The fourth derives from a condition of action systems not present in mechanical systems, the fact that action systems maintain their boundaries. The laws are:

1. *The Principle of Inertia:* A given process of action will continue unchanged in rate and direction unless impeded or deflected by opposing motivational forces.
2. *The Principle of Action and Reaction:* If, in a system of action, there is a change in the *direction* of a process, it will tend to be balanced by a *complementary change which is equal in motivational force and opposite in direction.*
3. *The Principle of Effort:* Any change in the rate of an action process is directly proportional to the *magnitude* of the motivational force applied or withdrawn.
4. *The Principle of System-Integration:* Any pattern element (*mode of organization* of components) within a *system* of action will tend to be confirmed in its place within the system or to be eliminated from the system . . . as a function of its contribution to the integrative balance of the system. (pp. 102–103)

With the paper on "Phase Movement" we come to a joining of the four object-attitudinal combinations of pattern variables and a second set of combinations of those variables, the whole being used to define the flow of motivation through the stages of action. The new combinations are:

Object-Oriented	*Attitudinal-Oriented*
1. Achievement	1. Specificity
2. Particularism	2. Affectivity
3. Ascription	3. Diffuseness
4. Universalism	4. Affective neutrality

Just how these new combinations came into being is not clear, but their later function is plain.

It was noticed that, in these two pattern variable arrangements, taken together, each attitudinal variable is linked with two different object categories and each object category is related to two attitudinal variables. This gave four sets of four clusters which, in turn, were recognized as defining the four phases of action and, simultaneously, exposing their connections. The four phases look like this:

> *Phase A* (*Adaptation*): Consists of adaptive-instrumental activity associated with the phase of maximal adaptation. Orientation to objects is marked by universalism and achievement. Attitude is marked by specificity and neutrality.
>
> *Phase G* (*Goal Gratification or Enjoyment of Goal-State*): Consists of expressive-instrumental activity associated with the phase of maximal system integration. Orientation to objects is marked by achievement and particularism. Attitude is marked by affectivity and ~~neutrality~~.
>
> *Phase I* (*Integration*): Consists of integrative-expressive activity associated with the phase of maximal system integration. Orientation to objects is marked by particularism and ascription. Attitude is marked by diffuseness and affectivity.
>
> *Phase L* (*Latency*): Consists of symbolic-expressive activity associated with the phase of maximal latency. Orientation to objects is marked by ascription and universalism. Attitude is marked by neutrality and diffuseness. (Adapted from pp. 180–186)

We notice that each phase is hooked to its predecessor by an attitudinal component and to its successor by an object-orientation. It is this hooking together of the phases of action that is performed by the second combinations of the pattern variables across the object-attitude line. Motivational energy, conceived as having a one-way flow, tends to move through the steps in the order A-G-I-L.

Once these AGIL patterns are formed, we can link them to the central problems suggested by this paper's title. They are said to provide the sequence of acts through which motivational input (seen as a rate of flow and an allocation; not as an absolute quantity) will pass. Their steps are identified with particular social norms concerning expected performances and appropriate rewards and deprivations for performance. Each phase is related to a type of symbol patterning said to be peculiarly suitable to it. As Bales was able to use his interaction categories and system problems to define role differences and interrelations, so this more differentiated version of the same scheme provides a richer set of such definitions, and, at the end, is shown capable of reflecting significant distinctions between illustrative role systems of the larger society—the occupational and family systems. Finally, there is the pervasive use of the notion that this comprehensive scheme makes it possible to define the kind of orientation to objects and to attitudes that must accompany any given stage of action if it is to be consummated.

Bales's excellent chapter summarizing his work with small problem-solving groups relates to these theoretical papers in showing how a scheme based on the stages of acts can be used to study their equilibrium properties. This possibility is demonstrated in the intergroup consistencies of the distribution of interaction in his well-known observation categories, in the balance of the nature of acts and reactions and of the personnel involved over the course of a meeting, in the regularities of the movement of such groups through the phases of action, and in the related changes in role structure. He also includes a statistical model to represent the empirical trends he has established.

It is reasonable for any reader to ask what can be done, now or after some further work, with the scheme these authors give us in their last three papers. At this stage, the reviewer can only try to set some boundaries for answering the question.

First, they have given us a set of four equilibrium laws for action systems. The first three of these will hold for any set of data, if they constitute a system in the usual logical sense. The important fourth principle may apply to some systems and not others. This can only be judged when there is greater clarity about the sense in which action systems are boundary-maintaining and others are not.

Second, Bales demonstrates that, when one has a comprehensive set of categories for behaviors organized into systems, it is profitable to treat one's materials using general equilibrium principles.

Third, most of the material presented here is true, if at all, by definition. It is difficult to judge the usefulness of their work as a basis for deductive theory construction until we are given a clear picture of the dependent variables they ultimately hope to order.

We may also try to estimate what Parsons, Bales, and Shils have not provided for us (while being clear that they make no claims to have provided these things). For example, it seems unlikely that the general substantive categories they present are necessary as well as sufficient for the treatment of human behavior in systematic or equilibrium terms. There are several examples of such treatments in the absence of the categories presented here (e.g., the work of Marx and Hawley).

We may also notice that other writers have used schemes in which they are able to treat situations in which actors do not depend on each other for the completion of the various steps in some common action. Many ecological problems are of this sort. It is doubtful that the general categories of the act have much to contribute to such problems.

Finally, if the central problems for sociology have to do with predicting the patterns of relationship that will exist among a population of roles, the general behavior concepts we shall find most helpful are those that can be used to describe the way influence passes among these roles and to predict the results of that passage. We are usually interested in distinguishing one instance of influencing, or its results, from another, and the fact that all have certain features in common is of little concern or use. The present concepts, unlike such notions as power or as reward and deprivation, neither help us relate roles to each other in predicted chains of behavior nor permit us to make general, but refined, descriptions of differences in their patterns.

G. E. Swanson

University of Michigan

Anthropology Today: An Encyclopedic Inventory. Prepared under the Chairmanship of A. L. Kroeber. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. xv, 966 pp. $9.00.

An Appraisal of Anthropology Today. Edited by Sol Tax, Loren C. Eiseley, Irving Rouse, and Carl Voegelin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953. xlv, 395 pp. $6.00.

The enterprise which led to the publication of these two volumes is unique in the history of anthropology; and the published results are equally unique and notable. The enterprise is inseparable from the results, and may be briefly

recounted. The story is told in the recently issued Report of the Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research Incorporated, the Report for the Year Ended January 31, 1953. Briefly: That Foundation fostered and supported a plan to hold in New York City, at the Foundation, an international congress which would review and assess the present status of anthropology in various aspects. It chose Dr. A. L. Kroeber as the guiding spirit, and he and an *ad hoc* committee assisted the Foundation in planning the conference. In the words of the Report above referred to: "Basic to the Symposium plan were the fifty inventory papers. Each author accepted responsibility for presenting a summary of anthropological thought on a specified subject, but the papers were not intended to be an exposition of the author's individual position or views. Such views were to emerge during the course of the Symposium when the author, as discussant, might make his personal position explicit. It was requested that clear copies of papers, suitable for reproduction by photo-offset, be submitted not later than two months prior to the Symposium. The Foundation undertook reproduction of papers upon arrival, and distributed them to participants, in most cases from ten to thirty days before they left their homes. This permitted time for thoughtful reading and enabled participants to arrive prepared for critical discussion. . . No papers were to be read aloud because (1) a comprehensive review of developments and results in any phase of anthropology would be prohibitive in length; and (2) fifty papers would exhaust the entire period to the exclusion of comment and productive discussion."

Eighty-one persons participated in the Symposium: fifty-four from the United States, and twenty-seven from foreign countries: "Fourteen from Europe, seven from Asia, four from Latin America, one from Australia." All speech was recorded on tape and stenographically. From these recordings of discussions the editors of the *Appraisal* volume made excerpts and composed the volume which now embodies them. In the two volumes, therefore, we have the entirety of the fifty papers and a considerable amount of the various discussions of them.

A reviewer faced with this regiment of specialists in various fields is at their mercy, rather than they at his command; for the most presumptuous critic would not claim competence in all aspects of the field.

The reviewer regrets the choice of the subtitle of *Anthropology Today*. The volume is not, and does not pretend to be, either encyclopedic or an inventory, if the latter word implies inclusiveness. For example: there is no assessment of ethnographic work and no reference to an ethnographic area. There is no treatment of primitive art, religion, knowledge and belief, technology, material culture, or economic life. There is nothing, save incidentally and almost accidentally, about the comparative method or about statistical procedures. The reviewer finds no fault with these or other omissions; but in view of them, why suggest either an encyclopedia or an inventory? This, however, is a very small worm in a big and a rich cheese. The reader, if only generally oriented in the field of anthropology, will find between the covers of this volume much to interest him and much to admire; perhaps more of each than he will find in any other one volume dealing with anthropology. Almost uniformly the papers attain a high level of scholarly insight and of lucid exposition. This excellence, it seems to us, is most marked in the papers dealing with archeology and with linguistics. Perhaps this conviction stems from the fact that a reviewer is likely to have the best opinion of papers dealing with subjects in which he has no competence; and is surprised that he can understand what is written there.

The volume is divided into three main sections: Problems of Historical Approach; Problems of Process; Problems of Application. Each of the first two are subdivided into Method; Results; Theory. The last principal section has only Results as a sub-topic. The rationale of this disarticulation into Method, Results, and Theory is a puzzler; and still more the assumption that Problems of Application have only Results. One would expect that here, of all places, method and theory would be so relevant to results that one would care little about so-called results if one knew nothing about the method and the theory by which they were obtained.

Apparently, however, these categories were afterthoughts and not previous admonitions; for no contributor seems to have been hampered by such unreal divisions. Rather they have been a triumvirate whose command has been heeded by practically every contributor; and if the papers were distributed at random under these subheadings, the arrangement would be as satisfactory as it is now. After all, the archeologist must use method and theory especially applicable to archeology; the same for physical anthropology; for linguistics; and for any field or problem; and the results must be assessed in the light of these methods and theories.

One cannot abolish inherent differences in data or in subject-matter by applying a same method and a same theory to the differentiated data; however much one may know of method

in archeology, he must learn the techniques of linguistics if he would be a linguist. The reviewer, therefore, will disregard the artificial divisions of the text and stick by the conventional classifications of special fields. If interested in archeology, he will find here much about the Old World, and more about the New; and it will all be exciting reading, even when the fundamentals seem to be inert things, stratifications, and the various techniques now employed to date things in either a relative or an absolute chronology. For the archeologist is now a detective who, often, finds out much more in his laboratory than his specimens or their environs could, or would, tell him in their native habitat.

The reader will certainly enthuse over the work done by linguists in recent years. It seems a long cry from archeology to language; yet it was the use of carbon ^{14} diagnoses adopted by archeologists from physical chemists that suggested to a linguist, Swadesh, the possibility that the words which drop out of separated languages that stemmed from a common parentage might be lost at an ascertainable rate. Testing with historical literatures in Europe indicated that over a given time span there was a fairly constant percentage loss of selected fundamental vocabulary; so that one could predict, or predicate, at about what time the two languages separated from the parent language.

Professor Greenberg applies to unwritten languages a statistical test of correspondences in vocabulary, and thus is able to establish the probabilities of relationship between various dialects—particularly in the African region. Professor Hoijer, following in part leads given by Whorf, indicates many subtle connections between the culture and the language, particularly in psychological and in logical orientations. There are papers dealing with culture—though one is surprised to find under Problems of Process, subtitle Results, a paper on the Contributions of Genetics to Anthropology followed by one on Universal Categories of Culture. (Or was Problems of Process meant to be a Universal Category?) National Character and Cultural Values are given a hearing; and Relations of Anthropology to the Social Sciences and to the Humanities, by one who has been a Dean of the Social Sciences. The section on Problems of Application includes a variety of applications: to anthropometry; growth and constitution; medicine; industry; government, here and abroad.

A last paper, under no other rubric, deals with Technical Aids in Anthropology: A Historical Survey. This reviews the adoption of various techniques and technological instruments and includes a great number and a wide variety of things, from photography to chemical analyses, aerial reconnaissance, mine detectors, earth-moving machinery. (The last mentioned does not refer to Archimedes, but to improvements on Da Vinci's inventions and suggestions.)

An Appraisal of Anthropology Today is, of course, not what it claims to be, and makes no attempts to be such. It is a monument to the faithful four who listened to all that was said, heard it again from tape recordings, and read it in typescript.

From this merry-go-round they have culled what seemed to them the most significant portions of the discussions; and for this labor of love—as it must have been unless they received unheard-of compensations—we are duly and sincerely thankful.

If we did not have it on record, we would say: "What a pity!" Now that we have it, so this reviewer must confess, one wonders whether their efforts have not outweighed the value of the results. Discussion may be very pertinent, but robbed of the occasion which elicited it, with the participants visible only to the eye of imagination, the good point, the quip, the repartee, the handsome compliments, are apt to seem jejune, if not positively juvenile or irrelevant. Not that this characterizes every page of the report. And, I repeat, if we did not have them we would regret the fact. I opened the book at random—I swear—and this passage of deep insight met the eye (I'll not give the page): "This year I gave a course in field methods for the first time. I remembered beginning the course with some nervousness. I started by telling. . . [omission in the original] about my first field trip. I described how I went to Dr. Kroeber quite playfully and asked him about field methods. Dr. Kroeber spoke of the different makes of cars and concluded that his preference for field work was a model-T Ford. I realized he was teasing, so I thought I would catch him and I said, 'Not to get there—but after I get there, then what do I do?' Then he recommended certain kinds of frying pans. . . [omission in the original]. In other words you did not have the kind of interest we have now. Now we give courses in field methods. . . ." [omission by the reviewer.] Again at random (again I swear): "Hungarian and Cheremis are related, but inasmuch as there are no scientists among the Cheremis, you might actually have lesser intelligibility with Hungarian and Cheremis than with Hungarian and German; so this cuts across any genetic classification. It might even work in the matter of learning another language. If, for example, you want to test my knowledge, of, say, Turkish, you take an arithmetic average and

say my phonetics is this good, my syntax is this good; but this does not say anything about how well I am doing."—The above are taken out of context. So, of necessity, is nearly everything reported in this volume. And some of it is well worth preserving for the record. If, instead of quoting, the editors had summarized remarks, the discussant would say he did not say what they said he said, and they did not say what he did say. And so they wisely chose the deep blue sea.

The best is seldom perfect. In *Anthropology Today* we have not only the best, but high excellence. Remarkable, too, is the speed with which these volumes came off the press. They are also, in format and typology, high tribute to that press.

Wilson D. Wallis
University of Minnesota

The Nature and Elements of Sociology. By McQuilkin DeGrange. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953. viii, 668 pp. $8.50.

Dr. DeGrange, who is Professor Emeritus of Sociology of Dartmouth College, has long been known as a specialist on Auguste Comte. In 1925 appeared his *La Courbe du Mouvement Sociétal: etude de dynamique sociologique d'apres la Politique Positive d'Auguste Comte,* which was apparently his doctoral dissertation at the University of Clermont, France; and in 1931 he contributed a long and enlightening paper, "The Method of Auguste Comte," to the volume *Methods in Social Science* edited by Stuart A. Rice. It is not surprising, accordingly, that the present thick volume, appearing after his retirement from teaching duties, turns out to be, in large part, a further examination and evaluation of the contribution of Comte to an adequate science of sociology. In this case, DeGrange has made considerable use also of Pièrre Laffitte, chief literary heir of Comte, especially his *Cours de Philosophie Première.* DeGrange says of Laffitte that his work, "essentially a continuation of Comte's, has never had the recognition it deserves" (p. 432). It has obviously been the aim of the author to write a general treatise on sociology; the title he has given to his work asserts as much. The value of what he has done is, however, impaired for the average reader, who is no more than moderately and indirectly interested in the history of the subject, by the involved and rather wordy manner in which DeGrange has sought to base a few significant conclusions concerning the "nature and elements of sociology" on the past developments of the subject, and the writings of Comte and Laffitte in particular. This complexity is further increased by the fact that, as DeGrange made clear in his earlier writings, he attaches a much greater importance to Comte's late major work, the *Système de Politique Positive* (4 vols., 1851–54), than most other scholars have done; he takes a great deal of pains in the present work, accordingly, to differentiate the positions taken by Comte in the *Positive Polity* from those set forth in the *Positive Philosophy* (1830–42).

Apart from the value of DeGrange's interpretation and appreciation of the contribution of Comte and Laffitte, concerning which there will probably be considerable diversity of opinion, an outstanding feature of this book is its treatment of "the sociological isolate," that is, the distinctive major abstraction on which the author believes the justification for a separate science of sociology rests. "The abstract societal isolate, basis for a sociological science, may be defined as a collective cumulation. Just as biology studies the continuous renewal of material substance so does sociology study the continuous cumulation of collective experience" (p. 239). In the handling of this idea, which he credits to Comte, DeGrange seems to be in line with the increasing emphasis on culture as a central, perhaps *the* central sociological phenomenon, which has been noticeable in the literature of social science for the past decade or two. Whether the treatment of the matter in the present volume adds anything to the understanding which had already been established is, however, doubtful.

Another somewhat distinctive feature of this book is the author's emphasis on the Comtean scheme of the linear order and "filiation" of the sciences, especially the order of the last three as Comte established it in the *Positive Polity*—biology, sociology, psychology (*la morale*), *not* biology, psychology, sociology (pp. 227–230, 248–249). It seems to this reviewer that DeGrange labors this point excessively; do the sciences necessarily have to be conceived to stand in a linear order? Is it most helpful to think of psychology as dependent on sociology and never, in any important particular, the reverse? DeGrange could defend himself ably, by citing detailed passages in this volume, from the charge that he has contended for anything of the sort, yet why all the emphasis on the linear order?

There is a good deal of matter in the latter parts of this volume which sociologists with leisure to peruse its somewhat involved arguments will find interesting, and which they will probably on the whole approve. The book is organized into five "Parts," of which Parts One, Two, and Three are primarily historical; Part Four deals with "The Societal Isolate and its

Implications;" while Part V, still following Comte, treats of social statics and social dynamics, both at great length. Finally there are two chapters of rather philosophical "Conclusion."

There is an index which seems adequate for proper names, but not for topics. There is a very brief "Bibliographical Note" which seems almost superfluous.

FLOYD N. HOUSE
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Ancient Judaism. By MAX WEBER (Translated and edited by HANS H. GERTH and DON MARTINDALE). Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952. xxvii, 484 pp. $6.00.

Books on the sociology of the Jews are rare. Good books in that field are very rare. Unlike Sombart's "The Jews and Modern Capitalism," which dealt with a limited aspect of Judaism only, namely as one of the allegedly necessary and sufficient conditions for the emergence of modern capitalism, Max Weber aimed at an all-round sociological analysis of Judaism. Gerth and Martindale are to be congratulated for having made available Weber's work in a faithful English translation and prefaced it with a sympathetic essay on his general philosophy.

Weber's writings on ancient Judaism formed volume three of his *Gesammelte Aufsaetze zur Religionssoziologie* published in 1921, shortly after his death. After thirty years they are still as rich and suggestive as when they first saw the light of day. His chief interest was in the emergence of postexilic Judaism, or in his own words: "How did Jewry develop into a pariah people with highly specific peculiarities?"

It was Weber's aim to proceed from an analysis of ancient Judaism to an investigation of Diaspora Judaism. Alas, his sociology of the Jews remained incomplete. As with his attempts on early Christianity and Islamism, death prevented him from rounding off his studies of Judaism with an analysis of the Psalms, the Book of Job and Talmudic Jewry. What we possess are the two essays, "The Israelite Confederacy and Yahwe" and "The Emergence of the Jewish Pariah People," supplemented by a short piece on "The Pharisees," which make up the present volume. To be sure, there are various references to Jewry and Judaism in Weber's other works, especially in *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft,* to permit at least an inkling of his thinking on Diaspora Jewry. They are not, however, an adequate substitute for what is missing in his sociology of the Jews.

To Weber, the postexilic Jews are "sociologically speaking a pariah people." That means, he says, "as we know from India, a guest people separated ritually, formally or *de facto,* from their social surroundings." But he proceeds at once to point out the differences between the Jewish and Indian pariah tribes. As the first significant difference he lists the fact that "Jewry was, or rather became, a pariah people in a *surrounding free of castes."* That alone would suffice to make the use of the term in its technical sense a highly dubious one. More important than the basic qualifications made by Weber himself is Baron's reminder of the religious disparity between the Jews and their Gentile rulers; that in India it was within the same religion that the position of an inferior, unchangeable caste was determined by the dominant religious doctrine and, on the whole, accepted by the pariahs themselves; that Judaism had remained a religion with its own values and counter-values and that it had always regarded the passing of a member to another camp as a serious loss to the person concerned, rather than as a reward. The editors' reply in their preface that "religious differences may sharpen the distinction between guest and host," that they "help to maximize the social distance or mutual strangeness," completely fails to meet Baron's point.

Socially, the Diaspora Jews were limited neither in their occupational choice nor in their class membership, as indeed we find them in all layers of society. Psychologically, there is a great difference between the pariah's acquiescence in and the Jew's rejection of his degradation. Jewish separateness was interpreted in antiquity preponderantly in terms of Jewish pride and arrogance. In short, in its precise scientific meaning, the term "pariah people" is not applicable to the Jews. As Weber uses it, it is at least equivocal. What is unequivocal about it is its connotation of detraction and contempt, a connotation that is not entirely absent from Weber's presentation. (I am, of course, in general agreement with the editors' statement that "Weber was neither an antisemite nor an equally dangerous philosemite," although I cannot quite understand how a *Schrulle* like philosemitism can be compared with antisemitism and considered "equally dangerous," especially after the historical experiences of the last twenty years.)

Weber is at his best when trying to show how the "confessional" elements in prophecy blend with the separatistic ritualism of priesthood in creating the climate for an internationally settled "guest people." "The new religious association," says Weber, "by ritualistic incapsulation, could consider itself as the direct continuation of the old ritualistic folk community precisely because the prophets had offered no means for the formation of a new religious

community, and because, in practice, the substance of the eschatological message consisted solely in sublimation of the traditional religion into ethical absolutism." In this connection Weber speaks of the peculiarly "plebeian" character of the prophetic ethic. These "demagogues," the prophets, advocated the ethic of humility and obedience. If Weber is suggesting that the prophets argued their "social-ethical charity-commandments of the Levite exhortation" primarily for the benefit of "the little people," the suggestion is plausible. He is also right in disputing the notion, frequently made in modern times, that the prophets were champions of democratic social ideals. The prophets were intellectuals. They demanded justice and humanity for the powerless, but their message was primarily religiously motivated. At any rate, they were not democrats in the sense that they demanded the rule of the people, pronounced any sort of religious "natural law," or advocated a right to revolution or self-help of the masses suppressed by the mighty.

It is equally plausible that the prophetic ethic of obedience and humility was peculiarly suited to the position of impotence of postexilic Jewry. There was then little room for an aristocratic ethic of proud self-confidence, trust in one's own abilities and self-renown. The prophetic ethic of humility "fitted" better. However, by subsuming it under the concept of a "plebeian" and "pariah people's" ethic, Weber brings the prophetic ethic into the neighborhood of phenomena with which it has little in common. For "plebeian" in Weber's sense are all those forms of ethics which satisfy the needs of socially oppressed groups or arise as the consequence of social oppression. But does this not apply to quite different sorts of ethics? Weber refers to the figure of the suffering Servant of God as a glorification of the Jewish pariah situation. Granted the type of religiosity represented in that figure was a result of suffering, was not its function to derive religious meaning from that experience? Does not this type of religiosity and ethic differ in nature from the forms invented by oppressed groups to make worse appear the better? Certainly the prophetic ethic is not plebeian in the sense that it extolls the poor per se as the pious, or enforced subservience as virtue, or craftiness and slyness as the legitimate weapons of the powerless. Not even in its glorification of humility does it come as close to that kind of ethic as Weber often appears to suggest.

For all fault-finding, however, Weber's book is superb classic. That is, it is erudite, rich, suggestive, and obliges scholars to ask new questions and provide more exact answers.

Joseph Maier

Rutgers University

Marriage. By Earl Lomon Koos. New York: Henry Holt and Company, Inc., 1953. xii, 441 pp. $4.00.

Koos states that in one sense his book is not a new one in the field, for in it his first objective is to "perpetuate directly" the teachings of Groves in his early text of the same title. The author's second purpose is to supplement the expository teachings of Groves with current research findings which throw so much new light on marriage and family relations. The main interest in the book is marriage, not family relations, which, together with the fact that it frankly does not attempt to treat any one area exhaustively, accounts for its relative brevity.

The content of the book covers the usual topics, their order correctly following the marriage cycle: qualifications for marriage, dating, courtship, engagement, wedding and honeymoon, and adjustments—or lack of them—in marriage (personality, sexual, economic). Each chapter is fairly brief, has a short summary, a reading list, and suggestions for "research projects," which might better have been called "further study," for most of them are not, and for the average undergraduate could not be, of a type that should rightly be called "research." This does not mean that they are not useful; many of them are definitely helpful as individual projects and should stimulate class discussion and understanding. At the end of the book is a full bibliography on each chapter; also an annotated list of recommended films. An unusual feature of the book is the list of suggestions for sociodrama, covering more than half of the chapters. The introduction of a few brief skits, on topics that best lend themselves to such dramatization, may be more effective in lasting impression than either lecture or discussion alone. However, such drama must be very carefully prepared and skilfully presented if it is to avoid being entertainment only.

Another unusual feature of the book is the chapter on "Growing Old in Marriage." This subject is neglected in most texts. The treatment here is brief, but to the point.

Like all texts, this book has both merits and shortcomings, though the former outweigh the latter. In reading it one frequently wishes that it were not so brief—that it would develop certain topics much more fully than it does. The dozen or more cartoons will please some teachers (for they *are* clever) but will impress others as high schoolish. But the book is well written, interesting, and sound. Its analysis embodies the findings of many studies on the topics covered, and thus brings to students, in

compact rather than verbose form, some good thinking on a subject of vital interest to them.

RAY E. BABER

Pomona College

Man and Modern Society. By KARL DE SCHWEINITZ, JR. and KENNETH W. THOMPSON, (With the collaboration of PAUL K. HATT). New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1953. xii, 849 pp. $5.25.

This book of readings and original material was the outgrowth of an integrated social science course at Northwestern University. According to its authors their purposes in writing and compiling it were three fold: (1) to provide a conceptual frame of reference for studying the whole of modern society; (2) to stress the main currents and underlying foundations of modern society; (3) to provide readings for students.

Part I: "The Foundations of Modern Society" provides materials on the permanent foundations of society. These are categorized under historic roots, physical environment, world resources, demographic factors, population and food supply, and the cultural setting. For the sociologist the treatment of historic roots and cultural setting will seem inadequate. Also in Part I are materials on political and economic choice in modern society and on the role of communication. The material on the latter is skimpy, but political and economic materials are plentiful. There is, however, an interesting contrast in these materials. The description of the economic system is an effective synthesis of institutional and analytical economics, whereas the sections on politics present readings in political theory and ideology. Further on in the book there are effective materials on bureaucracy and the fundamentals of parliamentary and presidential systems of government; but except for a few references in a reading by Weber and one other reading on parties and Marxism, political parties, pressure groups, and lobbies are inadequately treated.

Part II on industrial society sprawls into formlessness except for the materials on government already mentioned and two chapters on the growth of industrialism. The rest is a melange of sociological articles, articles on Russia, and articles on backward areas. In Part III on tensions the book comes apart at the seams. There is a completely inadequate treatment of social stratification, despite the use of one fine article by Paul Hatt; and the rest of the book is devoted to a scattergun approach to diplomacy and world peace. The final chapter on ideas, however, does present excellent materials from George F. Kennan on communism, and Reinhold Niebuhr on democracy as a religion.

Thus disaster comes to this general social science book, as perhaps it must to all such texts. The readings—most of them—are excellent; so also is the treatment of economic choice and of the growth of industrialism. But the conceptual scheme is inadequate, the political sections thin, and the rest of the book—not the individual readings—thinner still. Introductory courses in politics, economics, sociology, and anthropology using standard texts can, I believe, offer a deeper and perhaps even a broader knowledge of man and modern society.

WILLIAM L. KOLB

Tulane University

Social Problems and Scientism. By A. H. HOBBS. Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: The Stackpole Co., 1953. xi, 418 pp. $5.00.

The American social science movement is a racket. It has been putting over on an influential portion of the American people, namely college students, under pretense of reading lectures from the *Book of Facts,* all sorts of panaceas which may well become the end of organized society as we know it in these United States. Social scientists have been telling students how to choose a husband or wife, how to behave sexually, how to rear children, how to operate the economic system and run the government, what to do about war and peace. This pretension that the persons narrating the "facts" can remedy the conditions which the "facts" are supposed to demonstrate exist is *scientism.*

The author denies that his book is a "diatribe against science." That is so only in the sense that the scope of the scientific enterprise has been so severely circumscribed that it excludes practically everything labelled social science. The fact is that the book is not a critical appraisal of the social science movement but the expression of a temper that would gladden the heart of a Metternich. Professor Hobbs is a member of the party of reaction and not of progress. His argument stems from a concept of function which affirms that every society or civilization is dominated by a philosophy which prescribes what behavior is decent and right on its own account.

Any examination or questioning of this philosophy leads to an unsettling of the established order and eventually its subversion. That is the point of the stricture that "much if not most" of what is taught as social science is "neither

social nor science." It is not social because the data collected are not chosen from the aspect of a functioning society. There is much in the literature of sociology about marital adjustment and divorce, criminality, minority groups, and what not. But there is little about how people live, excepting for purposes of criticism. "The religion, the ethics, the morals, the patriotism, the economic system, and the family organization which characterize the society are characteristically criticized rather than described" (p. 253).

Professor Hobbs is less clear in his denotation of "science." The statement which follows the affirmation that social science is not science reads that "facts," however classified, remain "facts." The task of defining "science" is given up as an impossibility. As an alternative, the reader is presented with a list of the indispensable elements of scientific procedure. Space is also given to what has come to be called the "limitations of science." But what bothers the good professor is that persons who call themselves scientists demonstrate beliefs, prejudices, and convictions which, taken together, add up to a sense of unlimited human power over nature and the perfectibility of man. Joined to these is an ahistorical, if not actually an anti-historical, bias that flies in the face of the theory of function entertained. The pursuit of science tends to generate an attitude of scepticism toward any alleged correspondence with reality which may be implied in the wisdom and common sense which sanctions the established order, on the one hand, and a revolutionary temper to change things, on the other. The preoccupation of the scientist is *re*search, a debunking of the past. The scientist is also likely to view, given his sense of immense power, change as a mechanical thing, not an historical or organic one. He would scarcely heed the alarm that changes once begun in a social system have a way of ramifying in unsuspected and unwanted directions. To do so might compel him to relinquish his faith in the perfectibility of man by conscious artifice. That could be the end of the scientific enterprise itself.

Aside from the thousand and one *non sequitors* which dot the pages of this book, and the name calling, the unsatisfactory conclusions arrived at stem from an insistence that science is only a way of investigating nature. To the view of the world and man's relationship to it which is entertained by persons who value that way of inquiry is applied the derogatory term *scientism*. This is not to deny that a way of inquiry may become established as a social habit and in that way become detached from the world view which originally made it tenable. That may have already happened among natural scientists. If that is true, then we have in the history of the social sciences not a travesty, but a possible tardy condition of development.

Joseph Schneider
Indiana University

Psychosis and Civilization: Two Studies in the Frequency of Mental Disease. By Herbert Goldhamer and Andrew W. Marshall. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1953. 126 pp. $4.00.

Even before the relatively large proportion of Selective Service registrants who were rejected for neuropsychiatric disorders during World War II and the high percentage of disability discharges from the armed forces for similar reasons first shocked and then alarmed many persons in the United States, there had been considerable discussion as to whether the incidence of mental disorders was or was not increasing due to the stresses and strains of contemporary civilization. As the authors of this study quite correctly point out the assertion that the incidence of mental disorders is increasing has been based in most instances either upon pure speculation unrestrained by quantitative data or upon a superficial inspection of mental hospital statistics without adjustment for changes in definition, changes in age distribution, and similar factors which affect the magnitude of crude admission rates.

The study reviewed here had two objectives: first, to show that there has been no real increase in the incidence of psychoses during the past century, and, second, to advocate the use of a "new" method of expressing the risk of mental illness either during the entire lifetime of an individual or some segment of it.

To accomplish the first objective age-specific first admission rates based on statistics of institutions caring for mentally ill persons in Massachusetts were estimated for the period 1840 to 1885 and then compared with similar rates for Massachusetts and several other areas for various periods ranging from about 1920 to 1940. From these data the authors conclude that first admission rates for psychoses for persons between 20 and 50 years of age were as high around 1880 in Massachusetts as they are today. The increase in the rate for all ages is due to a sharp increase in first admission rates for persons 60 or more years of age who are suffering from mental disorders of the senium. As the authors point out their findings

apply only to the functional psychoses. Insufficient data are available to warrant generalizations concerning the trend in the incidence of less severe mental disorders such as the neuroses and psycho-neuroses. The trend for organic psychoses such as paresis also may have been different.

Anyone who has ever had occasion to examine the statistical reports of mental hospitals must admire the industry, perserverance and ingenuity displayed by the authors in assembling the data necessary for the computation of first admission rates for the period 1840 to 1885. Unfortunately one cannot say as much for the analysis and presentation of the data. The entire discussion has a tone of special pleading and one gets the impression, perhaps unjustly, that only those data have been presented which fit into the authors' desired conclusions. The rate for all ages is excluded from most tables because it shows an increase over the time period studied even after adjustment for changes in age distribution of the population. Although average age-specific first admission rates are presented for five year time periods from 1840–44 to 1880–84, most of the comparisons with present day rates are based upon data for the single year 1885. This is justified on the basis that statistics for 1885 are characteristic for the years 1883–87, but no data are presented to substantiate this claim.

Nor is any satisfactory explanation given as to why rates subsequent to 1885 are omitted. The footnote on page 53 implies that first admission rate continued to increase for several years after 1885. If this is true the authors could have demonstrated a decrease in first admission rates during the first half of the present century in Massachusetts. The usual scientific procedure would have been to present the entire time series of rates so that the full evidence would be available to the reader.

The second part of the study is devoted to a somewhat confused discussion of the merits of a "new" statistical measure of the incidence of mental disease. There is really nothing new in the measure proposed since it has been used for decades, in appropriate circumstances, by persons familiar with morbidity or actuarial techniques. The proposed measure is one minus the product of the probabilities of not being admitted to a mental hospital for the first time at consecutive ages over the entire life span or any part of it. As such it represents the proportion of persons who would be admitted for the first time to a mental hospital while passing from age x to age x + n in a population in which no person dies and which is subject to a fixed set of age-specific first admission rates. This measure may have some value for inhabitants of Elysium but appears to be of limited usefulness for inhabitants of this vale of tears where the grim reaper continuously takes his relentless toll of lives.

The price of the book is exorbitant; the title pretentious. Did civilization in Massachusetts really begin in 1885?

Harold F. Dorn

Bethesda, Maryland

Nationalism and Social Communication: An Inquiry Into the Foundations of Nationality. By Karl W. Deutsch. Boston and New York: The Technology Press and John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1953. x, 292 pp. $5.00.

Political science has traditionally tended to be a descriptive rather than an analytic science, with its excursions into analysis having the character of philosophy or journalism rather than systematic science. One result has been that certain fields which political science originally claimed—like public opinion and voting behavior—have been more developed by sociologists and psychologists than by political scientists. While the nineteen-twenties and thirties saw individual political scientists like Gosnell and Lasswell borrowing theory, data, and methods of research from sister social sciences to study political problems analytically, only during the last few years have most major departments of political science set up regular divisions of "political behavior." That the first results are highly promising may be seen from a perusal of recent journals and from such books as the one here under consideration.

Karl W. Deutsch is a professor of history and political science (at M. I. T.), and his topic is the development of nationalism. That such disciplines operating on such a topic would produce this splendid study is not only a hopeful sign of the above-mentioned trend but also a tribute to the seminal character of sociological theory and research procedures. While the author has sought his concepts and techniques of research in all the social sciences, he has relied most heavily on sociology. A somewhat simplified statement of his theory is that nationalism arises when a group of people having communication among themselves but barriers to communication with other people are thrown into economic or military contact with other people because of industrialization, urbanization, or conquest and become aware of their distinctive cultural characteristics. The theory

takes into account caste and class differentials, demographic changes, division of labor, assimilation, and a number of other sociological variables, but its key concept is communication.

While not claiming to present more than a theoretical framework and a concrete plan for the study of nationalism, the author has begun a systematic collection of relevant sociological and statistical data for the study of nationalism, especially in Finland, Czechoslavakia, India, and Scotland. The data are those on population and wealth distribution, traffic and migration patterns, areas of languages, dialects and cultures, effective market areas, areas of predominance of important social institutions and strata, audiences of the mass media, educational distributions. Surveys of this sort provide "a more detailed and realistic picture of the very uneven world in which politics must function" (p. 44). In discussing these phenomena, the author considers their possible and actual rates of change; his analysis "can thus show the limitations which they pose to what men can do in the future; and, by contrast, it can single out the most promising areas for action" (p. 137).

Admitting that his study has not progressed to the point where he would be justified in making predictions about world conditions, the author nevertheless feels called upon to make some remarks about present conditions. Pointing to the low possibilities for meaningful communication among contemporary peoples, the author states that the world is not yet ready for a super-national government and that if one were to be set up it would shortly either fall apart or else lose contact with the large masses of mankind. While finding that nationalism is still growing, he believes that the forces which have been promoting it—the mass mobilization and industrialization of peasant peoples and modern techniques of communication—will soon turn to weaken it. To hasten the end of nationalism, we should work to reduce the "vast poverty of Asia and Africa" by industrialization and at the same time raise the level of education in these places. This would provide the basis of "genuine integration."

It is difficult to characterize so sophisticated and promising a study as this one in so short a space.

Arnold M. Rose
University of Minnesota

BOOK NOTES

Population Problems (fourth edition). By Warren S. Thompson. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1953. xiii, 488 pp. $6.50.

The series of editions of this well-known text in the field of demography, covering a period of almost a quarter of a century, indicate the growth and the changing emphases of that field. This latest edition, the fourth, represents a considerable reorganization and revision over its predecessor. The order of the chapters has been changed, some materials have been eliminated and others have been added, resulting in a more comprehensive, up-to-date treatment of current population interests.

In this edition Thompson has placed greater emphasis on the theoretical frameworks basic to the presentation of date, e.g., his discussion of the effects of war on population changes; he has improved some of his socio-economic indices, e.g., replacing housing data with income data as a measure of economic status; and has removed the source of an earlier misnomer of indentifying an essentially industrial classification as an occupational one.

The most important and timely revision deals with the recent upsurge in the birth rate of many Western countries. He does not devote as much space as might be desired in interpreting these increases, but he employs considerable caution in dealing with their future trends and effects on estimates of future population.

The addition of a section on metropolitan areas is a welcome one. His eugenic emphases, on the other hand, might be replaced, with profit, with a discussion of a topic of more current interest—the interrelationships of social, economic and demographic trends, for example.—Eleanor H. Bernert.

Culture Change: An Analysis and Bibliography of Anthropological Sources to 1952. By Felix M. Keesing. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1953. ix, 242 pp. $4.00.

This initial volume in the Stanford Anthropological Series consists of a chronological bibliography—year by year since 1865, and alphabetical by author in each year—of about 4200 anthropological and allied references which

focus primarily or in part upon theoretical and methodological problems of cultural change (Part II); and a kind of classificatory sorting-out and present assessment of the major lines of interest which thread through this "fertile disorder of ideas and case materials" down to the present (Part I). The list of titles in Part II, comprising books and articles from more than 250 serials in English, German, French, and some other languages, gives excellent coverage within the limits of the author's specified criteria of selection. But the analytical Part I, while showing a valiant attempt at topical organization of the literature by decades, scarcely rises above the level of an encapsulated history of social anthropology. Its narrative form eats up space at the expense of critical comment: except for an occasional modifier, such as "important," "provocative," or "pioneering," evaluation of specific works is lacking; and the minority of works that are even mentioned are identified only by title. Keesing does offer a suggestive analytical scheme of his own for systematic coverage of the present and future field of cultural dynamics, but its connection with the bibliography is admittedly somewhat tenuous.

If the essential requisite of bibliography is a clear idea of the use to which it will be put, it seems fair to question the appropriateness for students of the behavioral sciences of the chronological form in which this one is cast. Intellectual historians should welcome it, and all students of change will appreciate its programming of "names and numbers of all the players;" but problem-oriented social scientists may find it less helpful than its title would lead them to expect.—STEPHEN W. REED.

Socialdmokratien och Kyrkan: 1881–1890. By BERNDT GUSTAFSSON. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag (Samlingar och Studier till Svenska Kyrkans Historia, No. 30), 1953. xviii, 420 pp. (Summary in English). No price indicated.

This study is concerned with the negative attitudes which socialistic movements customarily have held toward ecclesiastical institutions. Gustafsson has made a thorough analysis of the attitudes held by the Swedish *social democracy* toward the Church of Sweden during the eighties, the first decade of the movement's existence in that country. Through his explanations of these attitudes he has made some very valuable contributions to the sociological elucidation of forms and functions of one of the principal social movements of the present age.

Gustafsson's data have been gathered from several sources, narrative as well as registered. He has analyzed the content of resolutions put forth by social democratic organizations as well as of the press. He has also utilized a number of indices of other recorded behavior toward the church, especially of churchgoing and communion. He has chosen to view the church as a social institution, "a system of comparatively unchanging behaviors and roles that are identical within a group of persons, and are repeated from time to time" (pp. 2, 355). Next, the attitudes toward this institution have been analyzed along three dimensions: political, religious, and class. These dimensions are said to be highly interpedendent. Gustafsson has at some length discussed the problems involved in the process of "inferring attitudes from behavior" (Ch. III), but the entire book might have been considerably easier to understand if more rigorous definitions of the attitudes had been stated at the outset, i.e., if the types of behaviors which the word *attitude* in this study has been taken to represent had been stated more explicitly.

One might, in view of the fact that the study has been published in a series of contributions to the history of the Church of Sweden, have anticipated a certain bias in the presentation. However, such a bias is hard to detect. An approach which in many important respects is operational and highly quantitative has secured close conformity to requirements of modern sociological research.—ØRJAR ØYEN.

Survey of African Marriage and Family Life. Edited and with an Introduction by ARTHUR PHILLIPS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1953. xli, 462 pp. $9.00.

Three English experts on East Africa have joined together in producing this book wherein data on 77 tribes, 68 of them under British control, are compiled for purposes of comparison and synthesis. Although the survey was sponsored by two international bodies, one of them religious, little account is taken of "foreign" anthropological and legal material, and none at all of African contributions to the subject.

Religion, all through the book, remains the major consideration, and the account of divergent church policies, by the missionary member of the team makes fascinating reading, but the sociologist will miss a study of the relation between policies and social realities, both at home and in Africa. Repeatedly, African marriage is examined in a way reminiscent of a Kinsey report, then compared to a Sunday-school picture of European marriage. No wonder if the former suffers from such comparison, and is finally condemned as "potentially polygamous"

(p. xiv), while white men are found so pure that one of the authors smuggles in a footnote that European monogamy "goes back to the earliest known social origins of our race" (p 241). It would be interesting to know the reaction of the Christian body to which such a conclusion was presented.

"A complete survey of all the observations on African marriage," says the only social scientist in the team, "to be found in ethnographic writings would be the work of years. . ." However, this is exactly what sociologists expected from her, and she will disappoint them, except for her truly excellent compilation of material on South Africa, both urban and rural.

—JEAN L. COMHAIRE.

Marriage and The Family (second edition). By RAY E. BABER. New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1953. xi, 719 pp. $6.00.

This volume is similar to the first edition in its organization and framework. The aims of the book, which are to analyze the family for the purpose of understanding it better and to provide practical advice and information for young people contemplating marriage, also have not changed. Most of the chapters are reproductions of original versions except for the addition of recent statistical data and relevant researches on marriage and family behavior. In some instances parts of chapters have been reworked, incorporating these new findings.

The chapter "Early American Life" remains one of the best in the volume. Two others have been eliminated and new ones are "Irregular Sex Expression: Social Costs" and "Some Economic Aspects of Family Life." These additions and the extensive coverage given to women's roles suggest an emphasis by the author upon the practical aspects of marriage and family adjustment and a tendency to minimize a formal sociological analysis of family life.

In the last two decades we have witnessed a tremendous growth of empirical research in the marriage and family fields. Since publication space is limited, good materials must of necessity be omitted in any text attempting to bridge these two areas. Can a combined marriage and family text meet the requirements of a comprehensive course in either the sociology of marriage or the family? While the reviewer has his doubts about this, nevertheless this book is a sound work; empirical materials are ably interwoven into the text, and it is more than adequate to meet the needs of marriage courses. Professor Baber presents to the student in clear language sound information regarding paths to success in marriage and family living.—MARVIN B. SUSSMAN.

Group Psychotherapy: Studies in Methodology of Research and Therapy. By FLORENCE B. POWDERMAKER, JEROME D. FRANK, and Collaborators. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1953. xv, 615 pp. $6.50.

This monograph is the progress report of a U. S. Veterans Administration project, carried out under the auspices of the Washington School of Psychiatry, and devoted to the dual aim of establishing and testing methods of research in both the study and practice of group therapy of the analytically oriented or non-directive interview type. Although the project was divided into two sections, one consisting of groups of neurotic patients and the other of chronic schizophrenics, experiences with the former seem of more general application to the sociology of small groups.

Experimental and statistical methods were rejected as premature and unfruitful in the field of psychotherapy. Instead the techniques of the "running account" as kept by an observer of the group meetings, and the abstraction from these accounts of "situation analyses" in which therapists, clinical psychologists, and social workers collaborated, were used to record and analyze the dynamics of group interaction in its relation to therapy. The situation analyses singled out patterns of change involving individual patients, the group, and the doctor for comparative purposes. An attempt was also made to analyze the material in terms of long-term processes, but this aspect appeared to be slighted.

Among the problems examined were group composition, the effects of the attitude and personality of the doctor on group dynamics, the handling of monopolists, the resolution of tension through rallying topics, and the therapeutic utilization of antagonism and mutual support among group members. Generalizations are necessarily limited by the specifically therapeutic character of the groups and the dominant role played by the therapist. The leadership exerted by the doctor, especially in regard to establishing an atmosphere "conducive to free and honest expression of feeling," is crucial to groups designed to help members achieve "more mature ways of functioning," but the analysis of his problems in conducting such groups may not illumine the formation of group mores in less structured groups in which all members can be participant observers.—HELEN M. HACKER.

Introduction to the Theory of Statistics. By VICTOR GOEDICKE. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953. xii, 286 pp. $5.00.

This beginning text by a mathematician stresses the algebraic derivation of formulas,

thereby seeking to provide the student with knowledge of the limitations and versatility techniques. The derivations are skillfully presented and should be understandable to students who are reasonably familiar with algebraic manipulation. Unfortunately, many teachers of social statistics find they cannot assume even this minimum of mathematical knowledge.

For students of sociology, the major deficiency is an emphasis on the analysis of large samples. This makes the exposition clearer, but social research frequently deals with small samples. For example, Student's *t* distribution is not mentioned, and the normal curve is the basic tool. The teacher of social statistics would necessarily have to add material on the assumptions of various techniques when applied to small samples.—SANFORD M. DORNBUSCH.

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